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GRU is Russia’s military intelligence service, formally the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, and is a state actor associated with cyber espionage, disruptive cyber operations, sabotage, targeted violence, and psychological and information operations. Public reporting and government attributions have linked GRU activity to multiple operational units, including Unit 26165 and Unit 74455 in the 2016 U.S. election intrusion-and-leak campaign, as well as regional psychological operations and information operations structures across Russian military districts. GRU has also been associated with specialized formations such as Unit 67606, a Black Sea Fleet reconnaissance brigade assessed to include an embedded PSYOP capability. GRU has been attributed with spearphishing, credential theft, malware deployment, keylogging, screenshot capture, persistence, data exfiltration, use of spoofed personas, and staged information release operations. In the 2016 U.S. election operation, GRU officers were indicted for compromising Democratic Party organizations and campaign personnel, stealing documents and emails, and disseminating them through cutout personas and leak platforms to influence political outcomes. GRU has also been publicly blamed for disruptive DDoS attacks against Ukrainian government and banking targets in February 2022, activity assessed as part of broader preparation for military operations and hybrid warfare. Beyond direct intrusions, GRU has used compromised network infrastructure for operational obfuscation and proxying of malicious traffic. U.S. authorities stated that the Moobot botnet of compromised Ubiquiti Edge OS routers was operated by GRU to support cyberespionage against the United States and allied nations. GRU is also identified as a major espionage threat to Switzerland and other European states, and Russia-linked hybrid activity in Europe has included sabotage, arson, and targeted violence. The service has additionally been implicated by the United Kingdom in the 2018 Salisbury Novichok poisoning, including prior targeting of Yulia Skripal’s email accounts. Known aliases and references include GRU, Main Intelligence Directorate, and Russian military intelligence.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
52 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
The NotPetya attacks began by targeting Ukrainian agencies, but it quickly spread through the use of the EternalBlue exploit, which was developed by the National Security Agency and used in the WannaCry ransomware attacks.
In its own advisory for the CVE-2023-50224 vulnerability, TP-Link said that many of its products are affected, but that all of them have reached end-of-life status, which means they are no longer supported by the company.
19 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Described as conducting targeted violence and industrial sabotage in Europe, including the Salisbury poisoning and a broader Russian-directed arson/sabotage network using criminal proxies recruited via Telegram.
Used the Moobot botnet of compromised Ubiquiti Edge OS routers to proxy malicious traffic in cyberespionage operations.
Russian military intelligence is described as operating a regional psychological operations and information operations structure across military districts, including a unique PSYOP-capable unit, military unit 67606, in the Black Sea Fleet.
Russian military intelligence service identified as a principal espionage and hybrid cyber threat to Switzerland and as using Swiss-based infrastructure for operations abroad.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.