Loading malware…
Embargo is a Rust-based ransomware family used by a ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in 2024. It targets Windows environments and supports double-extortion attacks in which affiliates steal data before encrypting files and threaten disclosure to pressure victims into paying. Affected sectors include technology, healthcare, and manufacturing, with substantial targeting of organizations in the United States.
Embargo encrypts files using ChaCha20 and Curve25519 cryptography, appends randomized six-character hexadecimal extensions, and leaves ransom notes. It discovers files across local volumes, mounted drives, and network shares. Its recovery-inhibition behavior includes emptying the Recycle Bin and disabling Windows recovery.
The associated Rust-based toolchain includes the MDeployer loader and MS4Killer security-tool termination utility. MDeployer decrypts and deploys the ransomware and MS4Killer, establishes persistence through scheduled tasks or a Windows service, and can orchestrate execution after rebooting into Safe Mode. MS4Killer uses a vulnerable driver in bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver attacks to terminate security processes. The toolchain also tampers with Microsoft Defender protections, enumerates processes and services, and removes deployment artifacts.
Storm-0501 is a documented Embargo affiliate, rather than an alternative name for the malware. Affiliate intrusions have involved exploitation of known vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications, compromised privileged accounts, Active Directory reconnaissance, and lateral movement through Windows remote-management mechanisms. Embargo has been deployed through Group Policy and scheduled tasks. Associated data theft uses Rclone to transfer files to MEGA cloud storage; this exfiltration is part of the intrusion workflow rather than an intrinsic capability of the ransomware encryptor.
4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The article describes STORM-0501 using compromised Domain Admin accounts to distribute Embargo through GPOs, creating a scheduled task named “SysUpdate” to execute it on devices.
Hastalamuerte was an experienced affiliate who had previously worked with Embargo, LockBit, and Medusa before joining Qilin.
28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
75% вторжений в 2024 году задействовали действительные учётные данные (T1078, Valid Accounts
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
Ransomware is distributed through a GPO scheduled task named SysUpdate; schtasks creates the task to run pay.exe as SYSTEM.
APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution. Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads. During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used Windows batch files for persistence and execution.
Embargo has leveraged Windows Native API functions to execute its operations.
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
Ransomware is distributed through a GPO scheduled task named SysUpdate; schtasks creates the task to run pay.exe as SYSTEM.
75% вторжений в 2024 году задействовали действительные учётные данные (T1078, Valid Accounts
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
Ransomware is distributed through a GPO scheduled task named SysUpdate; schtasks creates the task to run pay.exe as SYSTEM.
75% вторжений в 2024 году задействовали действительные учётные данные (T1078, Valid Accounts
Embargo is distributed via a GPO scheduled task named SysUpdate.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.'
75% вторжений в 2024 году задействовали действительные учётные данные (T1078, Valid Accounts
MDeployer decrypts b.cache to praxisbackup.exe and a.cache to pay.exe using RC4 with a hardcoded key.
Embargo has utilized a hardcoded mutex name of "LoadUpOnGunsBringYourFriends" using the CreateMutexW() function. Embargo has also utilized a hardcoded mutex name of "IntoTheFloodAgainSameOldTrip."
Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.
Embargo has avoided encrypting specific files and directories by leveraging a regular expression within the ransomware binary.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.
Embargo is distributed via a GPO scheduled task named SysUpdate.
BlackByte performed Registry modifications to escalate privileges and disable security tools. Embargo has modified and deleted Registry keys to add services, and to disable Security Solutions such as Windows Defender. TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender through modification of the Registry. During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors, including Storm-2603, disabled security services via Registry modifications.
Embargo has obtained active services running on the victim’s system through the functions OpenSCManagerW() and EnumServicesStatusExW().
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
Embargo has searched for folders, subfolders and other networked or mounted drives for follow on encryption actions. Embargo has also iterated device volumes using FindFirstVolumeW() and FindNextVolumeW() functions and then calls the GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeNameW() function.
Embargo has searched for folders, subfolders and other networked or mounted drives for follow-on encryption actions.
Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.
Embargo encrypts files with ChaCha20 plus Curve25519 ECC and appends a random six-character hexadecimal extension.
The ransomware terminates database, backup, and productivity processes.
The ransomware disables recovery with bcdedit and deletes shadow copies through vssadmin or wmic.
Embargo has been leveraged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, to prompt victims to pay a ransom.
35 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.