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Malware1 associated actor

Crocodilus

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissanceCrypto theftSpoofing
Delivery
MalvertisingFake updateLanding pageLure
Platforms
Android

Crocodilus is an Android banking Trojan discovered by ThreatFabric in March 2025 that combines credential theft, cryptocurrency-wallet theft, and remote device takeover. Initially observed targeting financial applications in Spain and Turkey, its campaigns subsequently expanded across Europe, South America, and other regions. Distribution includes malicious advertisements and deceptive applications impersonating banking, e-commerce, casino, cryptocurrency, and utility software, as well as fake browser updates. A proprietary dropper facilitates installation while bypassing Android 13 and later restrictions.

After persuading victims to enable Android Accessibility services, Crocodilus monitors application launches and displays fraudulent overlays over targeted financial applications. Accessibility-based logging captures text changes and interface content, enabling keylogging and extraction of wallet seed phrases and private keys. The malware can prompt cryptocurrency-wallet users to reveal recovery information under a false backup pretext. It also collects SMS messages, contacts, device information, and authentication codes displayed by Google Authenticator, and can send SMS messages and execute USSD requests.

Operators can remotely inspect interface elements and simulate taps and gestures to control infected devices and conduct fraudulent transactions. Crocodilus conceals remote activity behind a black overlay and can mute the device. It can also insert attacker-specified contacts, including purported bank-support numbers, to support impersonation and social engineering.

Analyzed variants employ packing, encrypted payloads, string obfuscation, dynamic code loading, and malformed application archive headers to obstruct analysis. Decrypted payload files may be deleted after loading, and command-and-control communications use encrypted and additionally encoded messages. Target application lists and overlay configurations are supplied remotely.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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sybra

This environment has paved the way for the emergence of Crocodilus, a new and highly capable mobile banking Trojan discovered by ThreatFabric.

via threatfabricthreatfabric.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

Mimicking the apps of banks and e-commerce platforms, the malware was promoted via Facebook Ads. These ads encouraged users to download an app to claim bonus points.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Upon clicking the "Download" button, users were redirected to a malicious site that delivered the Crocodilus dropper, capable of bypassing Android 13+ restrictions.

Execution

1 technique
T1648Serverless ExecutionEvidence1

"New Android Trojan Crocodilus Abuses Accessibility to Steal Banking and Crypto Credentials"

Persistence

2 techniques
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

It is based on the AccessibilityLogging feature, already present in first variants but further improved with pre-processing of the logged data displayed on the screen.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Upon receiving the command “TRU9MMRHBCRO”, Crocodilus adds a specified contact to the victim’s contact list.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

It is based on the AccessibilityLogging feature, already present in first variants but further improved with pre-processing of the logged data displayed on the screen.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

These include: Code packing for both the dropper and payload Additional XOR encryption of the payload (Crocodilus) to conceal it during analysis Entangled, convoluted code to complicate reverse engineering

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

One such campaign disguised itself as an online casino... Another campaign is targeting Spanish users, distributing Crocodilus disguised as a browser update.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Initial installation is done via a proprietary dropper bypassing Android 13+ restrictions.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Upon receiving the command “TRU9MMRHBCRO”, Crocodilus adds a specified contact to the victim’s contact list.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Once installed, Crocodilus actively monitors the launch of Turkish financial apps, overlaying them with fake login pages.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Another data theft feature of Crocodilus is a keylogger. However, it is more accurate to call it an Accessibility Logger... it effectively logs all text changes performed by a victim, making it a keylogger, but the capabilities go beyond just keylogging.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Upon receiving the command “TRU9MMRHBCRO”, Crocodilus adds a specified contact to the victim’s contact list.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

This variant was equipped with an additional parser, helping to extract seed phrases and private keys of specific wallets.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Once installed, Crocodilus actively monitors the launch of Turkish financial apps, overlaying them with fake login pages.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Another data theft feature of Crocodilus is a keylogger. However, it is more accurate to call it an Accessibility Logger... it effectively logs all text changes performed by a victim, making it a keylogger, but the capabilities go beyond just keylogging.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

RAT command “TG32XAZADG” triggers a screen capture on the content of the Google Authenticator application... capture the text displayed (the name of the OTP code, as well as its value) and send these to the C2.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Once granted, the malware connects to the command-and-control (C2) server to receive instructions, including the list of target applications and the overlays to be used.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

With stolen PII and credentials, threat actors can take full control of a victim’s device using built-in remote access... Crocodilus is also able to make any remote access “hidden” – displaying a black screen overlay on top of all the activities.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence2

[Crocodilus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9004) has stolen cryptocurrency wallet details from victim devices.(Citation: ThreatFabric_Crocodilus_March2025)(Citation: ThreatFabric_Crocodilus_June2025)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

19 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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pointwild blogNews · Oct 30, 2026Don’t Make it Easy for Them: Seven Everyday Cybercrime Traps | Point WildDisguises itself as useful mobile applications and requests Accessibility access. It overlays banking applications with counterfeit login screens, reads SMS one-time passwords, and adds fraudulent bank-support numbers to contacts. The illustrative scenario also describes suppressing alerts during fraudulent transfers.Read more ↗shindan blogNews · Sep 17, 2026Blog - Crocodilus - A deep dive into its structure and capabilitiesAndroid banking trojan that abuses user-granted Accessibility permissions to steal credentials, cryptocurrency private keys and seed phrases, and Google Authenticator codes. Its RAT capabilities include remotely executing gestures, extracting UI information, concealing activity, and inserting attacker-specified contacts for social engineering. The analyzed variant impersonates Chrome and uses a two-stage packer that decrypts an embedded DEX payload, dynamically loads it, and deletes the decrypted file from disk. Modified APK ZIP headers obstruct analysis and, in the reported test, caused Google Play Protect scanning to fail while returning a SAFE verdict. C2 communication uses HTTP and WebSockets, with AES-CBC encryption and additional Base64 and string-reversal obfuscation. The content identifies Pragma Project as a codename observed in a variant.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Sep 11, 2026New Android Ransomware Records Screens, Steals OTPs and Secretly Takes Photos of Victims | Cryptika CybersecurityMentioned only as a comparison for abuse of Android Accessibility permissions.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Sep 11, 2026New Android Ransomware Records Screens, Steals OTPs and Secretly Takes Photos of VictimsMentioned only as a comparison for Android Accessibility-permission abuse.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

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IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.