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Malware2 associated actors

PteroGraphin

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 23 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

PteroGraphin is a PowerShell-based downloader used by Gamaredon, a Russian FSB-linked cyberespionage group, in operations against Ukrainian organizations. First discovered in August 2024, it establishes persistence and retrieves additional payloads through an encrypted communication channel using the Telegraph API. Early versions persisted through Microsoft Excel add-ins; later versions replaced this mechanism with scheduled tasks. It operates on Windows systems as part of Gamaredon’s multistage malware toolset.

PteroGraphin has also supported Turla’s Kazuar espionage operations on compromised Ukrainian systems. In an observed February 2025 execution chain, it downloaded the PteroOdd PowerShell downloader, which retrieved a further payload through Telegraph to execute Kazuar. PteroGraphin was used to restart Kazuar v3, demonstrating its role in maintaining access as well as delivering follow-on malware. These operations formed part of cooperation in which Gamaredon provided access to selected Ukrainian systems for Turla’s espionage activities, including operations focused on the defense sector. The initial compromise method for the investigated systems was not established.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Gamaredon Group

“A prior intrusion leveraged Gamaredon's PteroGraphin downloader to deploy Kazuar against Ukrainian targets.”

via tech timestechtimes.com
Turla

Inside Gamaredon 2025: Zero-Click Espionage at Scale PteroGraphin ... Gamaredon X Turla collab PteroGraphin

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Gamaredon is known for using spearphishing and malicious .lnk files on removable drives, thus one of these was the most likely compromise vector.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Later versions simplified persistence by using scheduled tasks instead.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4

Across incidents observed between February and June 2025, Gamaredon tooling, including PteroGraphin and PteroOdd, was used to deploy Turla’s Kazuar backdoor and, in at least one case, restore Turla’s access after the group appeared to have lost its foothold.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

using malicious LNK files to execute PowerShell commands directly from Cloudflare-generated domains

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Later versions simplified persistence by using scheduled tasks instead.

T1137.006Add-insEvidence1

PteroGraphin : Discovered in August 2024, this PowerShell tool initially used an uncommon persistence method involving Microsoft Excel add-ins.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Later versions simplified persistence by using scheduled tasks instead.

Stealth

1 technique
T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

In February 2025, Gamaredon’s PteroGraphin tool was used as a recovery method to restart Turla’s Kazuar espionage implant, likely after it crashed, ESET says.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

introducing new external platforms such as Codeberg repositories to dynamically distribute command and control (C&C) server information

Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.