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Malware1 associated actor

OtterCandy

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 4 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
LureClickfixFake update
Platforms
WindowsmacOSLinux

OtterCandy is a Node.js-based remote-access trojan and information stealer targeting Windows, macOS, and Linux. It combines characteristics of OtterCookie and RATatouille and is used by the North Korea-linked WaterPlum threat group, also tracked as Famous Chollima and PurpleBravo. Its deployment is associated particularly with WaterPlum’s Cluster B, commonly called BlockNovas, in the Contagious Interview and ClickFake Interview campaigns. Targets include software developers, job-seeking IT professionals, and cryptocurrency, blockchain, and Web3 specialists, with infections observed in Japan and other regions.

OtterCandy communicates with command-and-control infrastructure using Socket.IO and accepts operator commands to search directories, locate files by pattern, collect system information, and exfiltrate browser credentials, cryptocurrency-wallet data, and sensitive files. Persistence is typically established by a preceding component named DiggingBeaver; OtterCandy also implements a self-restart mechanism that forks another process when it receives a SIGINT signal. An update observed in August 2025 expanded targeted browser extensions, broadened Chromium user-data collection, improved victim identification, and added cleanup behavior that removes persistence-related registry entries, files, and directories.

Distribution uses fraudulent recruitment processes, malicious npm packages, coding assignments, and purported camera-setup or driver-update instructions, including ClickFix lures. Since approximately September 2026, WaterPlum has also delivered OtterCandy through recruitment challenges containing Git repositories configured with malicious clean filters. Routine Git operations or background status checks by development environments can trigger a script that downloads and executes an operating-system-specific payload. OtterCandy version 1.5.12 additionally supports executing NetSupport Manager as a follow-on payload.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Contagious Interview

2026年9月頃から、WaterPlumがGitのcleanフィルタを悪用し、OtterCandy[1]を実行する攻撃事例を観測しています。

via ntt security japanjp.security.ntt
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

"Hands-on-Keyboard Activity from the DPRK 'PolinRider' Supply Chain Attack" ... #PyPI, #OtterCandy, #PolinRider

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

WaterPlum actors upload malicious Node Package Manager (NPM) packages embedded with either BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, OtterCandy, or StoatWaffle malware.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence4

The actors seeded malicious NPM packages carrying BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, OtterCandy or StoatWaffle.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

WaterPlum approaches targets through social networks, job boards, gig sites and freelance marketplaces. It impersonates employers, then asks candidates to complete a coding task or resolve a supposed problem with interview software.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

BeaverTail is JavaScript-based malware hidden inside Node Package Manager packages. OtterCookie is a JavaScript-based Remote Access Trojan and information-stealing malware.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence10

During technical interviews or coding assignments, victims were told to download and run files hosted on developer platforms and code repositories.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

「OtterCandyは前段のDiggingBeaverによって永続化が行われます…」「…v2では永続化のためのレジストリキーの削除…」

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

「OtterCandyは前段のDiggingBeaverによって永続化が行われます…」「…v2では永続化のためのレジストリキーの削除…」

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

“It impersonates employers, then asks candidates to complete a coding task or resolve a supposed problem with interview software.”

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

“Deletion of registry keys used for persistence, as well as the deletion of files and directories are added to ss_del command implementation in v2.”

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

「ss_delコマンドが実行された際…ファイルやディレクトリの削除が実装」

T1070.005Network Share Connection RemovalEvidence1

「ss_delコマンドが実行された際、v2では永続化のためのレジストリキーの削除…」

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

“Other sensitive data targeted for exfiltration includes… Clipboard information, key-logs (recorded keystrokes), screenshots.”

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

“Once a target is compromised, the attackers attempt to steal ... cryptocurrency private keys and seed phrases...”

T1552.004Private KeysEvidence2

The attackers obtained funds or account credentials from more than 7,000 cryptocurrency wallets... Stolen browser logins, wallet keys... can support further theft.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Other sensitive data targeted for exfiltration includes authentication data stored in web browsers (ID, password, etc.) and cryptocurrency-wallet data (private key, seed phrase, etc.).

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence7

Once inside, the actors used remote access trojans and infostealers to take browser credentials...

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence7

Targeted data includes “Any files or data of interest to the actors on a PC or in shared folders (ID pictures of driver’s licenses, passports, etc.).”

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

“Other sensitive data targeted for exfiltration includes… Clipboard information, key-logs (recorded keystrokes), screenshots.”

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence4

The advisory lists “screenshots” among sensitive data targeted for exfiltration.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence3

The advisory identifies “Clipboard information” as data targeted for exfiltration.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“The stealer begins POSTing host data to 150.251.113[.]223:8443 using rotating browser user agents.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The multi-step infection chain leads to deployment of various malware families; backdoor access is abused to deliver remote access trojans.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence6

The malware families are described as including one that “sets up a remote access trojan to move deeper into the machine.”

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

The actors use infostealers to exfiltrate the victim’s sensitive data and cryptocurrency to a Command-and-Control (C2) IP address.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

« Fonds ou identifiants volés depuis plus de 7 000 portefeuilles de cryptomonnaies » et « 10,71 millions USD de cryptoactifs exfiltrés vers la RPDC »

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

25 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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ntt security japanNews · Nov 17, 2026WaterPlumによるGitのcleanフィルタを悪用した攻撃について | セキュリティナレッジ | NTTセキュリティ・ジャパン株式会社Malware used by WaterPlum and delivered through a fake recruitment coding challenge. Malicious configuration in the supplied .git directory abuses Git clean filters to download and execute OtterCandy through an OS-specific script. Execution can occur during git status or background IDE Git operations. The latest observed version, v1.5.12, adds functionality including execution of NetSupport Manager as an additional payload.Read more ↗infosecurity magazine newsNews · Sep 22, 2026North Korean Attackers Hit 30,000 Devices and Steal $10.7m - Infosecurity MagazineA named malicious payload delivered through trojanized NPM packages in WaterPlum's fake-job-interview campaign. The content does not assign distinct capabilities to OtterCandy.Read more ↗security affairsNews · Sep 22, 2026Contagious Interview: 30,000 devices infected by a fake job interviewA malware family embedded in fake coding-test or troubleshooting downloads distributed by WaterPlum. It is part of the campaign's credential-, cryptocurrency-wallet-, and sensitive-data-theft operation.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Sep 21, 2026Contagious Interview Campaign Compromises 30,000 Devices, Steals $10.71M in CryptoA malware family delivered via fake recruitment and coding-test lures in the Contagious Interview campaign.Read more ↗
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IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.