TinyTurla
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationExfiltrationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Phishing
- Platforms
- Windows
TinyTurla is a Windows backdoor attributed to the Russian cyberespionage group Turla and publicly disclosed by Cisco Talos in 2021. It provides second-stage remote access through a 64-bit DLL installed as a Windows service and loaded within the Windows service host process. The implant masquerades as a legitimate time-related Windows component to reduce suspicion and maintains persistence through its service installation.
TinyTurla stores its command-and-control server list, authentication password, and communication intervals in the Windows Registry. It communicates over HTTPS using WinHTTP, identifies the compromised host using its machine GUID, and authenticates its controller against the configured password. Its command protocol supports process creation and termination, command-output capture, file creation, file exfiltration, and bidirectional interaction with spawned processes through anonymous pipes. Operators can also remotely modify its server list, authentication password, and polling intervals. These functions enable continued post-compromise access, remote command execution, and data extraction.
TinyTurla is distinct from the later TinyTurla-NG backdoor, which shares similarities in coding style and functionality.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“TinyTurla Malware - a well-known second-stage backdoor attributed by Cisco Talos to the Turla group.” The reconstruction case examines a TinyTurla-NG x64 Windows DLL.
Techniques & procedures
34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
The attack sequence begins with a malicious .LNK file archived within a ZIP file, potentially distributed to users via phishing emails.
Execution
10 techniques
Execution
It creates a scheduled task to execute the newly generated log file using “MSBuild.exe” in the background every 20 minutes.
shell : This operation enables the backdoor to execute commands on the victim’s machine.
When a user executes the .LNK file, it triggers the execution of a PowerShell script embedded within it.
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has been installed using a .bat file.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has used `WinHTTP`, `CreateProcess`, and other APIs for C2 communications and other functions.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
Additionally, the PowerShell script executes the MSBuild project using “MSBuild.exe”... This ability to execute code in memory enables TAs to utilize MSBuild in fileless attacks.
When a user executes the .LNK file, it triggers the execution of a PowerShell script embedded within it.
The malware implements 12 different commands that include... creating pipes for process communication... The malicious file creates an anonymous pipe... The process reads data that is available through the pipe using the PeekNamedPipe and ReadFile APIs.
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can install itself as a service on compromised machines.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
the threat actors in this case modified the registry entry for the legitimate smphost service DLL to point to the malicious smpsvc.dll carrying the backdoor.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
It creates a scheduled task to execute the newly generated log file using “MSBuild.exe” in the background every 20 minutes.
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can set its configuration parameters in the Registry.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
The registry entry for the ‘smphost’ service was set with a value of ‘2’ for autostart, allowing the backdoor to auto-execute without threat actor interaction.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
It creates a scheduled task to execute the newly generated log file using “MSBuild.exe” in the background every 20 minutes.
The registry entry for the ‘smphost’ service was set with a value of ‘2’ for autostart, allowing the backdoor to auto-execute without threat actor interaction.
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can save its configuration parameters in the Registry.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
CRIL identified a campaign utilizing malicious .LNK files masquerading as a PDF document.
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has mimicked an existing Windows service by being installed as <code>Windows Time Service</code>.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has been deployed as `w64time.dll` to appear legitimate.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
Additionally, the PowerShell script executes the MSBuild project using “MSBuild.exe”... This ability to execute code in memory enables TAs to utilize MSBuild in fileless attacks.
Using the rijndael algorithm, it decrypts the retrieved encrypted content.
The first thread continuously monitors the running processes in the victim’s machine for any process main window title contains “MSBuild.exe” and hides if detected.
the threat actors in this case modified the registry entry for the legitimate smphost service DLL to point to the malicious smpsvc.dll carrying the backdoor.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can set its configuration parameters in the Registry.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
"Even if the traffic is TLS encrypted, the backdoor doesn't check the certificate."
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can query the Registry for its configuration information.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
The “MachineGuid” value is extracted via a function call to RegQueryValueExW... The process adds an HTTP request header called “Title” containing the Machine GUID to the HTTP request handle.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can upload files from a compromised host.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
Command and Control
7 techniques
Command and Control
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can go through a list of C2 server IPs and will try to register with each until one responds.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
Backdoor communications with C&C server.
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can use HTTPS in C2 communications.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
it has been observed how in servers infected by this threat, command and controls from other Turla tools have been deployed in order to use them as infrastructure in recent campaigns.
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has the ability to act as a second-stage dropper used to infect the system with additional malware.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has the ability to encrypt C2 traffic with SSL/TLS.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) contacts its C2 based on a scheduled timing set in its configuration.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
download : This operation enables the backdoor to exfiltrate a file from the victim’s machine to the C&C server.
Impact
2 techniques
Impact
The backdoor kills the process created above using the TerminateProcess routine... 1st byte = 0x06 – kill a process
ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads ... QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information ... Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file ...
Observables
13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
30 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.