HybridPetya is a ransomware strain that combines Petya/NotPetya-style bootlocker behavior with UEFI-focused persistence and Secure Boot bypass techniques. It was reported in 2025 and is characterized by pre-OS execution, destructive disk tampering, and modification of EFI boot components to maintain control of the system before the operating system loads.
On Windows systems, HybridPetya has been described as using an installer that decrypts an embedded DLL and executes it reflectively in memory, reducing reliance on conventional on-disk payload staging. Its payload enumerates local and remote drives, drops ransom notes across user-accessible locations, checks for administrative privileges, accesses the physical disk directly, and performs raw writes to the master boot record and other critical disk regions. It can force a crash and reboot, after which it presents a fake disk-check screen while encryption proceeds and ultimately locks the victim out at boot level with a ransom demand.
A distinguishing feature of HybridPetya is its targeting of the EFI System Partition and boot chain. It has been reported to install a malicious EFI application, replace or modify legitimate boot manager components, and thereby persist beyond normal operating system recovery workflows, including potential survival of OS reinstallation if the boot environment remains compromised. Public reporting has linked the malware to exploitation of Secure Boot bypass conditions involving vulnerable signed boot components, including CVE-2024-7344, enabling execution of untrusted code during boot on affected UEFI-based systems.
HybridPetya is primarily associated with Windows endpoints using UEFI firmware, but its abuse of EFI boot components places it in the broader category of firmware and boot-process threats. No high-confidence attribution to a specific threat actor is established in the available information. It is notable as an example of ransomware adopting bootkit-like tradecraft traditionally associated with stealthier persistence-focused malware.
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
11 old, Microsoft-signed, Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) applications could be abused to bypass Secure Boot on most systems using the modern firmware standard.
Attackers could bypass UEFI Secure Boot on a wide range of systems thanks to 11 Microsoft-signed UEFI shim bootloaders carrying vulnerabilities that have remained buried for more than a decade... Exploitation allows untrusted code to run during boot, opening the door to UEFI bootkits ... even with Secure Boot switched on.
Exploitation allows untrusted code to run during boot, opening the door to UEFI bootkits such as Bootkitty, HybridPetya and BlackLotus, even with Secure Boot switched on.
Once the system reboots after the destructive payload has executed, the malware continues its deception by showing a fake CHKDSK screen.
In some execution paths, the routine also targets the EFI system partition, renaming legitimate boot manager files (bootmgfw.efi) and replacing them with its own malicious payloads.
Exploited vulnerability: Uses CVE-2024–7344 to bypass Secure Boot and other security protections.
These checks prevent wasted effort on unsuitable targets, such as small virtual drives havin disk size less than 40 mb as shown in Figure 7.
11 old, Microsoft-signed, Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) applications could be abused to bypass Secure Boot on most systems using the modern firmware standard.
Attackers could bypass UEFI Secure Boot on a wide range of systems thanks to 11 Microsoft-signed UEFI shim bootloaders carrying vulnerabilities that have remained buried for more than a decade... Exploitation allows untrusted code to run during boot, opening the door to UEFI bootkits ... even with Secure Boot switched on.
Exploitation allows untrusted code to run during boot, opening the door to UEFI bootkits such as Bootkitty, HybridPetya and BlackLotus, even with Secure Boot switched on.
When executed, the installer decrypts this DLL into memory and uses reflective loading technique to initialize and run it without ever writing the DLL to disk.
For each valid drive, the code constructs full paths to standard directories (Desktop, Downloads, Documents, Public) and appends the fixed filename “YOUR_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.TXT”.
It then enumerates all logical drives using GetLogicalDriveStringsA and filters them by type (DRIVE_REMOVABLE, DRIVE_FIXED, DRIVE_REMOTE) to identify candidate locations for ransom note placement.
These checks prevent wasted effort on unsuitable targets, such as small virtual drives havin disk size less than 40 mb as shown in Figure 7.
Impact: Begins encrypting files before the operating system loads, making recovery extremely difficult.
The malware performs raw writes to multiple fixed offsets on the disk. These include sector 0 (the MBR itself) and additional offsets like 0x200, 0x2400, 0x4000, 0x4200, and 0x4400.
15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.