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Mallory
Malware5 associated actors19 associated CVEs

MooBot

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns19Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs316Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
DDOSBrute forceInitial accessPersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
Landing page
Platforms
LinuxNetwork deviceIOT

Moobot is a Mirai-derived botnet first identified in 2019 that compromises exposed Linux-based networking and IoT devices, including routers, IP cameras, and digital video recorders. Primarily used for distributed denial-of-service attacks, it spreads through Telnet credential brute-forcing, weak or default administrator credentials, and exploitation of device vulnerabilities. Documented targets include D-Link routers, Hikvision surveillance devices, TP-Link Archer AX21 routers, LILIN recorders, and Ubiquiti EdgeRouters. Exploited vulnerabilities include CVE-2015-2051, CVE-2021-36260, and CVE-2023-1389.

Moobot payloads are compiled for multiple processor architectures and connect to command-and-control infrastructure to register infected devices, send heartbeats, and receive attack instructions. Supported DDoS methods include SYN, UDP, ACK, and ACK-plus-PUSH flooding. Observed variants encrypt configuration data, disguise or randomize process names, delete their executable after launch, and terminate competing bot processes. Moobot-associated EdgeRouter compromises have included trojanized OpenSSH servers that bypass authentication and maintain access; rebooting affected routers does not remove the infection. Recovered source code also contains dormant routines for downloading and executing arbitrary ELF payloads, although those routines were not active in the recovered implementation.

Moobot has been used by financially motivated operators, including the Scar rental botnet operation. Separately, Russia's GRU-linked APT28 accessed Ubiquiti EdgeRouters previously infected by criminal Moobot operators and deployed additional tooling. APT28 repurposed those routers as infrastructure for traffic proxying, spearphishing, credential harvesting, and stolen-data exfiltration rather than relying solely on Moobot's native DDoS functionality. This infrastructure supported espionage against governments, militaries, and organizations across multiple industries. Operation Dying Ember disrupted the APT28-controlled router botnet in January 2024, with the operation publicly announced in February.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

19 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2015-2051via fortiguard otherExploited in the wildHNAP SOAPAction Header Command Injection in D-Link DIR-645In particular, MooBot and Enemybot Malware targeting D-Link routers (CVE-2015-2051).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-34129via cveExploited in the wildElevated-Privilege Command Injection in LILIN DVR ConfigurationA command injection vulnerability exists in LILIN DVR devices prior to firmware version 2.0b60_20200207 due to insufficient sanitization of FTP and NTP Server fields. Injected shell commands execute with elevated privileges during subsequent configuration syncs. The vulnerability was exploited in the wild by Moobot botnets.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-35394via fortinet threat researchExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Realtek Jungle SDK MP DaemonFortiGuard Labs observed several attacking bursts targeting Cacti and Realtek vulnerabilities ... and then spreading ShellBot and Moobot malware. ... CVE-2021-35394 (Realtek) and CVE-2022-46169 (Cacti).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-1389via forescoutExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Root Command Injection in TP-Link Archer AX21A prime example is CVE-2023-1389, a command injection affecting TP-Link Archer AX21 routers, which is part of CISA KEV since 2023 and has been exploited by botnets such as AGoent, Gafgyt, Moobot, Mirai and others.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-34130via cveExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Arbitrary File Read in LILIN DVR DevicesAn unauthenticated arbitrary file read exists in LILIN Digital Video Recorder (DVR) devices prior to firmware version 2.0b60_20200207 via the /z/zbin/net_html.cgi endpoint. The vulnerability has been exploited in the wild in conjunction with other issues by botnets like FBot and Moobot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-46169via fortinet threat researchExploited in the wildUnauthenticated command injection in Cacti remote pollingCVE-2022-46169 is a command injection vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti. The vulnerability resides in the “remote_agent.php” file, which can be accessed without authentication.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-17215via forescoutExploited in the wildRemote Command Injection in Huawei HG532 DeviceUpgrade ServiceThe botnet has been observed spreading via vulnerabilities on several IoT devices such as Tenda (CVE-2020-10987, CVE-2018-14558, CVE-2017-17215, CVE-2014-8361). | APT28 then leveraged Moobot to download their own malicious files into the victim routers and repurposed the botnet for espionage, conducting spearphishing and credential harvesting campaigns as well as exfiltrating stolen data.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-8361via forescoutExploited in the wildRealtek SDK miniigd UPnP SOAP Command InjectionThe botnet has been observed spreading via vulnerabilities on several IoT devices such as Tenda (CVE-2020-10987, CVE-2018-14558, CVE-2017-17215, CVE-2014-8361). | APT28 then leveraged Moobot to download their own malicious files into the victim routers and repurposed the botnet for espionage, conducting spearphishing and credential harvesting campaigns as well as exfiltrating stolen data.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-26258via forescoutExploited in the wildRemote Command Injection in D-Link DIR-820LThe botnet has been observed spreading via vulnerabilities on ... D-Link routers (CVE-2015-2051, CVE-2018-6530, CVE-2022-26258, CVE-2022-28958). | APT28 then leveraged Moobot to download their own malicious files into the victim routers and repurposed the botnet for espionage, conducting spearphishing and credential harvesting campaigns as well as exfiltrating stolen data.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-36260via forescoutExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Command Injection in Hikvision Surveillance DevicesThe botnet has been observed spreading via vulnerabilities on ... Hikvision cameras (CVE-2021-36260). | APT28 then leveraged Moobot to download their own malicious files into the victim routers and repurposed the botnet for espionage, conducting spearphishing and credential harvesting campaigns as well as exfiltrating stolen data.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2020-10987via forescoutExploited in the wildOS Command Injection in Tenda AC15 AC1900 RoutersThe botnet has been observed spreading via vulnerabilities on several IoT devices such as Tenda (CVE-2020-10987, CVE-2018-14558, CVE-2017-17215, CVE-2014-8361). | APT28 then leveraged Moobot to download their own malicious files into the victim routers and repurposed the botnet for espionage, conducting spearphishing and credential harvesting campaigns as well as exfiltrating stolen data.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-6530via forescoutExploited in the wildUnauthenticated OS command injection in D-Link router SOAP interfaceThe botnet has been observed spreading via vulnerabilities on ... D-Link routers (CVE-2015-2051, CVE-2018-6530, CVE-2022-26258, CVE-2022-28958). | APT28 then leveraged Moobot to download their own malicious files into the victim routers and repurposed the botnet for espionage, conducting spearphishing and credential harvesting campaigns as well as exfiltrating stolen data.View vulnerability →Source ↗

7 more CVEs associated with this family tracked in Mallory.

Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

APT28 then leveraged Moobot to download their own malicious files into the victim routers and repurposed the botnet for espionage, conducting spearphishing and credential harvesting campaigns as well as exfiltrating stolen data.

via forescoutforescout.com
Scar

Analysis of the Scar rental botnet confirmed that the group contains not only the new botnet family found this time, but also other botnet families Mirai and Moobot.

via qianxin ti centerti.qianxin.com
Unit 26165

Moobot est un variant de Mirai, découvert en 2019 par Netlab 360. Il cible des équipements IoT à faible sécurité, se connecte à un serveur C2 et exécute des attaques DDoS.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
Russian Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU)

In February 2024, the FBI dismantled Moobot, a botnet of Ubiquiti Edge OS routers used by the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) to proxy malicious traffic in cyberespionage attacks.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
GRU

For instance, in February 2024, the FBI dismantled Moobot, a botnet of Ubiquiti Edge OS routers used by Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) to proxy malicious traffic in cyberespionage attacks.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1595Active ScanningEvidence1

Internal Alien Labs research has identified new Moobot, a Mirai variant botnet, infrastructure scanning for known but uncommon vulnerabilities in Tenda routers.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

Un C2 actif est identifié : 162.141.92.192 (port TCP/14123), hébergé chez DeluxHost à Amsterdam (ASN 214677).

T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

APT28 threat actors have accessed EdgeRouters previously compromised by an OpenSSH trojan.

T1584.008Network DevicesEvidence4

Подготовка Network Devices T1584.008, Resource Development Массовая компрометация SOHO-роутеров (Ubiquiti EdgeRouter, TP-Link TL-WR841N).

T1588Obtain CapabilitiesEvidence1

APT28 actors accessed EdgeRouters compromised by Moobot, a botnet that installs OpenSSH trojans on compromised hardware.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

Cybercriminals not linked with the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) first infiltrated Ubiquiti Edge OS routers and deployed the Moobot malware, targeting Internet-exposed devices with widely known default administrator passwords.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence6

Internal Alien Labs research has identified new Moobot, a Mirai variant botnet, infrastructure scanning for known but uncommon vulnerabilities in Tenda routers... CVE-2014-8361, CVE-2017-17215, CVE-2018-14558, CVE-2020-10987

T1566PhishingEvidence4

该僵尸网络有三个用途:中继窃取的Microsoft Exchange认证哈希、在住宅IP地址上托管钓鱼页面,以及在劫持的路由器上运行自定义Python脚本。

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Att&ck IDs: T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence5

CVE-2021-36260 results from insufficient input validation, allowing unauthenticated users to inject malicious content into a <language> tag to trigger a command injection attack on a Hikvision product.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

该僵尸网络有三个用途:中继窃取的Microsoft Exchange认证哈希、在住宅IP地址上托管钓鱼页面,以及在劫持的路由器上运行自定义Python脚本。

T1106Native APIEvidence1

[The bot will] write as executable, rename, fork, and execute the returned ELF file.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence5

During our analysis, we observed numerous payloads attempting to leverage this vulnerability to probing the status of devices or extracting sensitive data from victims.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

echo -e "echo \"Starting logging\"\nklogd\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\n/cmslite/.o balloon;" > /etc/init.d/S11log

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Att&ck IDs: T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

Cybercriminals not linked with the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) first infiltrated Ubiquiti Edge OS routers and deployed the Moobot malware, targeting Internet-exposed devices with widely known default administrator passwords.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Att&ck IDs: T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

echo -e "echo \"Starting logging\"\nklogd\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\n/cmslite/.o balloon;" > /etc/init.d/S11log

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Att&ck IDs: T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

Cybercriminals not linked with the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) first infiltrated Ubiquiti Edge OS routers and deployed the Moobot malware, targeting Internet-exposed devices with widely known default administrator passwords.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Att&ck IDs: T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Att&ck IDs: T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

This variant also forks itself with the process name “/usr/sbin*” to try to look like a normal process while wiping out the original file, “macHelper”.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

Att&ck IDs: T1070 - Indicator Removal on Host

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

First, because the final Moobot will be saved as “macHelper,” it first tries to remove any file already named “macHelper.” ... while wiping out the original file, “macHelper”.

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

Cybercriminals not linked with the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) first infiltrated Ubiquiti Edge OS routers and deployed the Moobot malware, targeting Internet-exposed devices with widely known default administrator passwords.

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

DNS spoofing Impersonation T1656, Defense Evasion Перенаправление DNS-ответов на attacker-controlled серверы с фишинговыми login-страницами M365

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1601Modify System ImageEvidence2

Finally, it changes commonly used commands, such as “reboot,” to prevent an administrator from invoking reboot on the affected device.

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

The botnet served three purposes: relaying stolen authentication hashes toward Microsoft Exchange...

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Moobot samples are mainly spread through weak telnet passwords and some nday and 0day vulnerabilities.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

Att&ck IDs: T1552 - Unsecured Credentials

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

“硬编码登陆账号密码列表: root/icatch99 report/8Jg0SR8K50 默认账号密码: admin/123456”

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

Authentication traffic toward Microsoft 365 and similar services was then funnelled through Adversary-in-the-Middle nodes for credential and OAuth-token harvesting.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

2020-06-09 We saw the scans targeting the vulnerability ... Moobot scans port 8000 through Loader, after locating the right target device, Moobot samples will be dropped via the vulnerabilities.

Collection

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

Authentication traffic toward Microsoft 365 and similar services was then funnelled through Adversary-in-the-Middle nodes for credential and OAuth-token harvesting.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence10

Un C2 actif est identifié : 162.141.92.192 (port TCP/14123) ... avec plus de 500 sessions d’attaque courtes observées en août 2026. Le panel StresD Pro+ repose sur un backend Node.js/Express sur WebSocket.

T1090ProxyEvidence5

The FBI dismantled Moobot, a botnet of Ubiquiti Edge OS routers used by the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) to proxy malicious traffic in cyberespionage attacks.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence2

Russian state-sponsored threat actors have also been observed enlisting compromised Ubiquiti Edge OS routers into a botnet designed to proxy malicious traffic.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The binary protocol used by Condi to communicate with the C2 server is a modified version of that initially implemented in Mirai.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

Le code révèle une fonctionnalité dormante de téléchargement et exécution (download-and-execute) jamais documentée auparavant, représentant le mécanisme le plus plausible derrière la réutilisation de Moobot par APT28.

Impact

3 techniques
T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence9

Moobot cible des équipements IoT à faible sécurité, se connecte à un serveur C2 et exécute des attaques DDoS. Le panel StresD Pro+ génère également du trafic d’attaque via un script Python implémentant un flooder Minecraft Bedrock Edition / RakNet.

T1498.001Direct Network FloodEvidence1

Except for SYN flood, the C2 server has other attacking commands, such as 0x06 for UDP flood, 0x04 for ACK flood, and 0x05 for ACK+PUSH flood.

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence1

Moobot DDoS campaign Moobot's DDoS attacks are active all year round ... Here are the DDoS targets launched by Moobot.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

316 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

53 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching316Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities19CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.