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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actors

Venom RAT

Venom RAT is a remote access trojan and multi-function malware tool, described as a successor to Quasar RAT and in one report as an AsyncRAT variant. It is commercially sold and has been observed in cybercrime ecosystems and malware-as-a-service style offerings, including premium hidden VNC (hVNC) functionality with customer support. Reported capabilities include keylogging, surveillance, file management, remote command execution, covert remote desktop access via hVNC, data theft, reverse proxying, anti-kill protections, persistence via Windows Registry changes, removable-media/USB propagation, and remote execution through APC injection. Additional reported behaviors include modifying process DACLs, terminating security-related processes, tampering with Task Scheduler and the Registry to disable security tools, terminating Microsoft Defender Antivirus, preventing system sleep, keeping the display on, and, when elevated, enabling SeDebugPrivilege and marking itself as a critical process.

Observed delivery vectors include phishing emails with invoice themes, JavaScript loaders, PowerShell downloaders, Windows Internet Shortcut files delivered via phishing, WebDAV-hosted shortcut chains, and loader malware such as Kiss Loader. In one documented chain, Kiss Loader decrypted and executed Venom RAT via APC injection. TA558/RevengeHotels used phishing emails in Portuguese and Spanish targeting hotels in Brazil and Spanish-speaking markets to deliver Venom RAT, with the objective of stealing credit card data from hotel systems and online travel agencies. CERT-UA also reported Venom RAT among malware families used by UAC-0050 in campaigns affecting Ukrainian organizations. Venom RAT infrastructure was also included in Europol/Eurojust Operation Endgame in November 2025, which dismantled more than 1,025 servers and seized domains linked to Venom RAT, Rhadamanthys, and the Elysium botnet; one report states the main Venom RAT suspect was arrested in Greece.

Targeting and victimology directly mentioned in the content include hospitality, hotel, and travel organizations in Latin America, especially Brazil and Spanish-speaking regions, as well as Ukrainian government, energy, finance, healthcare, and IT organizations in broader campaign reporting. Infrastructure associated with Venom RAT was identified in the 45.154.98.0/24 subnet alongside other malware families. High-confidence indicators and artifacts mentioned in relation to Venom RAT activity include use of hVNC; JavaScript and PowerShell-based loaders; APC injection; and campaign artifacts such as the downloaded file name "cargajecerrr.txt" in TA558 activity.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0050

...застосовано... шкідливих програм: REMCOS RAT, QUASAR RAT, VENOM RAT, REMOTE UTILITIES та LUMMASTEALER.

via cert uacert.gov.ua
TA558

...deploy Venom RAT in Brazil Hotel Attacks

via cloudatg insightscloudatg.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"...для проникнення до мережі зловмисники використовували скомпрометовані облікові записи VPN..."

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"...для проникнення до мережі зловмисники використовували скомпрометовані облікові записи VPN..."

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Another notable defense evasion tactic adopted by DeepLoad is the use of asynchronous procedure call (APC) injection to run the main payload inside a trusted Windows process without a decoded payload written to disk

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"...для проникнення до мережі зловмисники використовували скомпрометовані облікові записи VPN..."

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Across these threads, the same pattern continued: promotion of RATs, crypters, and related tooling... On DarkForums itself, the same user was found promoting a range of tools, including... APK encryption and bypass methods... This thread, posted by “markoliver,” promoted an APK encryption method...

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Another notable defense evasion tactic adopted by DeepLoad is the use of asynchronous procedure call (APC) injection to run the main payload inside a trusted Windows process without a decoded payload written to disk

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"...для проникнення до мережі зловмисники використовували скомпрометовані облікові записи VPN..."

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

hVNC utilizes the Microsoft Windows Desktop API to craft a hidden desktop via the Windows feature CreateDesktop. This concealed desktop remains invisible to users... hVNC capabilities go beyond mere observation, actively emulating keyboard and mouse input, allowing cybercriminals to navigate compromised systems with precision.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The post promoted “EagleSpy v5” as a lifetime-activated Android RAT... additional threads associated with the same user across DarkForums, including posts promoting other tools such as Craxs RAT, XWorm HVNC RAT... On DarkForums itself, the same user was found promoting a range of tools, including: Craxs RAT, XWorm HVNC RAT...

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
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IOC matching1

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.