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MalwareUsed by 5 actorsExploits 1 CVE

HyperBro

HyperBro is a remote access trojan/backdoor used in multiple Chinese-linked espionage campaigns and observed across numerous operations alongside malware families such as PlugX, ShadowPad, China Chopper, and Cobalt Strike. The content describes HyperBro as an evolved version of HttpBrowser and states that the Iron Tiger APT group has used it since at least 2017, while LuckyMouse/APT27 is also commonly associated with it and has reportedly used it since at least 2013. UNC215 is described as deploying HYPERBRO after initial intrusion stages, using it for richer information collection including screen capture and keylogging.

Documented capabilities include executing shellcode injected into a newly created process, taking screenshots, listing all services and their configurations, starting and stopping specified services, deleting specified files, packing its payload, and executing applications or scripts via CreateProcessW or ShellExecuteW. The malware has also been described as operating in an in-memory state to minimize disk artifacts, and as being used to maintain persistence and enable remote administration on compromised systems.

Observed delivery and execution methods include DLL side-loading and trojanized software installers. ESET reported that the Able Desktop chat application and likely its compromised update mechanism were used in Mongolia to deliver HyperBro, including via legitimate executables such as Symantec IntgStat.exe and McAfee siteadv.exe that side-loaded malicious DLLs to decrypt, decompress, and run the payload. Trojanized Able Desktop installers bundled HyperBro as a payload, and legitimate Able Desktop updates were observed downloading and executing HyperBro beginning in mid-2018. In another intrusion described by CISA, actors exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities in 2021 later installed HyperBro on the Exchange server and two additional systems in a Defense Industrial Base environment.

Targeting mentioned in the content includes Mongolian government-related organizations through the Able Desktop supply-chain/update abuse, Russian, Georgian, and Mongolian organizations in broader Chinese-linked espionage contexts, and a Defense Industrial Base sector organization. Known command-and-control indicators directly cited in the content for HyperBro samples include https://developer.firefoxapi[.]com/ajax and https://139.180.208[.]225/ajax.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

Although LuckyMouse has been spotted using a widely used Microsoft Office vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to weaponize Office documents in the past, researchers have no proofs of this technique being used in this particular attack against the data center.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Threat Group-3390

В качестве полезной нагрузки, которая была встроена в инсталляторы, исследователи называют бэкдоры HyperBro и Korplug (PlugX).

via ptsecurityptsecurity.com
TA428

ESET researchers discovered that chat software called Able Desktop ... was used to deliver the HyperBro backdoor (commonly used by LuckyMouse) ... In mid-2018, we observed a first occurrence of the legitimate Able Desktop application being used to download and execute HyperBro.

via eset welivesecurity blogweb.archive.org
unc215

UNC215 often uses FOCUSFJORD for the initial stages of an intrusion, and then later deploys HYPERBRO, which has more information collection capabilities such as screen capture and keylogging.

via fireeyefireeye.com
TAG-67

The same benign vfhost.exe file has also been abused in activity we attribute to... TAG-67 ... to load HyperBro through a similar low-prevalence DLL search order hijacking triad.

via recorded future bloggo.recordedfuture.com
ZipToken

"...tools would attempt to infect users with HyperBro, a remote access trojan that operated via an 'in-memory' state, leaving minimal traces on disk..."

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques list includes "T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server"

T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

"The main command and control (C&C) server ... belongs to a Ukrainian ISP, specifically to a MikroTik router ... Researchers believe the Mikrotik router was explicitly hacked for the campaign"

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

“...redirected users to malicious sites hosting exploitation tools such as ScanBox and BEeF...” | “...used access to the data center to add JavaScript code to government sites, which redirected users to malicious sites...”

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

One of the Able update servers was likely compromised in order to deploy HyperBro and Tmanger.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

"The initial attack vector ... is unclear, but researchers believe LuckyMouse possibly had conducted watering hole or phishing attacks to compromise accounts belonging to employees"

Execution

4 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence1

"ADVSTORESHELL is capable of starting a process using CreateProcess"; "build_downer has the ability to use the WinExec API"; "Aria-body has the ability to launch files using ShellExecute"

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Able Desktop trojanized installer is executed by the user.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence2

"Anchor can create and execute services to load its payload"; "APT32's backdoor has used Windows services as a way to execute its malicious payload"; "Ragnar Locker has used sc.exe to execute a service that it creates"; "Shamoon creates a new service named 'ntssrv' to execute the payload"

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

In the past, SysUpdate was loaded in memory by a known method involving three files: One legitimate executable, sometimes signed, and vulnerable to dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading; One malicious DLL loaded by the legitimate file; One binary file usually containing obfuscated code, unpacked in memory by the malicious DLL.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques list includes "T1055.003 ... Thread Execution Hijacking"

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

GuLoader has the ability to inject shellcode into donor processes that is started in a suspended state. Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable. Pandora can start and inject code into a new svchost process. ShadowPad has injected an install module into a newly created process.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

"Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz"; "APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium"; "Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection."

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The launcher starts by instantiating the CLoadInfo object... Directory to copy all files %PROGRAMDATA%\Test\ ... Name of the legitimate executable dlpumgr32.exe ... Lastly, the launcher starts a suspended process with the command line “C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServices,”and injects the appropriate shellcode into it.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques list includes "T1055.003 ... Thread Execution Hijacking"

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

GuLoader has the ability to inject shellcode into donor processes that is started in a suspended state. Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable. Pandora can start and inject code into a new svchost process. ShadowPad has injected an install module into a newly created process.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

In the past, SysUpdate was loaded in memory by a known method involving three files: One legitimate executable, sometimes signed, and vulnerable to dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading; One malicious DLL loaded by the legitimate file; One binary file usually containing obfuscated code, unpacked in memory by the malicious DLL.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

“...HyperBro, a remote access trojan that operated via an ‘in-memory’ state, leaving minimal traces on disk...”

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"HYPERBRO... capabilities such as screen capture and keylogging"

Discovery

1 technique
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques list includes "T1010 Application Window Discovery"

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"HYPERBRO... capabilities such as screen capture and keylogging"

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques list includes "T1213 Data from Information Repositories"

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1090ProxyEvidence2

“...hacked a MikroTik router to host the command and control server of the HyperBro RAT.”

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques list includes "T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques list includes "T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer"; described delivery of tools and payloads post-access.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
10 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
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IOC matching12

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution5

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping27

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.