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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

Hades

Hades is a malware name used in the provided content primarily for a ransomware family associated with Evil Corp, also tracked as INDRIK SPIDER / GOLD DRAKE, and in some reporting linked to UNC2165 deployments. Multiple sources in the content state that Evil Corp adopted or developed Hades after U.S. Treasury OFAC sanctions, superseding or replacing WastedLocker in order to hinder attribution and circumvent sanctions-related payment restrictions. The content also notes Phoenix/Phoenix Locker as a variant or spinoff of Hades in some reporting.

For ransomware operations, the content states Hades was deployed in targeted intrusions, including attacks where UNC2165 used the FakeUpdate/SocGholish infection chain for access and in some cases stolen credentials as the initial access vector. During Hades attacks, GOLD DRAKE reportedly made extensive use of Cobalt Strike and post-exploitation tooling including Mimikatz, Advanced Port Scanner, PsExec, Metasploit, MSBuild, batch scripts to stop services and clear event logs, RDP, reverse SOCKS proxies, and MEGASync for data exfiltration. The content also states Hades was used in multiple attacks, including one against Forward Air.

The provided content also includes a distinct 2026 report describing a newly identified malware variant named Hades attributed to the Mini Shai-Hulud / Miasma lineage in a PyPI supply-chain campaign. In that reporting, Hades abuses Python .pth startup hooks so code executes when the Python interpreter initializes, even if the package is never imported. The loader installs the Bun JavaScript runtime and executes an obfuscated _index.js payload. Reported capabilities include theft of AWS credentials, GCP service account keys and project IDs, Azure Key Vault data, Kubernetes service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault access codes, CircleCI secrets, Docker config.json, GitHub tokens, GitLab keys, SSH private keys, package-manager credentials (.npmrc, .pypirc, RubyGems, JFrog), Anthropic API tokens, Claude/MCP configurations, .env files, shell histories, and localized crypto wallets. That variant reportedly exfiltrates data to attacker-created GitHub repositories via authenticated API calls such as POST /user/repos, stores encrypted results in paths like results/results-<timestamp>-<counter>.json, generates decoy HTTPS traffic to api.anthropic.com/v1/api, and establishes persistence via gh-token-monitor files, systemd user services on Linux, and LaunchAgents on macOS. Additional reported identifiers include the repository description "Hades - The End for the Damned," the commit flag string "IfYouYankThisTokenItWillNukeTheComputerOfTheOwnerFully," and a GitHub Actions fallback using artifact name format-results and workflow name Run Copilot.

The content also contains references to a separate threat actor called Hades in APT reporting, including claims of exploitation of Exim CVE-2019-10149 and possible links to Sofacy-related activity. Because the supplied material uses the same name for multiple distinct malware/threat contexts, attribution should be handled carefully. High-confidence associations directly supported by the content are that Hades is widely recognized as an Evil Corp-linked ransomware family used after WastedLocker, and that the name was also applied in separate reporting to a PyPI-delivered credential-stealing supply-chain malware variant.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Indrik Spider

Phoenix has ties to Hades ransomware, which are both run by Evil Corp., said Liska. Hades was developed by the ransomware gang to avoid the Treasury’s sanctions.

via cybersecurity divecybersecuritydive.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

A sophisticated cross-runtime supply chain attack has breached the Python Package Index (PyPI), distributing 37 malicious wheel artifacts across 19 packages.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence Mechanisms: To guarantee access after reboot, it dynamically configures daemon jobs, systemd units, and launch agents

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Although the initial delivery platform is Python, the core payload of the Hades malware is written in JavaScript. To bridge this runtime gap without assuming Node.js or Python dependencies exist, the loader downloads and installs a static binary of the Bun runtime.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence Mechanisms: To guarantee access after reboot, it dynamically configures daemon jobs, systemd units, and launch agents

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Persistence Mechanisms: To guarantee access after reboot, it dynamically configures daemon jobs, systemd units, and launch agents

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

By abusing legitimate Python .pth (path configuration) files as startup execution hooks, the malware runs immediately upon interpreter startup, even before the target package is explicitly imported.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence Mechanisms: To guarantee access after reboot, it dynamically configures daemon jobs, systemd units, and launch agents

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Persistence Mechanisms: To guarantee access after reboot, it dynamically configures daemon jobs, systemd units, and launch agents

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

By abusing legitimate Python .pth (path configuration) files as startup execution hooks, the malware runs immediately upon interpreter startup, even before the target package is explicitly imported.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Once Bun is executed, the highly obfuscated _index.js file runs. This file uses multiple nested layers of packaging to prevent static inspection and heuristic detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The malware generates direct outbound HTTPS packets to api.anthropic.com/v1/api on port 443. While this is Anthropic’s legitimate API endpoint, the path /v1/api is dead, returning a standard 404 error. This outbound traffic acts as network-log pollution.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Evasion Controls: It queries the environment to confirm if Russian locales are configured. It also probes for StepSecurity/harden-runner integration and actively skips pre-identified developer decoy tokens to avoid trigger-happy security canaries.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

It searches specifically for: Cloud Providers: AWS credentials... Google Cloud Platform (GCP service account keys)... Microsoft Azure key vaults... Local Developer Configuration Files: .env config variables, shell histories...

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Upon full memory execution, the Hades agent systematically crawls local profiles, process environments, CI runners, and system configurations. It searches specifically for: Cloud Providers: AWS credentials... GitHub access tokens... SSH private keys... Package Managers: Configuration tokens for npm (.npmrc), PyPI (.pypirc), RubyGems, and JFrog Artifactory.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Evasion Controls: It queries the environment to confirm if Russian locales are configured. It also probes for StepSecurity/harden-runner integration and actively skips pre-identified developer decoy tokens to avoid trigger-happy security canaries.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

the loader downloads and installs a static binary of the Bun runtime

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The harvested data is packaged, compressed, encrypted, and exfiltrated back to GitHub. The agent makes authenticated API calls ( POST /user/repos ) using stolen developer tokens to create temporary public repositories.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence4

Insurance company CNA Financial reportedly paid its attackers $40 million following a ransomware attack disclosed in March.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping13

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.