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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

MoqHao

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 6 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs272Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissanceBrute force
Delivery
SmishingLureFake updateCloaking
Platforms
AndroidNetwork device

MoqHao, also known as Wroba and XLoader for Android, is an Android banking trojan with remote-access, information-stealing, and backdoor capabilities associated with the financially motivated Roaming Mantis threat group. It primarily targets individual mobile users through smishing campaigns impersonating parcel-delivery services. Malicious links lead to Android applications masquerading as legitimate applications or updates, including Chrome and Facebook. Historically concentrated in East Asia, particularly Japan and South Korea, campaigns have expanded into Europe and other regions worldwide.

MoqHao can steal sensitive information, read and send SMS messages, install additional applications, and use compromised devices to distribute further smishing messages. Variants conceal their payloads through encryption, packing, and native-code-assisted dynamic loading, and can hide their application icons. Some newer variants begin malicious activity during installation without requiring the victim to launch the application manually. Command-and-control configuration is retrieved from social-media profiles acting as dead-drop resolvers, including profiles on VKontakte, Pinterest, and Imgur. Distribution infrastructure can use geographic and operating-system checks to restrict payload delivery and hinder analysis.

Some variants also attack wireless-router administration interfaces from infected Android devices. They identify supported router models, attempt logins using default credentials and brute-force techniques, and submit CAPTCHA images to an external optical-character-recognition service to bypass text-based challenges. After obtaining administrative access, they change router DNS settings to redirect users toward phishing or malware-delivery sites. This router-targeting activity has particularly involved ipTIME and EFM Networks devices in South Korea.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Roaming Mantis

This blog post is part of an ongoing series of analysis on MoqHao (also referred to as Wroba and XLoader), a malware family commonly associated with Roaming Mantis. MoqHao is generally used to target Android users, often via an initial attack vector of phishing SMS messages (smishing).

via team cymruteam-cymru.com
Yanbian Gang

Ever received a text message alerting you to problems with the delivery of a package - even though you weren't waiting for one? Then you've already met Moqhao in person, also known as Shaoye or XLoader. Moqhao is something like the bestseller from the Roaming Mantis malware family, ready to build a backdoor into your smartphone's Android operating system.

via telekom blogtelekom.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

3 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence2

Domain Fuzzing ● Techniques to find typosquatting domains. | Certificate Transparency enables to monitor HTTPS websites.

T1583.004ServerEvidence1

At the time of writing, we were able to identify 9 servers hosted on EHOSTIDC and VELIANET Autonomous Systems.

T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

The malware then retrieves its C2 server by requesting one of the social network profiles stored in the payload. In the analysed sample, the profiles are: shaoye77, shaoye88 and shaoye99 on Imgur service.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence4

it also uses phishing pages to steal user credentials... The landing page identified the user’s device platform to provide malicious APK files for Android or redirect to phishing pages for iOS.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The initial attack vector is a text message distributed by SMS and containing a malicious URL... The URL either deploys the MoqHao Android malware, or redirects to an Apple login details credential harvesting page.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

From mid-2019 until 2022, the criminals mainly used smishing instead of DNS hijacking to deliver a malicious URL as their landing page.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Finally, the DNS changer generates a URL query with the rogue DNS IPs to compromise the DNS settings of the Wi-Fi router, depending on the model

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Furthermore, an ELF file, libarmeaib-v7alibdf.so, was embedded in the APK file: it uses Java Native Interface (JNI) for the second stage payload, for decryption and also part of the loading feature.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Potential victims were redirected by DNS hijacking to a malicious web page that distributed a Trojanized application spoofed Facebook or Chrome that is then installed manually by users.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

If the target clicks on the link, an HTTP request is sent to the server.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

uses malicious Android package (APK) files to control infected Android devices and steal device information

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Throughout 2020 and 2021, the criminal group behind Roaming Mantis made use of various obfuscation techniques in the landing page script in order to evade detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

A scam impersonating the Tokyo Public Prosecutors Office. ● A kind of fraud.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Then, the encrypted payload is XORed using the embedded XOR key. After the XOR operation, as with previous samples, the data is decompressed using zlib to extract the payload, a Dalvik Executable (DEX) file.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

In addition to obfuscation, the landing page blocks the connection from the source IP address in non-targeted regions and shows just a fake “404” page for these connections.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The user agent checking feature has not been changed in the landing page since 2019; it evaluates the devices by user agent, redirecting to the phishing page if the device is iOS-based, or delivering the malicious APK file if the device is Android-based.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

This feature is used in combination with brute-force attacks on wireless router’s web interfaces to compromise routers and perform DNS hijacking attacks.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

When trying to “PWNtcha” a vulnerable router, Moqhao first determines the IP address of the router to request its web-based administration pages. By accessing this default pages, Moqhao can determine the router’s model.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

In addition to obfuscation, the landing page blocks the connection from the source IP address in non-targeted regions and shows just a fake “404” page for these connections.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The user agent checking feature has not been changed in the landing page since 2019; it evaluates the devices by user agent, redirecting to the phishing page if the device is iOS-based, or delivering the malicious APK file if the device is Android-based.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

These new backdoor commands are added to steal galleries and photos from infected devices.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

the DNS changer connects to the hardcoded vk.com account “id728588947” to get the next destination

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

If the target clicks on the link, an HTTP request is sent to the server... The malware then retrieves its C2 server by requesting one of the social network profiles stored in the payload.

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

The malware connects to an email inbox using hardcoded outlook.com credentials via POP3. It then obtains the email subject (in Chinese) and extracts the real C2 address using the string “abcd” as an anchor.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence2

it is configured to receive C2 information ( 91.204.227.31 :28877) from a user profile on VKontakte.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

In this sample, the decrypted payload is saved as datadataggk.onulfc.jb.utxdtt.bkfilesd and executed to infect the malicious main module on victim devices.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence4

MoqHao ● An Android malware. ● It uses DGA like domains. ysu3g.xyz hs3dg.xyz Nsi3h.xyz /[a-z][a-z][a-z0-9][a-z0-9][a-z]\.xyz/

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

The delivery and installation methodology for MoqHao includes the use of ‘disposable’ staging infrastructure which generally utilizes Dynamic DNS services

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

This activity leveraging MoqHao or Apple IDs' credential harvesting pages notably provides Roaming Mantis access to data from the local system, SD card, applications, messages or contact list... as well as allowing remote interaction with a victims' device.

Impact

1 technique
T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence4

We have been tracking Roaming Mantis since 2018, and published five blog posts about this campaign: Roaming Mantis uses DNS hijacking to infect Android smartphones.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

272 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching272Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping28Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.