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APT27 is a Chinese state-sponsored advanced persistent threat group primarily engaged in cyberespionage. It is also known as Emissary Panda, Bronze Union, Iron Tiger, LuckyMouse, TG-3390, and Linen Typhoon. The group has conducted espionage operations for more than a decade, including campaigns affecting government organizations, gambling businesses, and commercial enterprises. Its activity includes a confirmed compromise of a Philippine gambling company, targeting in Taiwan, attacks involving a Mongolian government messaging application, and intrusions affecting German and French companies. APT27 maintains custom malware families including HyperBro and SysUpdate and has also deployed Noodle RAT. Its tooling supports remote command execution, host and process reconnaissance, screenshot capture, file management, and data transfer. SysUpdate operates on Windows and Linux and supports DNS TXT-based command-and-control communications. Windows deployments use DLL side-loading through legitimate signed applications, encoded shellcode, in-memory execution, and process hollowing. Persistence mechanisms include registry entries and services on Windows and systemd services on Linux. The group has abused stolen code-signing certificates and used malware obfuscation to hinder detection and analysis. Its credential-collection tooling includes password-hash extraction utilities and a custom Chrome password and cookie stealer. APT27 has conducted messaging-application supply-chain attacks and exploited internet-facing enterprise software. In 2025, activity attributed to Linen Typhoon exploited the ToolShell Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities as zero-days, enabling remote code execution and access to cryptographic secrets.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
57 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
52 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
47 additional families tracked in Mallory.
28 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 28 of them exploited in the wild.
Once these cryptographic secrets are retrieved, they can craft fully valid and signed __VIEWSTATE payloads. | Deserialization of untrusted data in on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. Microsoft is aware that an exploit for CVE-2025-53770 exists in the wild.
CVE-2021-26855 (CVSS 9.1) is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Exchange that allows the attacker to send arbitrary HTTP requests and authenticate as the Exchange server.
CVE-2021-27065 (CVSS 7.8) is a post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange. If the threat actor first authenticates with the Exchange server they could then use this vulnerability to write a file to any path on the server.
Microsoft has detected a 0-day remote code execution exploit being used to attack SolarWinds Serv-U FTP software in limited and targeted attacks. The vulnerability being exploited is CVE-2021-35211, which was recently patched by SolarWinds. The vulnerability exists in Serv-U’s implementation of the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol.
Based on the attack chain (CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-49704), dubbed ToolShell, attackers are able to access cryptographic keys stored in memory or configuration.
23 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
486 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Chinese state-sponsored group mentioned as having exploited ToolShell zero-days before public disclosure; it is background context rather than the focus of this report.
Listed in the detection's technique annotations; the content does not attribute ShieldCrash exploitation to this group.
Identified as a group that has deployed Noodle RAT, a cross-platform remote-access trojan. The content does not specify Iron Tiger's individual campaigns, victims, sponsorship or initial-access methods.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.