MooBot
- Type
- Botnet
- Capabilities
- DDOSBrute forceInitial accessPersistenceDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Landing page
- Platforms
- LinuxNetwork deviceIOT
Moobot is a Mirai-derived botnet first identified in 2019 that compromises exposed Linux-based networking and IoT devices, including routers, IP cameras, and digital video recorders. Primarily used for distributed denial-of-service attacks, it spreads through Telnet credential brute-forcing, weak or default administrator credentials, and exploitation of device vulnerabilities. Documented targets include D-Link routers, Hikvision surveillance devices, TP-Link Archer AX21 routers, LILIN recorders, and Ubiquiti EdgeRouters. Exploited vulnerabilities include CVE-2015-2051, CVE-2021-36260, and CVE-2023-1389.
Moobot payloads are compiled for multiple processor architectures and connect to command-and-control infrastructure to register infected devices, send heartbeats, and receive attack instructions. Supported DDoS methods include SYN, UDP, ACK, and ACK-plus-PUSH flooding. Observed variants encrypt configuration data, disguise or randomize process names, delete their executable after launch, and terminate competing bot processes. Moobot-associated EdgeRouter compromises have included trojanized OpenSSH servers that bypass authentication and maintain access; rebooting affected routers does not remove the infection. Recovered source code also contains dormant routines for downloading and executing arbitrary ELF payloads, although those routines were not active in the recovered implementation.
Moobot has been used by financially motivated operators, including the Scar rental botnet operation. Separately, Russia's GRU-linked APT28 accessed Ubiquiti EdgeRouters previously infected by criminal Moobot operators and deployed additional tooling. APT28 repurposed those routers as infrastructure for traffic proxying, spearphishing, credential harvesting, and stolen-data exfiltration rather than relying solely on Moobot's native DDoS functionality. This infrastructure supported espionage against governments, militaries, and organizations across multiple industries. Operation Dying Ember disrupted the APT28-controlled router botnet in January 2024, with the operation publicly announced in February.
Associated vulnerabilities
19 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
7 more CVEs associated with this family tracked in Mallory.
Associated threat actors
5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
APT28 then leveraged Moobot to download their own malicious files into the victim routers and repurposed the botnet for espionage, conducting spearphishing and credential harvesting campaigns as well as exfiltrating stolen data.
Analysis of the Scar rental botnet confirmed that the group contains not only the new botnet family found this time, but also other botnet families Mirai and Moobot.
Moobot est un variant de Mirai, découvert en 2019 par Netlab 360. Il cible des équipements IoT à faible sécurité, se connecte à un serveur C2 et exécute des attaques DDoS.
In February 2024, the FBI dismantled Moobot, a botnet of Ubiquiti Edge OS routers used by the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) to proxy malicious traffic in cyberespionage attacks.
For instance, in February 2024, the FBI dismantled Moobot, a botnet of Ubiquiti Edge OS routers used by Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) to proxy malicious traffic in cyberespionage attacks.
Techniques & procedures
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
Internal Alien Labs research has identified new Moobot, a Mirai variant botnet, infrastructure scanning for known but uncommon vulnerabilities in Tenda routers.
Resource Development
4 techniques
Resource Development
Un C2 actif est identifié : 162.141.92.192 (port TCP/14123), hébergé chez DeluxHost à Amsterdam (ASN 214677).
APT28 threat actors have accessed EdgeRouters previously compromised by an OpenSSH trojan.
Подготовка Network Devices T1584.008, Resource Development Массовая компрометация SOHO-роутеров (Ubiquiti EdgeRouter, TP-Link TL-WR841N).
APT28 actors accessed EdgeRouters compromised by Moobot, a botnet that installs OpenSSH trojans on compromised hardware.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
Cybercriminals not linked with the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) first infiltrated Ubiquiti Edge OS routers and deployed the Moobot malware, targeting Internet-exposed devices with widely known default administrator passwords.
Internal Alien Labs research has identified new Moobot, a Mirai variant botnet, infrastructure scanning for known but uncommon vulnerabilities in Tenda routers... CVE-2014-8361, CVE-2017-17215, CVE-2018-14558, CVE-2020-10987
该僵尸网络有三个用途:中继窃取的Microsoft Exchange认证哈希、在住宅IP地址上托管钓鱼页面,以及在劫持的路由器上运行自定义Python脚本。
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
Att&ck IDs: T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job
CVE-2021-36260 results from insufficient input validation, allowing unauthenticated users to inject malicious content into a <language> tag to trigger a command injection attack on a Hikvision product.
该僵尸网络有三个用途:中继窃取的Microsoft Exchange认证哈希、在住宅IP地址上托管钓鱼页面,以及在劫持的路由器上运行自定义Python脚本。
[The bot will] write as executable, rename, fork, and execute the returned ELF file.
During our analysis, we observed numerous payloads attempting to leverage this vulnerability to probing the status of devices or extracting sensitive data from victims.
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
echo -e "echo \"Starting logging\"\nklogd\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\n/cmslite/.o balloon;" > /etc/init.d/S11log
Att&ck IDs: T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job
Cybercriminals not linked with the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) first infiltrated Ubiquiti Edge OS routers and deployed the Moobot malware, targeting Internet-exposed devices with widely known default administrator passwords.
Att&ck IDs: T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
echo -e "echo \"Starting logging\"\nklogd\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\n/cmslite/.o balloon;" > /etc/init.d/S11log
Att&ck IDs: T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job
Cybercriminals not linked with the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) first infiltrated Ubiquiti Edge OS routers and deployed the Moobot malware, targeting Internet-exposed devices with widely known default administrator passwords.
Att&ck IDs: T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Stealth
6 techniques
Stealth
Att&ck IDs: T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information
This variant also forks itself with the process name “/usr/sbin*” to try to look like a normal process while wiping out the original file, “macHelper”.
Att&ck IDs: T1070 - Indicator Removal on Host
First, because the final Moobot will be saved as “macHelper,” it first tries to remove any file already named “macHelper.” ... while wiping out the original file, “macHelper”.
Cybercriminals not linked with the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) first infiltrated Ubiquiti Edge OS routers and deployed the Moobot malware, targeting Internet-exposed devices with widely known default administrator passwords.
DNS spoofing Impersonation T1656, Defense Evasion Перенаправление DNS-ответов на attacker-controlled серверы с фишинговыми login-страницами M365
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Finally, it changes commonly used commands, such as “reboot,” to prevent an administrator from invoking reboot on the affected device.
Credential Access
5 techniques
Credential Access
The botnet served three purposes: relaying stolen authentication hashes toward Microsoft Exchange...
Moobot samples are mainly spread through weak telnet passwords and some nday and 0day vulnerabilities.
Att&ck IDs: T1552 - Unsecured Credentials
“硬编码登陆账号密码列表: root/icatch99 report/8Jg0SR8K50 默认账号密码: admin/123456”
Authentication traffic toward Microsoft 365 and similar services was then funnelled through Adversary-in-the-Middle nodes for credential and OAuth-token harvesting.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
2020-06-09 We saw the scans targeting the vulnerability ... Moobot scans port 8000 through Loader, after locating the right target device, Moobot samples will be dropped via the vulnerabilities.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Authentication traffic toward Microsoft 365 and similar services was then funnelled through Adversary-in-the-Middle nodes for credential and OAuth-token harvesting.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
Un C2 actif est identifié : 162.141.92.192 (port TCP/14123) ... avec plus de 500 sessions d’attaque courtes observées en août 2026. Le panel StresD Pro+ repose sur un backend Node.js/Express sur WebSocket.
The FBI dismantled Moobot, a botnet of Ubiquiti Edge OS routers used by the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) to proxy malicious traffic in cyberespionage attacks.
Russian state-sponsored threat actors have also been observed enlisting compromised Ubiquiti Edge OS routers into a botnet designed to proxy malicious traffic.
The binary protocol used by Condi to communicate with the C2 server is a modified version of that initially implemented in Mirai.
Le code révèle une fonctionnalité dormante de téléchargement et exécution (download-and-execute) jamais documentée auparavant, représentant le mécanisme le plus plausible derrière la réutilisation de Moobot par APT28.
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
Moobot cible des équipements IoT à faible sécurité, se connecte à un serveur C2 et exécute des attaques DDoS. Le panel StresD Pro+ génère également du trafic d’attaque via un script Python implémentant un flooder Minecraft Bedrock Edition / RakNet.
Except for SYN flood, the C2 server has other attacking commands, such as 0x06 for UDP flood, 0x04 for ACK flood, and 0x05 for ACK+PUSH flood.
Moobot DDoS campaign Moobot's DDoS attacks are active all year round ... Here are the DDoS targets launched by Moobot.
Observables
316 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
53 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.