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Malware2 associated actors

QUIETCANARY

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
USB
Platforms
Windows

Tunnus, also publicly reported as QUIETCANARY, is a lightweight .NET backdoor associated with the Turla espionage ecosystem. It has been linked to operations attributed to UNC4210/Turla, including activity targeting a Ukrainian organization, where it appeared as a later-stage payload following earlier compromise and victim profiling. Tunnus is designed for interactive post-compromise control of infected Windows systems, supporting command execution and file operations, and returning results to command-and-control infrastructure. Reported behavior includes executing processes in hidden windows to reduce user visibility, querying the Windows Registry for host information, and Base64-encoding command-and-control communications. In observed intrusions, operators used the malware after selective staging to interact with the victim environment and then compress, stage, and exfiltrate collected data. Its role, tradecraft, and association with Turla indicate use in targeted espionage operations against government, diplomatic, and related high-value entities.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

Tools... KopiLuwak, Tunnus

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
UNC4210

"QUIETCANARY is a lightweight .NET backdoor also publicly reported as 'Tunnus'..."

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1106Native APIEvidence3

[QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) can call `System.Net.HttpWebRequest` to identify the default proxy configured on the victim computer.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“communications… are RC4 encrypted and Base64 encoded over HTTPS.”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence6

[QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) can use a custom parsing routine to decode the command codes and additional parameters from the C2 before executing them.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence7

[QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) can execute processes in a hidden window.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

Discovery

5 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence6

[QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) has the ability to retrieve information from the Registry.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence5

[QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) can identify the default proxy setting on a compromised host.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

“…conducted basic network reconnaissance… with whoami…”

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

“…with… netstat… looking for all current TCP connections (with PID)…”

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

“The attackers also checked the logical disks…” and later targeted file paths under AppData and Users/D:\

Collection

2 techniques
T1074Data StagedEvidence3

[QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) has the ability to stage data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

“UNC4210 attempted to collect documents and data using WinRAR… rar a c:\programdata\win_files.rar … -hp[redacted] -v3M …”

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence7

[QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) can use HTTPS for C2 communications.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“…downloaded and executed a WinRAR Self-Extracting Archive (WinRAR SFX) containing KOPILUWAK…” and “…downloaded and executed QUIETCANARY.”

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

[QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) can base64 encode C2 communications.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

[QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) can RC4 encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

“…command result… uploaded… via POST requests.” and “QUIETCANARY… used primarily to gather and exfiltrate data…”

Mallory platform

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Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.