Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor9 associated CVEs

Ramnit

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 19 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns9Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK49Techniques
IOCs203Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPrivilege escalationDefense evasion
Delivery
MalvertisingExploit kitDrive byMalspam
Platforms
Windows

Ramnit is a Windows banking trojan and file-infecting malware family first observed in 2010. It initially operated as a self-propagating worm and subsequently incorporated leaked Zeus code, developing capabilities for financial credential theft and online banking fraud. Ramnit infects executable files and HTML documents; infected HTML documents can contain malicious VBScript that drops and executes a worm component.

Ramnit uses web injects to alter browser-displayed pages and steal sensitive information, including credit card data. Its modular capabilities include screenshot capture, file execution, browser-cookie theft, FTP credential harvesting, browser communication hooks, and interference with antivirus software. Stolen cookies and other information can be uploaded to command-and-control infrastructure. Some variants incorporate Windows local privilege-escalation exploits for CVE-2013-3660 and CVE-2014-4113, enabling execution with SYSTEM privileges. Ramnit also delivers additional malware, including Ngioweb, AZORult, and ransomware payloads.

Distribution has included malvertising, exploit-kit-driven drive-by downloads, and delivery by downloaders such as Sload and SnatchLoader. The Seamless campaign distributed geographically tailored Ramnit payloads through the RIG exploit kit, while AdGholas campaigns delivered Ramnit through Stegano/Astrum. Retrieved modules and web-inject configurations can vary by victim location, with localized financial targets documented in Japan and the United States.

Ramnit uses a domain generation algorithm to locate command-and-control servers. Analyzed variants communicate through a custom protocol with RC4-encrypted data rather than HTTPS, even when using a port commonly associated with HTTPS. Its operations continued after a major infrastructure takedown in 2015. Legacy infections have also persisted in isolated industrial Windows environments, distinct from its principal financial-theft activity.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

9 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2014-4113via checkpoint research blogExploited in the wildWin32k.sys Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityOur Ramnit sample exploits both CVE-2013-3660 (by PlayBit) and CVE-2014-4113 (using the same exploit code originally found as a 0-Day). | CVE-2013-3660 ... Used by the following malware families: Dyre, Ramnit.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2013-3660via checkpoint research blogWin32k Read AV VulnerabilityCVE-2013-3660 Classification: 1-Day Basic Description: Uninitialized kernel pointer in EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec Used by the following malware families: Dyre, Ramnit | CVE-2013-3660 ... Used by the following malware families: Dyre, Ramnit.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-27065via microsoft generalExploited in the wildMicrosoft Exchange Server Post-Authentication Arbitrary File Write in ProxyLogonAppendix Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detection details Antivirus Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects exploitation behavior with these detections: ... Exploit:ASP/CVE-2021-27065 ... Defending against exploits and post-compromise activities Attackers exploit the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities in combination to bypass authentication and gain the ability to write files and run malicious code.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-15982via ntt security japanExploited in the wildAdobe Flash Player Use-After-Free Remote Code ExecutionSpelevo Exploit Kitは2つの脆弱性(CVE-2018-8174とCVE-2018-15982)を悪用することが報告されていますが、PseudoGateによる攻撃ではCVE-2018-15982のみが観測されています。CVE-2018-15982はAdobe Flash PlayerのRCEの脆弱性です。View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-26855via microsoft generalExploited in the wildProxyLogon SSRF in Microsoft Exchange ServerIn one notable example, the Lemon Duck operators compromised a system that already had xx.bat and a web shell. After establishing persistence on the system in a non-web shell method, the Lemon Duck operators were observed cleaning up other attackers’ presence on the system and mitigating the CVE-2021-26855 (SSRF) vulnerability using a legitimate cleanup script that they hosted on their own malicious server.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-4117via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildRemote code execution in Adobe Flash PlayerThe landing page loads a Flash file that is able to exploit three different vulnerabilities (CVE-2015-8651, CVE-2016-1019, CVE-2016-4117), depending on the version of Flash found on the victim's system.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-0162via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildInternet Explorer File-Existence Information DisclosureUsing the known Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2016-0162, the encoded script attempts to verify that it is not being run in a monitored environment such as a malware analyst’s machine.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-1019via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildRemote code execution and denial of service in Adobe Flash PlayerThe landing page loads a Flash file that is able to exploit three different vulnerabilities (CVE-2015-8651, CVE-2016-1019, CVE-2016-4117), depending on the version of Flash found on the victim's system.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-8651via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildInteger overflow leading to code execution in Adobe Flash Player and AIRThe landing page loads a Flash file that is able to exploit three different vulnerabilities (CVE-2015-8651, CVE-2016-1019, CVE-2016-4117), depending on the version of Flash found on the victim's system.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
TA554

sLoad is a PowerShell downloader that most frequently delivers Ramnit banker... Line 13: sLoad downloading Ramnit, after receiving a command to do so.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

49 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1584.005BotnetEvidence1

Once installed onto a client machine, banking trojans use a variety of techniques to create botnets, steal credentials, inject malicious code into browsers, or steal money.

T1585Establish AccountsEvidence1

It generates spam that it sends out on port 25,Hendrik already described this behavior in his post.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence3

First Seamless campaign which is a Drive-by Download attack campaign uses Ramnit banking trojan.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

The user reads the landing page of the RIG Exploit Kit at Gate, which attacks and sends Ramnit.

T1566PhishingEvidence6

Conclusion This post has been an overview of a downloader malware known as SnatchLoader... It is being delivered via spam campaigns

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The email includes a .rar file attachment that, when downloaded and unzipped, reveals a .pdf.lnk file disguised as a legitimate PDF document.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The emails are crafted in the targeted country’s language and are often personalized to include recipients’ names and addresses in various parts of the email such as email body and subject. TA554 frequently uses package delivery or order notification lures; the emails contain URLs linking to zipped LNK files or zipped documents.

Execution

9 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

Attackers can use WMI (MITRE Technique T1047) to interact with local and remote systems and use them to perform many offensive tactics.

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence Using Scheduled Task: MITRE Technique T1053. The malicious PowerShell script creates a scheduled task (AppRunLog).

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

this post by Nocturnus Research Team, which details how the banking trojan Ramnit utilizes COM API to create scheduled tasks, in an attempt to remain persistent

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

The original exploit for CVE-2014-4113 was part of an exploit framework in which the API passes a command-line argument, and that command is executed as SYSTEM. As that wasn’t the original API for PlayBit’s exploit, some adjustments were made and PlayBit’s exploits were re-adjusted to receive a command-line argument to be executed once elevated.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The attackers used a combination of built-in Windows products including PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and certutil to avoid detection.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

その後、復号したマルウェアを%TEMP%\Low以下に保存し、wmicコマンドを使用して実行します。

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

BITSAdmin Abuse: MITRE Technique T1197. The malicious PowerShell script uses BITSAdmin to download sLoad from bureaucratica[.]org/bureaux/tica.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

It starts with the usual large letter message "Please wait page is loading" -then Java exploit launches and compromise takes place if the machine is vulnerable.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

つまり攻撃者がマルウェアをユーザーのPCに感染させ、そのマルウェアを利用してそのユーザーのPCに新しいデスクトップを作成し、そのデスクトップの上で悪事を働いても、その間ユーザーに気づく術はありません。

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence Using Scheduled Task: MITRE Technique T1053. The malicious PowerShell script creates a scheduled task (AppRunLog).

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

this post by Nocturnus Research Team, which details how the banking trojan Ramnit utilizes COM API to create scheduled tasks, in an attempt to remain persistent

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

AvTrust Antivirus Trusted Module v2.0 (AVG, Avast, Nod32, Norton, Bitdefender) Add to antivirus software exception list

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

BITSAdmin Abuse: MITRE Technique T1197. The malicious PowerShell script uses BITSAdmin to download sLoad from bureaucratica[.]org/bureaux/tica.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Adds a Windows service Mi cor soft Windows Service - note the spelling

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ vcryserj.exe - copy of the original

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence Using Scheduled Task: MITRE Technique T1053. The malicious PowerShell script creates a scheduled task (AppRunLog).

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

this post by Nocturnus Research Team, which details how the banking trojan Ramnit utilizes COM API to create scheduled tasks, in an attempt to remain persistent

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Loader introduced with remote library injection ... Masquerades Bumblebee’s main DLL as a legitimate DLL

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

All of the exploits that we found related to this actor were 1-Day exploits for Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities in Windows.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Adds a Windows service Mi cor soft Windows Service - note the spelling

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ vcryserj.exe - copy of the original

Stealth

10 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

\Local Settings\Temp\ dnsgvbny.sys the rootkit

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Powershell Obfuscation: MITRE Technique T1027. The ZIP file uses the .lnk that links to a PowerShell with a malicious obfuscated encoded command.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The second argument of “getexec” command is used to specify the file name for the downloaded executable... “msiexic.exe”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Loader introduced with remote library injection ... Masquerades Bumblebee’s main DLL as a legitimate DLL

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The encoded payloads were decoded into a malicious executable using certutil.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

BITSAdmin Abuse: MITRE Technique T1197. The malicious PowerShell script uses BITSAdmin to download sLoad from bureaucratica[.]org/bureaux/tica.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The payload is then decrypted and launched via regsvr32.exe or rundll32.exe.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

PlayBit supplies the customer with a thin wrapper around the exploit, which checks whether the target computer is indeed vulnerable. Although the check varies a bit between different exploits and versions, the basics are the same: the modification date of the vulnerable win32k driver is checked, to detect if a patch was installed.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

この仕組みを利用してユーザーには見ることのできない隠されたデスクトップを作成し悪用する脅威が存在します。

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

After establishing its persistence using scheduled tasks, the Ramnit banking Trojan executes its reflective code injection.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

AvTrust Antivirus Trusted Module v2.0 (AVG, Avast, Nod32, Norton, Bitdefender) Add to antivirus software exception list

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Looking at this DLL with IDA, you can see that it is a program that interferes with Anti-Virus software.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Dubbed ‘Karius’, the Trojan aims to carry out web injects to add additional fields into a bank’s legitimate login page and send the inputted information to the attacker.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

This file seems to be zip. Looking inside it was IE's cookies. There was a DLL module that zipped the cookie, so it might be related.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

“Data-Stealing Threats… focus on stored credentials, cryptocurrencies, browser sessions/cookies, browser passwords…”

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Ramnit and Hupigon are both long-standing trojans that can facilitate data theft and the delivery of additional malware. Either could have been involved in the theft of credentials attackers later reused to access the housing authority’s system

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

After obtaining information about the victim’s network, the payload collects additional information about the local operating system and processor.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

malicious svchost.exe modifies or tries to modify every binary and HTML file by appending malicious code to each file or a vbs script to HTML files

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

PlayBit supplies the customer with a thin wrapper around the exploit, which checks whether the target computer is indeed vulnerable. Although the check varies a bit between different exploits and versions, the basics are the same: the modification date of the vulnerable win32k driver is checked, to detect if a patch was installed.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.005VNCEvidence1

オンラインバンキングマルウェア等が利用するHiddenVNC(hVNC)を通して攻撃者がユーザーの隠しデスクトップ上で様々なウインドウを開いていても、元のデスクトップ側から(ツールなどを利用して)それらを列挙することは基本的にできません。

Collection

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Dubbed ‘Karius’, the Trojan aims to carry out web injects to add additional fields into a bank’s legitimate login page and send the inputted information to the attacker.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

The main method sLoad uses to collect information is via screen capturing. It continues to capture the screen throughout its entire execution.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

Finally, look at 139_13.bin. This is the config of the injecting code for the web page.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Cookie Grabber v0.2 (no mask) Compress and send cookies of browsers (firefox, chorome, opera, IE) to zip.

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Two malicious files communicate with it... It and a single housing authority IP address exchanged data 5,904 times between November 2 and December 30.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Ramnit uses the original protocol when communicating with C2. Following this protocol, I try to extract the configs and modules from the traffic of Ramnit and C2. This protocol uses port 443. But, not https.

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

Upon infection, the sample starts to make DNS queries for many different domains in rapid succession.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

It is used mainly to turn the victim’s machine into malicious proxy servers... Ngioweb represents a multifunctional proxy server... The malware can operate in two main modes: Regular back-connect proxy Relay proxy.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence12

The main functionality of SnatchLoader is to download and load additional malware families so most of the command types and arguments are in support of doing that in various ways

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

Upon infection, the sample starts to make DNS queries for many different domains in rapid succession.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence4

README.md ... Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) of Malware reimplemented in Python.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

This data is encoded with RC4. So I decode it.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

UPLOAD_COOKIES

Indicators of compromise

Observables

203 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

51 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
trojan killer newsNews · Oct 30, 2026Virus:VBS/Ramnit.B on an Old Drive: What to CheckRamnit infects files, including HTML documents and executable programs. The cited historical analysis describes malicious script appended to HTML documents by Virus:Win32/Ramnit.B that drops and runs Worm:Win32/Ramnit.A, including a copy at %TEMP%\svchost.exe. The related Virus:Win32/Ramnit.gen!B variant can leave infected executables permanently altered even after malware removal, requiring restoration from backup. A detection on an old drive alone does not establish execution on the current computer, account compromise, or theft of personal files.Read more ↗sh3llc0d3 blogNews · Oct 20, 2026Legacy Commodity Malware in Industrial Control S | ShellcodeIdentified as one of the legacy self-propagating malware families found in isolated industrial environments. The content treats Ramnit as part of the operational dilemma of containing persistent infections without causing plant outages through aggressive IT remediation. It provides no Ramnit-specific technical behavior, exploitation details, or attribution.Read more ↗arbor networksNews · Aug 14, 2026SnatchLoader Reloaded | NETSCOUTAn information-stealing and banking malware family delivered by SnatchLoader in the observed campaign.Read more ↗securityscorecard researchNews · Apr 22, 2026Ransomware Attack Against U.S. Public Housing Authority Linked to Previous Attacks - SecurityScorecardLong-standing trojan associated here with credential theft, delivery of additional malware, and in some cases ransomware as a second-stage payload.Read more ↗
+45 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching203Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities9CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping49Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.