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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

Avaddon

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 17 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK58Techniques
IOCs63Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionReconnaissancePersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionDDOS
Delivery
MalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

Avaddon is a Windows ransomware family distributed through a ransomware-as-a-service operation associated with the threat actor RIDDLE SPIDER. It encrypts victim files using AES-256 and RSA-2048 and appends a random extension to encrypted files. The malware uses the Windows Crypto API to generate AES keys.

Avaddon performs reconnaissance by collecting information about running processes and the victim's external IP address, and by enumerating shared folders and mapped volumes. It establishes persistence through Windows Registry autostart entries and bypasses User Account Control using the CMSTPLUA COM interface. It also decrypts encrypted strings during execution.

The Avaddon operation used affiliates to conduct intrusions, with some affiliates employing SystemBC as a post-exploitation tool. Beginning in January 2021, its operators used DDoS attacks against victims as an additional extortion tactic. The operation shut down in 2021, and decryption tools are available for Avaddon-encrypted files.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2019-11510via zdnet zero dayExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Arbitrary File Read in Pulse Connect SecureThe security researcher noted that all the Pulse Secure VPN servers included in the list were running a firmware version vulnerable to the CVE-2019-11510 vulnerability. Bank Security believes that the hacker who compiled this list scanned the entire internet IPv4 address space for Pulse Secure VPN servers, used an exploit for the CVE-2019-11510 vulnerability to gain access to systems, dump server details (including usernames and passwords), and then collected all the information in one central repository.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Avaddon

Avaddon ransomware gang updating its affiliates rules following the Colonial Pipeline disaster.

via reliaquest com threat huntingreliaquest.com
RIDDLE SPIDER

“RIDDLE SPIDER: the Avaddon ransomware operators, whose affiliates use SystemBC as a post exploitation tool.”

via malbeacon blogblog.deception.pro
Bassterlord

Bassterlord, a suspected Russian-speaking threat actor who previously served as an affiliate for the LockBit ransomware gang, but also other rival RaaS operations, such as REvil, Avaddon, and RansomExx.

via the record mediatherecord.media
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

58 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

“Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure (T1583) · Virtual Private Server (T1583.003)”

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

más adelante hacer uso de credenciales de acceso débiles en servicios de acceso remoto, como RDP y redes VPN

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

the ransomware operators obtained initial access via remote access portals such as RDP and VPN, a pivot away from direct email access.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Affiliates who join the program are responsible for distributing the ransomware via spam, compromising networks, and exploit kits.

T1566PhishingEvidence5

The bot loader has been propagated through a variety of means over the years, including being loaded by other malware, freeware, and unwanted programs, or delivered by phishing emails from already-infected bots.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

In 2020 and 2021 we observed the bot loader being spread through Phorpiex bot-delivered emails with .zip or other archive file attachments.

Execution

10 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence5

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) uses wmic.exe to delete shadow copies.(Citation: Hornet Security Avaddon June 2020)

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Registrando una Tarea Programada (Scheduled Task)

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

El código JScript a su vez ejecuta comandos de Powershell para descargar el ransomware de un servidor web

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

también se ha visto utilizar en sus comienzos archivos Excel con macros maliciosas

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence5

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) has been executed through a malicious JScript downloader.(Citation: Hornet Security Avaddon June 2020)(Citation: Awake Security Avaddon)

T1106Native APIEvidence4

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) has used the Windows Crypto API to generate an AES key.(Citation: Hornet Security Avaddon June 2020)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence2

After the attachment is downloaded and ran, it uses a PowerShell command and the BITSAdmin command-line tool to download and run the ransomware payload.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

incluyen un archivo JScript malicioso adjunto... para hacerle creer a la potencial víctima que se trata de un archivo comprimido que contiene una foto comprometedora

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

“Execution User Execution (T1204) · Malicious File (T1204.002)”

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence1

Avaddon bypasses UAC using the CMSTPLUA COM interface... LockBit 3.0 can bypass UAC to execute code with elevated privileges through an elevated Component Object Model (COM) interface. Medusa Group has attempted to bypass UAC using Component Object Model (COM) interface.

Persistence

7 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Registrando una Tarea Programada (Scheduled Task)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

más adelante hacer uso de credenciales de acceso débiles en servicios de acceso remoto, como RDP y redes VPN

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence13

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) modifies several registry keys for persistence and UAC bypass.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

the ransomware operators obtained initial access via remote access portals such as RDP and VPN, a pivot away from direct email access.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence2

After the attachment is downloaded and ran, it uses a PowerShell command and the BITSAdmin command-line tool to download and run the ransomware payload.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Persistence mechanisms can also vary, and we have observed variations of Avaddon that utilize the creation of a new Windows service, as well as the use of scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) uses registry run keys for persistence.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

Privilege Escalation

7 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Registrando una Tarea Programada (Scheduled Task)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“Defense Evasion… Process Injection (T1055)”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

más adelante hacer uso de credenciales de acceso débiles en servicios de acceso remoto, como RDP y redes VPN

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Persistence mechanisms can also vary, and we have observed variations of Avaddon that utilize the creation of a new Windows service, as well as the use of scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) uses registry run keys for persistence.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Avaddon intenta elevar sus privilegios a través de un bypass en el User Account Control (UAC)

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence10

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) bypasses UAC using the CMSTPLUA COM interface.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) has used encrypted strings.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

“Defense Evasion… Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) · Software Packing (T1027.002)”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

As the bot loader updates, the key values change to reflect new files, randomized file paths, and masqueraded system files. The example below illustrates a change from SVCHOST to LSASS

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“Defense Evasion… Process Injection (T1055)”

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

WMIC.EXE is typically used to remove VSS via SHADOWCOPY DELETE /nointeractive.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

más adelante hacer uso de credenciales de acceso débiles en servicios de acceso remoto, como RDP y redes VPN

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence9

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) has decrypted encrypted strings.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence2

After the attachment is downloaded and ran, it uses a PowerShell command and the BITSAdmin command-line tool to download and run the ransomware payload.

T1202Indirect Command ExecutionEvidence1

In late June 2020, the malware added the option to launch payloads via PowerShell.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Utiliza técnicas para dificultar el análisis: anti-VM, anti-debugging

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Avaddon payloads perform checks to insure they are not executing on a victim device located in certain regions of CIS. The GetUserDefaultLCID() function (and/or GetKeyboardLayout() ) is used to determine the users’ default locale.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Utiliza técnicas para dificultar el análisis: anti-VM, anti-debugging

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence13

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) modifies several registry keys for persistence and UAC bypass.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence12

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) looks for and attempts to stop anti-malware solutions.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

Discovery

13 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK T1012 Query Registry

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) can collect the external IP address of the victim.(Citation: Awake Security Avaddon)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence8

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) has collected information about running processes.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence1

“Discovery… Permissions Groups Discovery (T1069)”

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

realiza primero tareas de reconocimiento para identificar principalmente bases de datos, backup y copias shadow

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) has searched for specific files prior to encryption.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence5

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) has enumerated shared folders and mapped volumes.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1

“Discovery… Domain Trust Discovery (T1482)”

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Utiliza técnicas para dificultar el análisis: anti-VM, anti-debugging

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Avaddon payloads perform checks to insure they are not executing on a victim device located in certain regions of CIS. The GetUserDefaultLCID() function (and/or GetKeyboardLayout() ) is used to determine the users’ default locale.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence7

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Utiliza técnicas para dificultar el análisis: anti-VM, anti-debugging

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

hacer uso de credenciales de acceso débiles en servicios de acceso remoto, como RDP y redes VPN

Collection

2 techniques
T1074Data StagedEvidence1

more and more ransomware gangs prefer to steal the data before encrypting it, to use it as leverage in ransom negotiations

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

“Collection Archive Collected Data (T1560) · Archive via Utility (T1560.001)”

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“Command and Control Application Layer Protocol (T1071) · Web Protocols (T1071.001)”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

It uses three distinct types of C2 to fulfil different goals during and after installation: Downloading the Phorpiex malware implant Downloading updates to the Phorpiex implant and new exploit modules

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

“Command and Control… Encrypted Channel (T1573)”

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Muchos grupos de ransomware adoptaron la modalidad extorsiva del doxing; es decir, el robo de información de los sistemas comprometidos previo al cifrado

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

The data of the victim was leaked in full after the victim apparently refused to pay the ransom.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

“Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) · Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002)”

T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage SitesEvidence1

As 14 ransomware gangs are now stealing data and publishing it in their blogs, we can assume that more ransomware operators will adopt the tactic and will require double ransoms.

Impact

6 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence22

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) encrypts the victim system using a combination of AES256 and RSA encryption schemes.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1489Service StopEvidence5

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) looks for and attempts to stop database processes.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence10

[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools.(Citation: Hornet Security Avaddon June 2020)(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

Triple extortion follows a straightforward formula: adding DDoS attacks to the aforementioned encryption and data exposure threats.

T1498.001Direct Network FloodEvidence1

Avaddon was one of the first to add DDoS attacks as yet another intimidation mechanism to their arsenal: If clients failed to comply with the ransom demands, they stood to experience a damaging DDoS attack.

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence1

otra estrategia extorsiva que el grupo dice llevar adelante son los ataques de DDoS sobre los sitios de las víctimas

Indicators of compromise

Observables

63 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching63Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping58Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.