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Malware1 associated CVE

DripDropper

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

DripDropper is a Linux malware family identified by Red Canary and described as a previously unknown downloader/backdoor used in intrusions against cloud-hosted Linux systems. It has been observed after exploitation of Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604, a remote code execution vulnerability, to gain persistent access on vulnerable servers. The malware was deployed by unknown threat actors in campaigns targeting cloud Linux environments running ActiveMQ.

DripDropper is described as an encrypted, password-protected PyInstaller ELF executable that communicates with an attacker-controlled Dropbox account using a hardcoded bearer token. It commonly drops two additional malicious files. One dropped file may perform process monitoring or retrieve follow-up instructions from Dropbox, with its name and location determined by execution arguments. Persistence for this component was established by modifying 0anacron files across /etc/cron.* directories. The second dropped file uses a randomly generated eight-character alphabetical filename, also contacts Dropbox for commands, modifies SSH-related configuration files, and changes the default login shell for the games user account to /bin/sh, likely to support persistent shell-based access.

Associated post-exploitation activity in the same intrusion cluster included use of Sliver and Cloudflare Tunnels for command and control, and modification of sshd configuration to enable root login over SSH. A notable behavior linked to these intrusions is that the operators downloaded legitimate patched ActiveMQ JARs from repo1[.]maven[.]org / Apache Maven and replaced vulnerable JAR files, effectively patching CVE-2023-46604 on already-compromised hosts. Red Canary assessed this was done to prevent competing attackers from exploiting the same flaw and to reduce detection by vulnerability scanners. High-confidence indicators and behaviors mentioned in the content include Dropbox-based communications via a hardcoded token, creation of two secondary files, cron/0anacron persistence, SSH configuration changes, root SSH enablement, and modification of the games account shell to /bin/sh.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2023-46604via red canary blogApache ActiveMQ OpenWire Deserialization Remote Code ExecutionUnder a new session started by sshd, the adversary downloaded and executed a previously unknown downloader that we have named “DripDropper.”View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

Red Canary has detected an attacker exploiting Apache ActiveMQ ... security hole CVE-2023-46604, to gain persistent access on cloud Linux systems.

Execution

1 technique
T1053.003CronEvidence2

DripDropper will establish persistent execution for the dropped file by modifying the 0anacron file observed in each /etc/cron.*/ directory.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence2

DripDropper will establish persistent execution for the dropped file by modifying the 0anacron file observed in each /etc/cron.*/ directory.

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

The second is an eight-character random file, also connecting to Dropbox and tweaking SSH settings to enable further covert access through the 'games' user account.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

These are then used to alter Secure Shell SSH configuration files to permit root logins...

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.003CronEvidence2

DripDropper will establish persistent execution for the dropped file by modifying the 0anacron file observed in each /etc/cron.*/ directory.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Under these new settings, the attacker finally drops and executes DripDropper. This is an encrypted PyInstaller ELF binary requiring a password to run. This approach makes reverse engineering difficult.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The first, whose name and location change based on execution arguments... The second is an eight-character random file...

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Where DripDropper changes the game is that, once it's in, it patches the security hole behind it.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

These are then used to alter Secure Shell SSH configuration files to permit root logins...

Credential Access

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

These are then used to alter Secure Shell SSH configuration files to permit root logins...

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Needless to say, once in, DripDropper deploys Command and Control (C2) frameworks such as Sliver and Cloudflare Tunnels for long-term control.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

It communicates with an adversary-controlled Dropbox account using a hardcoded bearer token.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

DripDropper itself communicates with a Dropbox account via a hardcoded bearer token to begin its next step.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Under a new session started by sshd, the adversary downloaded and executed a previously unknown downloader that we have named “DripDropper.”

Mallory platform

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.