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Malware2 associated actors

PteroEffigy

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs1Tracked

PteroEffigy is a Gamaredon (also known as Shuckworm/Armageddon) PowerShell-based lightweight downloader observed in 2025 operations targeting Ukrainian government, military, and defense-related entities. It is one of six new PowerShell tools added to Gamaredon’s arsenal and is described as a simple downloader used to fetch next-stage payloads, additional malware, or command-and-control information. Its notable characteristic is abuse of the GoFile cloud storage service as a dead-drop mechanism to obtain the next C2 server. ESET also reported a chain in which PteroOdd dropped PteroEffigy, which then contacted the domain eset.ydns[.]eu to deliver Turla’s Kazuar v2, and PteroEffigy was observed on machines co-compromised by Gamaredon and Turla where Turla deployed Kazuar v3. High-confidence associations in the reporting tie PteroEffigy to Gamaredon’s sustained 2025 cyberespionage activity against Ukraine and to incidents reflecting operational collaboration or shared access with Turla.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Gamaredon Group

Six new PowerShell tools, including PteroDee, PteroCache, PteroDum, PteroOdd, PteroEffigy, and PteroPaste, were introduced, broadening their custom malware capabilities.

via scworldscworld.com
Turla

...PteroOdd was used to drop another PowerShell downloader codenamed PteroEffigy, which ultimately contacted the "eset.ydns[.]eu" domain to deliver Kazuar v2...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The group tracked as Gamaredon spent the first half of the year developing six new PowerShell-based downloaders and shifted focus in the second half to launching at least 35 spear-phishing campaigns.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The group tracked as Gamaredon spent the first half of the year developing six new PowerShell-based downloaders.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

Six new PowerShell tools, including PteroDee, PteroCache, PteroDum, PteroOdd, PteroEffigy, and PteroPaste, were introduced

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

...use of a wide range of legitimate services as data exfiltration channels and dead drop resolvers... hidden behind tunnels or serverless workers.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

They also abused multiple legitimate messaging, social media, blogging, and paste services as dead drops for resolving C&C servers and distributing payloads.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

Gamaredon abused multiple legitimate messaging, social media, blogging, and paste services as dead drops for resolving C&C servers... In 2025, Gamaredon abused numerous services in this way: Telegram channels, Telegra.ph, Teletype, rentry.co, write.as, Dropbox, GoFile, DEV Community, Mastodon, lesma, nopaste.net, and Paste.ee.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

...trigger the retrieval of downloader malware... PteroEffigy for fetching the command-and-control (C2) server using the GoFile cloud storage service

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

...use of a wide range of legitimate services as data exfiltration channels and dead drop resolvers to obtain details of the C2 server... Gamaredon further expanded its use of dead drops, tunnels, workers, dynamic DNS, and cloud storage

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.