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Mallory
Threat actor

Roaming Mantis

Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware10Families
ATT&CK32Techniques
IOCs256Tracked
Origin
🇨🇳 China
Motivation
Financial
Targets
JPFRKRTWUSDEGBATINTRMYDKITNLSEFICHBRAUNPTHZARUUABDSR
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationInitial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionSpoofing
Also known asRoaming Mantisroamingmantis

Roaming Mantis, also known as RoamingMantis and Shaoye, is a financially motivated, Chinese-speaking cybercrime group publicly tracked since at least 2017. It targets mobile users for credential theft, information theft, and monetary fraud. Initially concentrated in East Asia, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, its campaigns expanded into Europe and other regions worldwide. The group primarily distributes Android malware through SMS phishing, frequently impersonating postal and parcel-delivery services. Landing pages identify visitors’ operating systems and locations, delivering malicious Android applications or redirecting iOS users to fraudulent Apple login pages. Android payloads commonly masquerade as legitimate applications or browser updates. Its principal malware is MoqHao, also known as Wroba and XLoader for Android, which provides remote-access, information-stealing, and banking-trojan functionality. Other malware associated with its operations includes FakeCop, FakeSpy, and FunkyBot. Phishing operations harvest account credentials and payment-card information, while Android malware accesses device information and SMS messages. Roaming Mantis also compromises Wi-Fi router DNS settings to redirect users to malicious landing pages. Some Android malware variants can alter settings on vulnerable routers connected to infected devices, extending exposure to other users of the same network. Operational techniques include geofencing, platform-specific delivery, dynamically generated Android packages, encrypted payloads, and command-and-control discovery through legitimate social platforms and email services. These mechanisms support infrastructure flexibility and hinder analysis and detection. The group has additionally deployed browser-based cryptocurrency mining against desktop visitors.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Financial Services
  • Transportation

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Japan
  • France
  • United States
  • Germany
  • United Kingdom
  • India
  • South Korea
  • Taiwan
  • Austria
  • Brazil
  • Malaysia
  • Türkiye
  • Australia
  • Bangladesh
  • Belgium
  • Switzerland

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • China
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

32 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

11 of 15 tactics38 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance2 techniques
T1592Gather Victim Host Information
T1598Phishing for Information
TA0042Resource Development1 technique
T1583Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001Domains
T1583.004Server
T1583.006Web Services
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1566×5Phishing
T1566.002Spearphishing Link
T1566.003×2Spearphishing via Service
TA0002Execution3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1106Native API
T1204User Execution
T1204.001Malicious Link
T1204.002×2Malicious File
TA0005Stealth4 techniques
T1027×3Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.002Software Packing
T1036×3Masquerading
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1497×3Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1056Input Capture
TA0007Discovery2 techniques
T1033System Owner/User Discovery
T1497×3Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
TA0009Collection2 techniques
T1005Data from Local System
T1056Input Capture
TA0011Command and Control4 techniques
T1071×5Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2Web Protocols
T1071.003Mail Protocols
T1102Web Service
T1102.001×2Dead Drop Resolver
T1105×2Ingress Tool Transfer
T1568×2Dynamic Resolution
T1568.001Fast Flux DNS
TA0010Exfiltration1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
TA0040Impact2 techniques
T1496Resource Hijacking
T1565Data Manipulation
T1565.001×5Stored Data Manipulation
Indicators of compromise

Observables

256 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Roaming Mantis target?
Roaming Mantis targets Financial Services and Transportation in Japan, France, United States, Germany, United Kingdom, India, South Korea, Taiwan, and 8 more.
What malware does Roaming Mantis use?
Roaming Mantis is associated with MoqHao, Fakecop, Wroba.j, FakeSpy, FunkyBot, and 5 more.
Where is Roaming Mantis from?
Mallory's sources associate Roaming Mantis with China.
Activity feed

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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sekoia blogNews · Jul 28, 2026Ongoing Roaming Mantis Smishing Campaign Targeting FranceConducting a large-scale smishing campaign targeting mobile users in France, delivering MoqHao to Android devices and harvesting Apple credentials from iPhone users.Read more ↗mcafee labsNews · Feb 7, 2024MoqHao evolution: New variants start automatically right after installationRoaming Mantis is known for distributing the MoqHao Android malware family, primarily via SMS-based phishing (smishing) campaigns. The group targets users in Asian countries and has recently expanded to other regions. Their latest MoqHao variants can auto-execute upon installation, use Unicode tricks to disguise as legitimate apps, leverage social engineering to become the default SMS app, and use legitimate services like Pinterest to update phishing content. The malware is capable of stealing SMS, contacts, device info, photos, and more, and can send phishing messages to further propagate itself.Read more ↗broadcomNews · Jan 30, 2024MoqHao malware continues to target mobile users in EuropeRoaming Mantis is associated with MoqHao/Wroba campaigns targeting mobile users globally, using SMS phishing (smishing) to distribute spyware and banking malware, with earlier focus on Japan, Taiwan, and the US and more recent targeting of European countries.Read more ↗team cymruNews · Mar 17, 2023Team Cymru Explores MoqHao Part 3: Global Targeting TrendsFinancially motivated smishing campaigns delivering MoqHao to Android users, with operations expanding from East Asia to global targeting across Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and parts of South America.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping32MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware10Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables256Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.