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Malware2 associated actors

PteroPaste

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceLateral movementPost exploitation
Delivery
SpearphishingUSB
Platforms
Windows

PteroPaste is a custom Gamaredon malware tool used in cyberespionage operations against Ukrainian targets. It emerged as one of the more capable additions to Gamaredon’s 2025 PowerShell-based arsenal and combines multiple functions in a single component: downloader behavior, USB weaponization, and a runner or orchestration role used for persistence and execution of additional malicious components. The malware repeatedly checks compromised Windows systems for connected USB drives and can copy a malicious downloader onto removable media, disguising it as a shortcut to facilitate execution. It has also been used to infect USB drives and network drives with malicious LNK-based propagation mechanisms, supporting lateral movement inside compromised environments.

PteroPaste is associated with Gamaredon, a Russia-aligned threat actor widely linked to sustained espionage activity against Ukrainian government and military institutions. Its operational purpose is to extend access within victim networks and retrieve follow-on payloads over encrypted channels while helping conceal backend infrastructure through legitimate online services and tunneling layers. Reported variants have staged encrypted payloads through public services and later retrieved encrypted command-and-control information from cloud storage before connecting to infrastructure hidden behind tunnel services. Some reporting also attributes Dropbox-based data upload behavior to PteroPaste.

The malware has additionally been observed in incidents linked to cooperation between Gamaredon and Turla, where PteroPaste and other Gamaredon tools were used to deploy Turla’s Kazuar implant on selected Ukrainian systems. This suggests PteroPaste can serve not only as a propagation and downloader utility but also as an enabler for delivery of higher-value follow-on espionage payloads. Its design reflects Gamaredon’s broader tradecraft preference for simple but adaptable tooling that can be updated quickly and combined flexibly across spearphishing-led intrusion chains and post-compromise spread via removable and networked media.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Gamaredon Group

Based on the public reporting, it seems that PteroOdd and PteroPaste, two custom malware families attributed to Gamaredon, deployed Kazuar, a malware attributed to Turla.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
Turla

The standout among the new tools is PteroPaste, which is considerably more complex than the others. It combines a downloader, a USB weaponizer, and a runner component used for persistence and orchestration.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence5

Gamaredon also employed PteroLNK and PteroPaste for lateral movement via infected USB and network drives

T1566PhishingEvidence2

The group tracked as Gamaredon spent the first half of the year developing six new PowerShell-based downloaders and shifted focus in the second half to launching at least 35 spear-phishing campaigns.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

The group tracked as Gamaredon spent the first half of the year developing six new PowerShell-based downloaders.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

Six new PowerShell tools, including PteroDee, PteroCache, PteroDum, PteroOdd, PteroEffigy, and PteroPaste, were introduced

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

...infecting USB drives and network drives with malicious LNK files that, when opened by an unsuspecting user, trigger the retrieval of downloader malware.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

It randomly selects a Word document on the infected system, appends a .lnk extension to it, and gives the smuggled loader that filename, so that any human passerby might think it an ordinary file.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

It randomly selects a Word document on the infected system, appends a .lnk extension to it, and gives the smuggled loader that filename, so that any human passerby might think it an ordinary file.

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Early versions of PteroPaste used Rentry as an intermediary staging point for encrypted payloads. Later versions... retrieve an encrypted C&C hostname from Dropbox, decrypt it locally

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence5

Gamaredon also employed PteroLNK and PteroPaste for lateral movement via infected USB and network drives

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence3

Gamaredon also employed PteroLNK and PteroPaste for lateral movement via infected USB and network drives

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1090.002External ProxyEvidence2

Gamaredon continued to refine its techniques for protecting its network infrastructure and hiding its C&C servers... the group’s reliance on third-party services grew significantly, with tunnel services and serverless worker platforms becoming an increasingly important part of how it hid its real back-end infrastructure.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

They also abused multiple legitimate messaging, social media, blogging, and paste services as dead drops for resolving C&C servers and distributing payloads.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence2

Gamaredon abused multiple legitimate messaging, social media, blogging, and paste services as dead drops for resolving C&C servers... In 2025, Gamaredon abused numerous services in this way: Telegram channels, Telegra.ph, Teletype, rentry.co, write.as, Dropbox, GoFile, DEV Community, Mastodon, lesma, nopaste.net, and Paste.ee.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

...trigger the retrieval of downloader malware... PteroEffigy for fetching the command-and-control (C2) server using the GoFile cloud storage service

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

Gamaredon has also updated two of its primary stealer tools to upload stolen files to legitimate cloud storage services like Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) buckets. Its best new tool, the aforementioned PteroPaste, uploads to Dropbox.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.