SPAWNMOLE is a C-based, 32-bit ELF tunneling tool targeting Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. It hijacks an existing process and hooks its communication capabilities to establish a proxy server. Its SOCKS5 tunneling functionality enables attackers to relay network traffic through compromised appliances and evade network defenses during post-exploitation activity.
SPAWNMOLE belongs to the SPAWN malware ecosystem, alongside the SPAWNANT installer, SPAWNSNAIL SSH backdoor, and SPAWNSLOTH log-tampering utility. SPAWNANT persistently installs SPAWNMOLE and other components on compromised Ivanti appliances; persistence is provided by the installer rather than established as an independent SPAWNMOLE capability.
SPAWNMOLE has been deployed by UNC5337, an activity cluster subsequently merged into UNC5221, a suspected China-nexus espionage actor. Its deployment has been observed in intrusions involving exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure vulnerabilities. The broader SPAWN ecosystem supports stealthy, long-term access to edge appliances in campaigns spanning multiple countries and industries.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
UNC5221 is a suspected China-nexus actor that Mandiant is tracking as the only group exploiting CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 during the pre-disclosure time frame since early Dec. 2023.
UNC5330 has been observed chaining CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887 to compromise Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as Feb. 2024. Post-compromise activity by UNC5330 includes deployment of PHANTOMNET and TONERJAM.
Mandiant has identified zero-day exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 in the wild beginning mid-December 2024. CVE-2025-0282 is an unauthenticated stack-based buffer overflow.
It includes multiple modules with diverse capabilities: SPAWNMOLE: SOCKS5 tunneler
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The SPAWN ecosystem of malware ... includes ... SPAWNMOLE tunneler.
The SPAWN ecosystem of malware ... includes ... SPAWNMOLE tunneler.
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A SPAWNCHIMERA module that provides SOCKS5 tunneling/proxying to route attacker traffic through the compromised appliance for internal access and operational concealment.
Component malware whose functionality is incorporated into the SPAWNCHIMERA framework.
A tunnelling component used to evade network defenses and support covert communications.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.