Latrodectus

campaigns using RaccoonO365 have been active since September 2024. These attacks typically mimic trusted brands like Microsoft, DocuSign, SharePoint, Adobe, and Maersk in fraudulent emails, tricking them into clicking on lookalike pages that are designed to capture victims' Microsoft 365 usernames and passwords.

Latrodectus has used JavaScript files as part its infection chain during malicious spam email campaigns. Saint Bear has delivered malicious Microsoft Office files containing an embedded JavaScript object that would, on execution, download and execute OutSteel and Saint Bot.

On 28 November 2023, Proofpoint observed the last TA577 Latrodectus campaign. The campaign began with thread hijacked messages that contained URLs leading to either zipped JavaScript files or zipped ISO files. | This actor typically uses contact forms to initiate a conversation with a target.

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

AppleSeed has the ability to use JavaScript to execute PowerShell. APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications. Astaroth uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities.

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

Earlier this April, the Redmond-based company warned of several phishing campaigns leveraging tax-related themes to deploy malware such as Latrodectus, AHKBot, GuLoader, and BruteRatel C4 (BRc4). The phishing pages, it added, were delivered via RaccoonO365

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

Latrodectus resolves Windows API functions dynamically by hash

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

Many entries explicitly describe deleting artifacts 'to cover tracks,' 'evade detection,' 'remove evidence,' 'reduce their footprint,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup process.' Examples include APT28 deleting files to cover tracks, FIN5 using SDelete to clean up the environment, and Dragonfly deleting operational files as part of cleanup.

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

The MSI executed the bundled DLL with the export "fin" to run Latrodectus.

If this JavaScript was executed, it called MSIEXEC to run an MSI from a WebDAV share.

The malware starts by resolving bulk APIs for various functions. After all the functions have been resolved to their global pointers, the malware ensures it is running in a suitable environment by performing virtualization checks.

Latrodectus resolves Windows API functions dynamically by hash, checks for debuggers present, gathers operating system information, checks running processes...

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

cmd_get_desktop_items 2 Get the filenames of files on the desktop

The malware starts by resolving bulk APIs for various functions. After all the functions have been resolved to their global pointers, the malware ensures it is running in a suitable environment by performing virtualization checks.

Latrodectus resolves Windows API functions dynamically by hash, checks for debuggers present, gathers operating system information, checks running processes...

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

BS2005 uses Base64 encoding for communication in the message body of an HTTP request... Helminth encodes data with base64 and sends it via the "Cookie" field of HTTP requests. For C2 over DNS, Helminth converts ASCII characters into their hexadecimal values... RDAT can communicate with the C2 via base32-encoded subdomains.

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

The commands Latrodectus supports currently: cmd_exec_exe 12 Execute executable; cmd_exec_dll 13 Execute DLL with given export; cmd_run_icedid 18 Download bp.dat and execute

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

On 15 December 2023, Proofpoint observed TA578 deliver the Latrodectus downloader via a DanaBot infection.

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.