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Malware1 associated actor

TinyTurla

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK34Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

TinyTurla is a Windows backdoor attributed to the Russian cyberespionage group Turla and publicly disclosed by Cisco Talos in 2021. It provides second-stage remote access through a 64-bit DLL installed as a Windows service and loaded within the Windows service host process. The implant masquerades as a legitimate time-related Windows component to reduce suspicion and maintains persistence through its service installation.

TinyTurla stores its command-and-control server list, authentication password, and communication intervals in the Windows Registry. It communicates over HTTPS using WinHTTP, identifies the compromised host using its machine GUID, and authenticates its controller against the configured password. Its command protocol supports process creation and termination, command-output capture, file creation, file exfiltration, and bidirectional interaction with spawned processes through anonymous pipes. Operators can also remotely modify its server list, authentication password, and polling intervals. These functions enable continued post-compromise access, remote command execution, and data extraction.

TinyTurla is distinct from the later TinyTurla-NG backdoor, which shares similarities in coding style and functionality.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

“TinyTurla Malware - a well-known second-stage backdoor attributed by Cisco Talos to the Turla group.” The reconstruction case examines a TinyTurla-NG x64 Windows DLL.

via intezer blogresearch.intezer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The attack sequence begins with a malicious .LNK file archived within a ZIP file, potentially distributed to users via phishing emails.

Execution

10 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It creates a scheduled task to execute the newly generated log file using “MSBuild.exe” in the background every 20 minutes.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

shell : This operation enables the backdoor to execute commands on the victim’s machine.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

When a user executes the .LNK file, it triggers the execution of a PowerShell script embedded within it.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has been installed using a .bat file.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1106Native APIEvidence3

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has used `WinHTTP`, `CreateProcess`, and other APIs for C2 communications and other functions.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

Additionally, the PowerShell script executes the MSBuild project using “MSBuild.exe”... This ability to execute code in memory enables TAs to utilize MSBuild in fileless attacks.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

When a user executes the .LNK file, it triggers the execution of a PowerShell script embedded within it.

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence1

The malware implements 12 different commands that include... creating pipes for process communication... The malicious file creates an anonymous pipe... The process reads data that is available through the pipe using the PeekNamedPipe and ReadFile APIs.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence4

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can install itself as a service on compromised machines.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

the threat actors in this case modified the registry entry for the legitimate smphost service DLL to point to the malicious smpsvc.dll carrying the backdoor.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It creates a scheduled task to execute the newly generated log file using “MSBuild.exe” in the background every 20 minutes.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence11

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can set its configuration parameters in the Registry.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

The registry entry for the ‘smphost’ service was set with a value of ‘2’ for autostart, allowing the backdoor to auto-execute without threat actor interaction.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It creates a scheduled task to execute the newly generated log file using “MSBuild.exe” in the background every 20 minutes.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

The registry entry for the ‘smphost’ service was set with a value of ‘2’ for autostart, allowing the backdoor to auto-execute without threat actor interaction.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence4

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can save its configuration parameters in the Registry.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

CRIL identified a campaign utilizing malicious .LNK files masquerading as a PDF document.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has mimicked an existing Windows service by being installed as <code>Windows Time Service</code>.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has been deployed as `w64time.dll` to appear legitimate.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

Additionally, the PowerShell script executes the MSBuild project using “MSBuild.exe”... This ability to execute code in memory enables TAs to utilize MSBuild in fileless attacks.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Using the rijndael algorithm, it decrypts the retrieved encrypted content.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The first thread continuously monitors the running processes in the victim’s machine for any process main window title contains “MSBuild.exe” and hides if detected.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

the threat actors in this case modified the registry entry for the legitimate smphost service DLL to point to the malicious smpsvc.dll carrying the backdoor.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence11

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can set its configuration parameters in the Registry.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1553.004Install Root CertificateEvidence1

"Even if the traffic is TLS encrypted, the backdoor doesn't check the certificate."

Discovery

2 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence7

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can query the Registry for its configuration information.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The “MachineGuid” value is extracted via a function call to RegQueryValueExW... The process adds an HTTP request header called “Title” containing the Machine GUID to the HTTP request handle.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence4

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can upload files from a compromised host.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence3

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can go through a list of C2 server IPs and will try to register with each until one responds.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Backdoor communications with C&C server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) can use HTTPS in C2 communications.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1090ProxyEvidence1

it has been observed how in servers infected by this threat, command and controls from other Turla tools have been deployed in order to use them as infrastructure in recent campaigns.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has the ability to act as a second-stage dropper used to infect the system with additional malware.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) has the ability to encrypt C2 traffic with SSL/TLS.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1029Scheduled TransferEvidence3

[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) contacts its C2 based on a scheduled timing set in its configuration.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

download : This operation enables the backdoor to exfiltrate a file from the victim’s machine to the C&C server.

Impact

2 techniques
T1489Service StopEvidence1

The backdoor kills the process created above using the TerminateProcess routine... 1st byte = 0x06 – kill a process

T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads ... QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information ... Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file ...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

30 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping34Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.