Loading threat actor…
Storm-0501 is a financially motivated ransomware operator active against on-premises, hybrid, and Microsoft Azure environments. The group has deployed Embargo ransomware through a Group Policy–distributed scheduled task and has conducted cloud-focused extortion by abusing Azure Blob Storage encryption scopes. In the latter activity, it created Key Vault-backed encryption material and scopes to render victim data inaccessible before demanding payment. Storm-0501 has also compromised hybrid identity infrastructure, including Microsoft Entra Connect, abused compromised accounts and insufficiently protected Global Administrator accounts, and accessed cloud resources using storage-account access keys. Storm-0501 conducts extensive post-compromise discovery of endpoint and cloud environments. It has used AzureHound to enumerate Entra ID tenants, native Windows utilities and open-source endpoint tools to collect system details, process enumeration to identify running software, and service queries to identify endpoint security products. The group has used Impacket credential-dumping functionality to obtain account credentials and passwords. It has employed PowerShell, DNS-based command-and-control behavior, Cobalt Strike, and regsvr32 for payload execution. For data theft, it has used Rclone, MegaSync, and AzCopy to transfer data through cloud-storage services. Storm-0501 has also used self-signed TLS certificates in operational infrastructure.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
56 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
21 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
16 additional families tracked in Mallory.
13 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 13 of them exploited in the wild.
Initial Access Primary (Storm-0501): Exploitation of known N-day vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications: CVE-2022-47966 (Zoho ManageEngine RCE)
Initial Access Primary (Storm-0501): Exploitation of known N-day vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications: CVE-2023-29300 / CVE-2023-38203 (Adobe ColdFusion)
Initial Access Primary (Storm-0501): Exploitation of known N-day vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications: CVE-2023-29300 / CVE-2023-38203 (Adobe ColdFusion)
Initial Access Primary (Storm-0501): Exploitation of known N-day vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications: CVE-2023-4966 (Citrix NetScaler - "Citrix Bleed")
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
8 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
4 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Cited as combining Rclone, MegaSync, and AzCopy CLI for cloud-based data exfiltration.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Mentioned only in a list of actors tied to ATT&CK T1190.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.