OtterCandy is a Node.js-based remote-access trojan and information stealer targeting Windows, macOS, and Linux. It combines characteristics of OtterCookie and RATatouille and is used by the North Korea-linked WaterPlum threat actor, also known as Famous Chollima and PurpleBravo, particularly its BlockNovas cluster. Samples date to February 2025, with cross-platform distribution observed from around July 2025. Its recruitment-themed operations target software developers, job seekers, and cryptocurrency, blockchain, and Web3 professionals, including victims in Japan.
OtterCandy is distributed through malicious npm packages, coding assignments, and fraudulent interview websites associated with the Contagious Interview and ClickFake Interview campaigns. ClickFix-style lures and purported camera setup or driver updates induce victims to execute malicious software. The malware communicates with command-and-control infrastructure using Socket.IO and accepts operator commands to search directories, locate files by patterns, and exfiltrate system information, browser credentials, cryptocurrency-wallet data, and confidential files.
Persistence is typically established by a preceding component named DiggingBeaver. OtterCandy also implements a self-restart mechanism that forks another process when it receives an interrupt signal. An update observed in late August 2025 improved victim identification, expanded targeted browser extensions from four to seven, and broadened Chromium browser-data collection from selected data to all files. The update also enhanced anti-forensic cleanup by removing persistence-related registry entries, files, and directories.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
"Hands-on-Keyboard Activity from the DPRK 'PolinRider' Supply Chain Attack" ... #PyPI, #OtterCandy, #PolinRider
WaterPlum actors upload malicious Node Package Manager (NPM) packages embedded with either BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, OtterCandy, or StoatWaffle malware.
The actors seeded malicious NPM packages carrying BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, OtterCandy or StoatWaffle.
WaterPlum approaches targets through social networks, job boards, gig sites and freelance marketplaces. It impersonates employers, then asks candidates to complete a coding task or resolve a supposed problem with interview software.
BeaverTail is JavaScript-based malware hidden inside Node Package Manager packages. OtterCookie is a JavaScript-based Remote Access Trojan and information-stealing malware.
During technical interviews or coding assignments, victims were told to download and run files hosted on developer platforms and code repositories.
「OtterCandyは前段のDiggingBeaverによって永続化が行われます…」「…v2では永続化のためのレジストリキーの削除…」
「OtterCandyは前段のDiggingBeaverによって永続化が行われます…」「…v2では永続化のためのレジストリキーの削除…」
“It impersonates employers, then asks candidates to complete a coding task or resolve a supposed problem with interview software.”
“Deletion of registry keys used for persistence, as well as the deletion of files and directories are added to ss_del command implementation in v2.”
「ss_delコマンドが実行された際…ファイルやディレクトリの削除が実装」
「ss_delコマンドが実行された際、v2では永続化のためのレジストリキーの削除…」
“Other sensitive data targeted for exfiltration includes… Clipboard information, key-logs (recorded keystrokes), screenshots.”
“Once a target is compromised, the attackers attempt to steal ... cryptocurrency private keys and seed phrases...”
The attackers obtained funds or account credentials from more than 7,000 cryptocurrency wallets... Stolen browser logins, wallet keys... can support further theft.
Other sensitive data targeted for exfiltration includes authentication data stored in web browsers (ID, password, etc.) and cryptocurrency-wallet data (private key, seed phrase, etc.).
Once inside, the actors used remote access trojans and infostealers to take browser credentials...
Targeted data includes “Any files or data of interest to the actors on a PC or in shared folders (ID pictures of driver’s licenses, passports, etc.).”
“Other sensitive data targeted for exfiltration includes… Clipboard information, key-logs (recorded keystrokes), screenshots.”
The advisory lists “screenshots” among sensitive data targeted for exfiltration.
The advisory identifies “Clipboard information” as data targeted for exfiltration.
“The stealer begins POSTing host data to 150.251.113[.]223:8443 using rotating browser user agents.”
The multi-step infection chain leads to deployment of various malware families; backdoor access is abused to deliver remote access trojans.
The malware families are described as including one that “sets up a remote access trojan to move deeper into the machine.”
The actors use infostealers to exfiltrate the victim’s sensitive data and cryptocurrency to a Command-and-Control (C2) IP address.
« Fonds ou identifiants volés depuis plus de 7 000 portefeuilles de cryptomonnaies » et « 10,71 millions USD de cryptoactifs exfiltrés vers la RPDC »
7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.