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TeamPCP is a financially motivated cybercrime group active since at least November 2025, also known as DeadCatx3, PCPcat, PersyPCP, ShellForce, UNC6780, and Storm_2999. It compromises cloud-native infrastructure, open-source software, developer accounts, and CI/CD systems to steal credentials and data, propagate malicious software, and enable follow-on intrusions and extortion. Its targeting is predominantly opportunistic and international rather than confined to a particular industry. Its early cloud campaigns automated scanning and exploitation of exposed or misconfigured Docker APIs, Kubernetes clusters, Ray dashboards, and Redis servers, as well as React/Next.js applications vulnerable to React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182). Shell and Python tooling harvests credentials, enumerates Kubernetes resources, spreads between accessible pods, and establishes persistence through privileged pods and host filesystem access. Compromised infrastructure also supports cryptocurrency mining and proxy operations. During 2026, TeamPCP conducted cascading software supply-chain compromises involving Trivy, Checkmarx KICS, LiteLLM, Telnyx, and TanStack. Stolen source-control and package-publishing credentials enabled malicious releases and modifications to trusted GitHub Actions tags. Downstream payloads harvested cloud keys, SSH keys, Kubernetes secrets, package-publishing tokens, AI-provider credentials, and CI/CD environment variables. The LiteLLM malware executed through Python startup mechanisms, encrypted stolen material before exfiltration, installed persistent backdoors, and attempted propagation to Kubernetes nodes. Associated malware includes CanisterWorm, SANDCLOCK, Mini Shai-Hulud, and Miasma. TeamPCP distributed self-propagating supply-chain malware, although attribution of the original 2025 Shai-Hulud campaigns to the group remains unestablished. TeamPCP monetizes stolen credentials and data through subsequent compromises and criminal partnerships, including cooperation with ShinyHunters and the Vect ransomware operation. In August 2026, Australian authorities arrested and charged two Western Australian men as alleged principal participants. Those allegations remain unproven and do not establish individual responsibility for specific compromises.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
58 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
23 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
18 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
The chain that reached the widest set of victims ran through Trivy into LiteLLM... The ecosystem flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-33634 and was added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 26 March 2026.
The threat actor gains entry by exploiting exposed Docker APIs, Kubernetes APIs, Ray dashboards, Redis servers, and the React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) vulnerability in React/Next.js applications. The script “react.py” is specifically used to exploit the React2Shell vulnerability at scale.
The tracking identifier is CVE-2026-45321 (CVSS 9.6 per The Hacker News; advisory GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx per Snyk).
During February, masscan[.]cloud again resolved to 44.252.85.168 and 67.217.57.240. During this period, the group expanded its exploitation to include CVE-2025-29927 and CVE-2025-55182, targeting a broad range of internet-facing technologies including AWS, Anyscale’s Ray, Docker, Kubernetes, Linux, Meta React, Microsoft Azure, Redis, and Vercel Next.js.
The four CVEs associated with this campaign are CVE-2026-33634, CVE-2026-48027, CVE-2026-45321, and CVE-2025-55182.
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
613 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
TeamPCP is mentioned as background for a separate March 2026 supply-chain attack involving malicious LiteLLM versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 published to PyPI. The content does not connect the group to exploitation of the newly disclosed vulnerabilities.
Identified as the group behind Shai-Hulud's origins, with members reportedly arrested in August. The article does not attribute the tensorlake compromise to TeamPCP; it suggests an independent actor or copycat may be reusing the malware and name.
A cybercriminal group cited as an example of AI-related supply-chain risk. The article describes TeamPCP targeting LiteLLM package versions used to build AI-powered applications, resulting in widespread credential theft.
A supply-chain-focused criminal group that compromises software publishers and CI/CD infrastructure, steals credentials, distributes malicious package updates and self-propagating worms, conducts data theft and extortion, and uses stolen access to enable follow-on attacks. The group published an open-source Mini Shai-Hulud variant and reportedly partnered with other extortion and ransomware groups.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.