Anatsa
- Type
- Banking trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceCrypto theft
- Delivery
- SmishingFake updateLure
- Platforms
- Android
Anatsa, also known as TeaBot, is an Android banking trojan discovered in January 2021. It combines credential theft, remote device control, and semi-automated transaction capabilities to facilitate financial fraud through victims’ own devices. Its targets include banking and cryptocurrency applications, with campaigns expanding to financial institutions in multiple countries, including the Netherlands.
Anatsa steals credentials through fraudulent overlays impersonating targeted financial applications. It also supports keylogging, SMS interception, contact and device-information exfiltration, and theft of Google Authenticator codes. By abusing Android Accessibility Services, it reads screen content and interface metadata and enables operators to observe the screen, interact with interface elements, launch applications, and manipulate text input. These capabilities support on-device fraud rather than relying solely on stolen credentials used elsewhere. Anatsa can obstruct normal uninstallation and interfere with device shutdown or reboot, complicating removal.
Distribution commonly uses staged installation through apparently legitimate utility applications on Google Play, including PDF readers and QR or barcode scanners. These applications may retain genuine functionality while prompting users to install a purported update that delivers the banking payload and requests accessibility access. Some distribution applications initially appeared benign before receiving malicious updates. Anatsa has also been delivered through SMS phishing campaigns using parcel-delivery impersonation. Documented campaigns use device profiling and regional filtering to select recipients, while some samples employ environment checks, malformed application archives, and runtime code encryption to hinder analysis and detection.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Anatsa was discovered by ThreatFabric in January 2021. Anatsa is a rather advanced Android banking trojan with RAT and semi-ATS capabilities.
Techniques & procedures
34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
the malware authors are believed to have paid to appear in Google Ads served within other legitimate applications and games
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
Families like Anatsa and Cabassous spread to thousands of victims by international SMiShing campaigns, coupled with various kinds of web phishing pages to trick users into downloading malicious APKs.
Usually, the SMS contains some link that claims to provide the information about your parcel from DHL or UPS. The link leads to the page with a localized text corresponding to the region defined by the victim’s IP location.
When it detects one, it overlays a fake login screen that mirrors the real app, tricking the user into entering their credentials directly into the malware.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
the user is forced to update the app in order to continue using the app... the user will be prompted to download and install it.
A fake document reader application, designed to look like a standard file management utility, was found secretly delivering the dangerous Anatsa Android banking trojan.
this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
It grants information to the malicious actors about everything displayed in the device’s screen, allowing the bot to interact with the UI elements and record all the information that is displayed in them.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
It grants information to the malicious actors about everything displayed in the device’s screen, allowing the bot to interact with the UI elements and record all the information that is displayed in them.
The apps were programmed to download an "update" followed by prompting users to grant them Accessibility Service privileges and permissions to install apps from unknown third-party sources.
Stealth
10 techniques
Stealth
the installer uses runtime string decryption powered by a dynamically generated DES key. The payload is hidden inside a corrupted ZIP archive with invalid compression and encryption flags, which causes most static analysis tools to fail completely.
decrypts the malicious payload file called eepHM.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘eepHM.odex’ and loads the decrypted file
These apps posed as QR code scanners, PDF scanners, and cryptocurrency apps.
This malware also terminates the predefined list of apps process(es)... that list includes a few popular security products... in order to remain undetected.
The file only executes at runtime and is deleted immediately after loading... The payload is further embedded inside a JSON file that is dropped and erased during execution, leaving minimal evidence of the infection on the device.
this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file
If the malware detects it is running inside an analysis environment, or if it cannot reach its command-and-control server, it simply shows a working file manager interface to the user.
the configuration contains filter rules based on device model. Based on the models being filtered out and the code of the dropper, we can draw a conclusion that this is done to avoid downloading the payload on emulators or research environment.
This app stays stealth by hiding its icon from the application drawer after its first launch.
this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Some of the malicious features include Key logging, Disabling Google Play Protect...
Credential Access
5 techniques
Credential Access
This is a classic Android bot, equipped with credential stealing capabilities such as the use of overlays (fake login screens) for crypto-currency wallet apps and Android banking apps.
Other features include keylogging, contact information and device information exfiltration, and accessibility logging.
the malware C2 sends the specific payload(s) to the victim device to perform an overlay attack and track all the activity related to the identified targeted application(s).
Anatsa is a rather advanced Android banking trojan with RAT and semi-ATS capabilities.
grab_google_auth Triggers stealing of google authenticator codes
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
It sent information gathered by software development kits, or SDKs, to a command-and-control server. That information included clues about where the installation originated, helping operators decide whether to send back a harmful payload.
get_accounts Triggers stealing the list of accounts on the device
If the malware detects it is running inside an analysis environment, or if it cannot reach its command-and-control server, it simply shows a working file manager interface to the user.
the configuration contains filter rules based on device model. Based on the models being filtered out and the code of the dropper, we can draw a conclusion that this is done to avoid downloading the payload on emulators or research environment.
This behavior is in line with Anatsa moving from region to region, constantly updating its list of targeted financial institutions.
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
This is a classic Android bot, equipped with credential stealing capabilities such as the use of overlays (fake login screens) for crypto-currency wallet apps and Android banking apps.
Other features include keylogging, contact information and device information exfiltration, and accessibility logging.
the malware C2 sends the specific payload(s) to the victim device to perform an overlay attack and track all the activity related to the identified targeted application(s).
threat actors here use MediaProjectionManager API to obtain a live streaming of the device screen on-demand and also interact with it via Accessibility Services.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
The PTI team has de-anonymized the C&C server and discovered that Toddler has already infected more than 7,632 devices at the time of this report.
He pointed to the Anatsa case from last year, an Android malware family used to drain bank accounts, where SI-CERT analyzed the residential proxy side.
it's also designed to retrieve a malicious APK file hosted on GitHub
When comparing Cabassous with Anatsa, the more dangerous of the two appears to be Anatsa due to its RAT capability.
All the communications between C2 and the malware remain encrypted using an XOR key
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Besides harvesting credentials, the bot also gathers all contact information (phone numbers) from a victim’s device... Other features include keylogging, contact information and device information exfiltration
Observables
43 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
41 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.