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Malware1 associated actor

Anatsa

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 12 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK34Techniques
IOCs43Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceCrypto theft
Delivery
SmishingFake updateLure
Platforms
Android

Anatsa, also known as TeaBot, is an Android banking trojan discovered in January 2021. It combines credential theft, remote device control, and semi-automated transaction capabilities to facilitate financial fraud through victims’ own devices. Its targets include banking and cryptocurrency applications, with campaigns expanding to financial institutions in multiple countries, including the Netherlands.

Anatsa steals credentials through fraudulent overlays impersonating targeted financial applications. It also supports keylogging, SMS interception, contact and device-information exfiltration, and theft of Google Authenticator codes. By abusing Android Accessibility Services, it reads screen content and interface metadata and enables operators to observe the screen, interact with interface elements, launch applications, and manipulate text input. These capabilities support on-device fraud rather than relying solely on stolen credentials used elsewhere. Anatsa can obstruct normal uninstallation and interfere with device shutdown or reboot, complicating removal.

Distribution commonly uses staged installation through apparently legitimate utility applications on Google Play, including PDF readers and QR or barcode scanners. These applications may retain genuine functionality while prompting users to install a purported update that delivers the banking payload and requests accessibility access. Some distribution applications initially appeared benign before receiving malicious updates. Anatsa has also been delivered through SMS phishing campaigns using parcel-delivery impersonation. Documented campaigns use device profiling and regional filtering to select recipients, while some samples employ environment checks, malformed application archives, and runtime code encryption to hinder analysis and detection.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Brunhilda

Anatsa was discovered by ThreatFabric in January 2021. Anatsa is a rather advanced Android banking trojan with RAT and semi-ATS capabilities.

via threatfabric blogthreatfabric.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

the malware authors are believed to have paid to appear in Google Ads served within other legitimate applications and games

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Families like Anatsa and Cabassous spread to thousands of victims by international SMiShing campaigns, coupled with various kinds of web phishing pages to trick users into downloading malicious APKs.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Usually, the SMS contains some link that claims to provide the information about your parcel from DHL or UPS. The link leads to the page with a localized text corresponding to the region defined by the victim’s IP location.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

When it detects one, it overlays a fake login screen that mirrors the real app, tricking the user into entering their credentials directly into the malware.

Execution

3 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence6

the user is forced to update the app in order to continue using the app... the user will be prompted to download and install it.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

A fake document reader application, designed to look like a standard file management utility, was found secretly delivering the dangerous Anatsa Android banking trojan.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence4

It grants information to the malicious actors about everything displayed in the device’s screen, allowing the bot to interact with the UI elements and record all the information that is displayed in them.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence4

It grants information to the malicious actors about everything displayed in the device’s screen, allowing the bot to interact with the UI elements and record all the information that is displayed in them.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence2

The apps were programmed to download an "update" followed by prompting users to grant them Accessibility Service privileges and permissions to install apps from unknown third-party sources.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

the installer uses runtime string decryption powered by a dynamically generated DES key. The payload is hidden inside a corrupted ZIP archive with invalid compression and encryption flags, which causes most static analysis tools to fail completely.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence2

decrypts the malicious payload file called eepHM.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘eepHM.odex’ and loads the decrypted file

T1036MasqueradingEvidence11

These apps posed as QR code scanners, PDF scanners, and cryptocurrency apps.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

This malware also terminates the predefined list of apps process(es)... that list includes a few popular security products... in order to remain undetected.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

The file only executes at runtime and is deleted immediately after loading... The payload is further embedded inside a JSON file that is dropped and erased during execution, leaving minimal evidence of the infection on the device.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

If the malware detects it is running inside an analysis environment, or if it cannot reach its command-and-control server, it simply shows a working file manager interface to the user.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

the configuration contains filter rules based on device model. Based on the models being filtered out and the code of the dropper, we can draw a conclusion that this is done to avoid downloading the payload on emulators or research environment.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

This app stays stealth by hiding its icon from the application drawer after its first launch.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Some of the malicious features include Key logging, Disabling Google Play Protect...

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence7

This is a classic Android bot, equipped with credential stealing capabilities such as the use of overlays (fake login screens) for crypto-currency wallet apps and Android banking apps.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence5

Other features include keylogging, contact information and device information exfiltration, and accessibility logging.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

the malware C2 sends the specific payload(s) to the victim device to perform an overlay attack and track all the activity related to the identified targeted application(s).

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Anatsa is a rather advanced Android banking trojan with RAT and semi-ATS capabilities.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

grab_google_auth Triggers stealing of google authenticator codes

Discovery

5 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It sent information gathered by software development kits, or SDKs, to a command-and-control server. That information included clues about where the installation originated, helping operators decide whether to send back a harmful payload.

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

get_accounts Triggers stealing the list of accounts on the device

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

If the malware detects it is running inside an analysis environment, or if it cannot reach its command-and-control server, it simply shows a working file manager interface to the user.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

the configuration contains filter rules based on device model. Based on the models being filtered out and the code of the dropper, we can draw a conclusion that this is done to avoid downloading the payload on emulators or research environment.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence3

This behavior is in line with Anatsa moving from region to region, constantly updating its list of targeted financial institutions.

Collection

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence7

This is a classic Android bot, equipped with credential stealing capabilities such as the use of overlays (fake login screens) for crypto-currency wallet apps and Android banking apps.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence5

Other features include keylogging, contact information and device information exfiltration, and accessibility logging.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

the malware C2 sends the specific payload(s) to the victim device to perform an overlay attack and track all the activity related to the identified targeted application(s).

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

threat actors here use MediaProjectionManager API to obtain a live streaming of the device screen on-demand and also interact with it via Accessibility Services.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

The PTI team has de-anonymized the C&C server and discovered that Toddler has already infected more than 7,632 devices at the time of this report.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

He pointed to the Anatsa case from last year, an Android malware family used to drain bank accounts, where SI-CERT analyzed the residential proxy side.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence10

it's also designed to retrieve a malicious APK file hosted on GitHub

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

When comparing Cabassous with Anatsa, the more dangerous of the two appears to be Anatsa due to its RAT capability.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence3

All the communications between C2 and the malware remain encrypted using an XOR key

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Besides harvesting credentials, the bot also gathers all contact information (phone numbers) from a victim’s device... Other features include keylogging, contact information and device information exfiltration

Indicators of compromise

Observables

43 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

41 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching43Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping34Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.