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Mallory
Malware11 associated CVEs

Fog

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 11 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns11Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs28Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationLateral movementDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanningBrute forceByovdExtortion
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Fog is a ransomware family first observed in May 2024, initially associated with attacks against education and recreation organizations in the United States. Its victim base subsequently expanded across industries, including technology, manufacturing, transportation, healthcare, and financial services. Fog operations employ double extortion, combining file encryption with data theft and threats of publication through a dedicated leak site.

Fog targets Windows systems and encrypts a broad range of files, including virtual machine disk images. Analyzed implementations use multithreaded encryption and symmetric cryptography with asymmetric protection of encryption keys. The ransomware gathers system and network information, terminates configured processes and services, and deletes Windows volume shadow copies to impede recovery. Operators also target backup infrastructure, including Veeam backups. Associated loaders employ obfuscation, encrypted payloads, sandbox and debugger checks, reflective loading, and DLL unhooking to evade analysis and security monitoring.

Intrusions commonly begin with compromised VPN credentials. Fog deployment has also followed exploitation of CVE-2024-40711 in Veeam Backup & Replication. Distribution and deployment activity has been associated with Storm-0844 and STAC 5881, clusters that have also deployed Akira; Fog remains a distinct ransomware family. Operators use credential dumping, pass-the-hash, network scanning, RDP, SMB administrative shares, and PsExec for discovery, privilege escalation, and lateral movement. Data theft and persistence are supported by separate tools and scripts rather than being integrated into every ransomware binary.

A customized variant branded DOGE Big Balls has been distributed through finance-themed phishing archives containing malicious shortcuts disguised as PDF documents. These campaigns use multistage PowerShell execution, host-information collection and exfiltration, and exploitation of a vulnerable Intel driver through CVE-2015-2291. Associated scripts establish persistence, disable security protections, steal credentials, and propagate across Windows networks. The variant incorporates politically themed messaging, but that branding does not establish involvement by the government initiative or individuals it references.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

11 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-40711via symantec blogExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Veeam Backup & ReplicationThe vulnerability targeted by the attackers was a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2024-40711) caused by deserialization of untrusted data.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-40766via macnica security blogExploited in the wildImproper Access Control in SonicWall SonicOS Management and SSLVPNThe author reports strong indications that Akira and Fog were exploiting CVE-2024-40766 for unauthorized access, with more than 100 suspected victim organizations as of December 23, 2024. However, the article explicitly states that exploitation had not been definitively established. At least 48,933 internet-exposed SonicWall devices reportedly remained unpatched as of December 24, 2024.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-2291via cyble blogExploited in the wildKernel Privilege Escalation in Intel Ethernet Diagnostics Driverktool.exe drops and loads the vulnerable driver (CVE-2015-2291) “iqvw64e.sys” as part of a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to gain kernel-level read/write access.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-48365via nuclei templates pull requestsExploited in the wildDoubleQlikCVE-2023-48365: Qlik Sense Enterprise HTTP Tunneling RCE (CVSS 9.9)View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-21762via nuclei templates pull requestsExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in FortiOS and FortiProxy SSL-VPNCVE-2024-21762: Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN Out-of-Bounds Write RCE (CVSS 9.8)View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-27997via nuclei templates pull requestsExploited in the wildXORtigateCVE-2023-27997: Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN Heap Buffer Overflow RCE - XORtigate (CVSS 9.8)View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-23006via nuclei templates pull requestsExploited in the wildPre-authentication deserialization RCE in SonicWall SMA1000 AMC and CMCCVE-2025-23006: SonicWall SMA 1000 Pre-Auth Deserialization RCE (CVSS 9.8)View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-23120via tenable cve feedExploited in the wildAuthenticated Remote Code Execution in Veeam Backup & ReplicationReferenced via: https://labs.watchtowr.com/by-executive-order-we-are-banning-blacklists-domain-level-rce-in-veeam-backup-replication-cve-2025-23120/ and multiple linked articles about Veeam RCE flaws.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-53704via greynoise blogExploited in the wildSonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN Authentication BypassDefenders should act now — ... patch CVE-2024-53704 (CVSS 9.8, CISA KEV) ... Exploitation Assessment ... CVE-2024-53704 ... Campaign Sessions 5 ... Confirm your SonicOS firmware is patched against CVE-2024-53704 (versions at or below 7.1.1-7058, 7.1.2-7019, or 8.0.0-8035 are vulnerable).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2019-7481via cyber security newsUnauthenticated SQL Injection in SonicWall SMA100Fog ransomware accounts for another significant share, with some documented intrusions achieving full network encryption in under four hours.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-20028via cyber security newsSQL Injection in SonicWall SRA AppliancesFog ransomware accounts for another significant share, with some documented intrusions achieving full network encryption in under four hours.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

public reporting will tie initial access in a consequential incident or bounded campaign to artifacts obtained through a separate, earlier edge-appliance exposure

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

Attacks leveraged compromised VPN appliances for access... Similar to the previous events, the threat actor used a compromised VPN appliance for access...

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

The vulnerability, CVE-2024-40711, was used as part of a threat activity cluster we named STAC 5881.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

atexec, Remote scheduled task, Scheduled Task events (4698)... In one engagement, attackers leveraged Active Directory Group Policy to distribute the ransomware payload as a scheduled task across domain-joined systems, ensuring simultaneous execution at scale.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

These commands use “Invoke-WebRequest” to download a PowerShell script named “stage1.ps1” ... executed in memory using Invoke-Expression (IEX).

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

atexec, Remote scheduled task, Scheduled Task events (4698)... In one engagement, attackers leveraged Active Directory Group Policy to distribute the ransomware payload as a scheduled task across domain-joined systems, ensuring simultaneous execution at scale.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

public reporting will tie initial access in a consequential incident or bounded campaign to artifacts obtained through a separate, earlier edge-appliance exposure

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

Attacks leveraged compromised VPN appliances for access... Similar to the previous events, the threat actor used a compromised VPN appliance for access...

T1136Create AccountEvidence2

...used the VEEAM vulnerability to create a new local administrator account named “point”. Similar to the previous events... created a new account named ‘point’. However in this incident a ‘point2’ account was also created.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Windows only executes files located directly in the root of the Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

atexec, Remote scheduled task, Scheduled Task events (4698)... In one engagement, attackers leveraged Active Directory Group Policy to distribute the ransomware payload as a scheduled task across domain-joined systems, ensuring simultaneous execution at scale.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

ktool.exe ... drops and loads the vulnerable driver (CVE-2015-2291) “iqvw64e.sys” as part of a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

public reporting will tie initial access in a consequential incident or bounded campaign to artifacts obtained through a separate, earlier edge-appliance exposure

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

Locating the SYSTEM process token in memory and assigning it to the ransomware process.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Windows only executes files located directly in the root of the Startup folder.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

public reporting will tie initial access in a consequential incident or bounded campaign to artifacts obtained through a separate, earlier edge-appliance exposure

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

Locating the SYSTEM process token in memory and assigning it to the ransomware process.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The script collects details such as the victim’s local and external IP addresses, the MAC address of the device, network adapters, the BSSID ... and the gateway’s IP.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The script collects data such as the UUID, BIOS serial number, disk specifications, CPU details, core count, RAM size, and operating system information.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

A qualifying case must clear four gates: Previously exposed artifacts are successfully reused. The reuse enables initial access in a consequential incident or bounded campaign.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

PsExec and direct access to administrative shares (ADMIN$, C$, etc.) remained present in some engagements... The most common approach involved executing the ransomware binary from a single compromised system — typically a domain controller or infrastructure server — and encrypting data on remote systems through administrative shares (ADMIN$, C$).

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Lootsubmit.ps1 ... is designed to gather extensive information from a victim’s machine, including both system-related and network-related details.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The script proceeds to download “ktool.exe,” a kernel exploit tool ... and saves it to the %TEMP% directory.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence5

After successfully encrypting files with the “.flocked” extension, it drops a “readme.txt” ransom note in every affected folder.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

Deletes the shadow volume copy using the command “vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet”.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

28 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching28Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities11CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.