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Malware1 associated actor

Skuld

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK36Techniques
IOCs241Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionReconnaissanceCrypto theftSpoofing
Platforms
Windows

Skuld is a Golang-based Windows infostealer focused on Discord theft but equipped with broader credential and data-harvesting functionality. First observed in 2023 and later reused in other criminal operations, it has been distributed both as an open-source proof-of-concept and as an operational payload in live malware campaigns, including deployment alongside AsyncRAT and use by HexaLocker V2 prior to ransomware encryption.

Skuld targets Discord tokens, Discord two-factor backup codes, browser-stored credentials, cookies, browsing history, download records, payment-card data, cryptocurrency wallets and wallet extensions, gaming-session data, saved Wi-Fi information, screenshots, host profiling data, and files from predefined sensitive locations. Reported variants also include Discord injection features that intercept authentication and account-change workflows, mechanisms to bypass protections such as BetterDiscord and Discord Token Protector, and wallet-focused theft including mnemonic phrases and passwords from selected wallets. Some builds include clipboard hijacking for cryptocurrency theft.

The malware incorporates multiple anti-analysis and defense-evasion features, including anti-debugging, anti-VM checks, fake error dialogs, process-based security-tool interference, and attempts to disable or weaken Windows Defender. It has also been described as using a UAC-bypass technique via fodhelper.exe to gain elevated access and steal data across user contexts. Persistence at system startup is supported in some versions.

Skuld is best classified as an infostealer. It has been associated with an actor using the alias Deathined, and code and behavioral overlaps have been noted with other open-source stealers and grabbers such as Creal Stealer, Luna Grabber, and BlackCap Grabber. Its availability as source code and modular theft capabilities have made it attractive for reuse by other threat actors targeting Windows users, especially Discord users and victims with browser-stored credentials or cryptocurrency assets.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Deathined

In May 2023, the Trellix Advanced Research Center discovered a new Golang stealer, known as Skuld, that compromised systems worldwide.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

36 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The first thing it tries is injecting some JavaScript code into the "discord_desktop_core" module.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Appendix B - MITRE ATT&CK Tactical Goal ATT&CK Technique (Technique ID) Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

startup: Ensures the program runs at system startup.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

startup: Ensures the program runs at system startup.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

The malware operates on Windows systems and use fodhelper.exe technique for privileges elevation.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

startup: Ensures the program runs at system startup.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

startup: Ensures the program runs at system startup.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

The malware operates on Windows systems and use fodhelper.exe technique for privileges elevation.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence2

The malware operates on Windows systems and use fodhelper.exe technique for privileges elevation.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

fakerror: Trick user into believing the program closed due to an error.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

antivm: Detects and exits when running in virtual machines (VMs).

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence3

antidebug: Terminates debugging tools.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence3

antivirus: Disables Windows Defender and blocks access to antivirus websites.

Credential Access

8 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

discordinjection: Intercepts login, register, and 2FA login requests. Captures backup codes requests. Monitors email/password change requests. Intercepts credit card/PayPal addition requests.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

discordinjection: Intercepts login, register, and 2FA login requests. Captures backup codes requests. Monitors email/password change requests. Intercepts credit card/PayPal addition requests.

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence1

After injecting the code, Skuld tries to steal the Discord backup codes, which are an alternative to the two-factor authentication code of the user.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

tokens: Extracts tokens from 4 Discord applications, Chromium-based browsers, and Gecko browsers.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

browsers: Steals logins, cookies, credit cards, history, and download lists from 37 Chromium-based browsers.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

browsers: Steals logins, cookies, credit cards, history, and download lists from 37 Chromium-based browsers. Steals logins, cookies, history, and download lists from 10 Gecko browsers.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

browsers: Steals logins, cookies, credit cards, history, and download lists from 37 Chromium-based browsers. Steals logins, cookies, history, and download lists from 10 Gecko browsers.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

discodes: Captures Discord Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) backup codes.

Discovery

9 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The third technique checks different registry keys associated with video and disk information of the system... C:\> Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path 'HKLM:SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion' -Name ProductName

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Figure 13 Public IP and MAC address discovery.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Figure 11 Hostname and username discovery.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The third and final block of checks performed by Skuld is getting the running processes of the system and comparing them to a blocklist.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

system: Gathers CPU, GPU, RAM, IP, location, saved Wi-Fi networks, and more.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The sample includes a file stealer module that targets files stored in a predefined list of paths, which is set up in the initialization part.

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The next target of the Skuld stealer malware is the information stored by Chromium and Gecko-based browsers.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

antivm: Detects and exits when running in virtual machines (VMs).

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence3

antidebug: Terminates debugging tools.

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

commonfiles: Steals sensitive files from common locations.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

discordinjection: Intercepts login, register, and 2FA login requests. Captures backup codes requests. Monitors email/password change requests. Intercepts credit card/PayPal addition requests.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

discordinjection: Intercepts login, register, and 2FA login requests. Captures backup codes requests. Monitors email/password change requests. Intercepts credit card/PayPal addition requests.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

From the system, the Skuld stealer takes a screenshot

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence3

clipper: Replaces the user's clipboard content with a specified crypto address when copying another address.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Once the information has been obtained, it is archived and compressed in a file called "browsers.zip"... The stealer will exfiltrate the files stored in those paths as a compressed ZIP archive

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

To send a file, first, the sample makes an HTTP GET request to the URL "https://api.gofile[.]io/getServer"... and a POST one in this case: "https://[server_name].gofile[.]io/uploadFile".

T1102.003One-Way CommunicationEvidence1

Skuld uses Discord webhooks to upload the information to a chat controlled by the attacker.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Appendix B - MITRE ATT&CK Tactical Goal ATT&CK Technique (Technique ID) ... T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

Once a module has completed execution, Skuld sends the stolen information to the attacker using two methods

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Once a module has completed execution, Skuld sends the stolen information to the attacker using two methods: a Discord webhook or Gofile upload service.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

if any process is matched with the blocklist, the application will kill the matched process instead of self-terminating.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

241 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching241Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping36Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.