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Wizard Spider is a Russian cybercriminal threat actor best known for operating the TrickBot ecosystem and for ransomware operations associated with Ryuk and Conti. The group is tracked under numerous aliases including TrickBot Gang, FIN12, UNC1878, UNC2053, ITG23, Gold Ulrick, Gold Blackburn, Periwinkle Tempest, Pistachio Tempest, Grim Spider, TEMP.MixMaster, DEV-0193, DEV-0237, G0102, Storm-0230, and Conti Team One. It is widely assessed as a financially motivated eCrime actor rather than a state-sponsored espionage group. Wizard Spider has targeted large enterprises and public-sector organizations, with especially notable impact on health-care and government environments. A prominent example is the disruptive Conti ransomware attack against Ireland’s national health service. Reporting also links the group to broader victimization across North America, Europe, and parts of Asia-Pacific. Operationally, Wizard Spider is associated with initial access through exploitation of known vulnerabilities, extensive post-compromise reconnaissance, credential access, persistence, and deployment of follow-on malware and ransomware. Documented behaviors include collecting host and Active Directory information with native tooling, identifying installed security products via WMI, modifying WDigest settings to force plaintext credential caching, establishing persistence through Registry Run keys and Startup-folder mechanisms, using PowerShell, and employing process injection. The group has also been associated with use of SystemBC as a proxy/backdoor component in ransomware intrusion chains. Wizard Spider’s malware and affiliate ecosystem has shown overlap with other criminal operations and tooling. The actor is closely tied to TrickBot and Conti, and reporting has linked ex-Conti or Wizard Spider personnel and infrastructure to later criminal activity. Some reporting also describes Akira as closely related to Conti-derived tradecraft and sometimes treated as a subgroup or descendant cluster, though subgroup relationships should be treated cautiously unless independently corroborated. Wizard Spider is primarily known for financially driven ransomware and extortion activity, including encryption-based attacks and operation of leak-site pressure tactics associated with the Conti era.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
56 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
39 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
34 additional families tracked in Mallory.
17 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 17 of them exploited in the wild.
Afin de se latéraliser, les opérateurs du MOA ont tenté, sans succès, d’exploiter les vulnérabilités PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527), BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708), puis ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) via l’outil Mimikatz.
DEV-0193 infrastructure has also been implicated in attacks deploying novel techniques, including exploitation of CVE-2021-40444.
De plus, grâce à des liens d’infrastructure, l’ANSSI a pu rattacher au même MOA plusieurs exploitations de la vulnérabilité ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41080 et CVE-2022-41082) ayant mené au déploiement de Play.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as Eternal Blue, during operations.
12 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
405 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Named cybercriminal group linked in the article to Vitaly Kovalev.
Mentioned only as an annotated threat actor associated with the ATT&CK technique Process Injection (T1055) in a Splunk detection entry; no campaign or activity is described.
Mentioned only as an annotation/tag associated with the ATT&CK technique Process Injection (T1055); no campaign or activity by this group is described in the content.
Mentioned only in an annotation/list associated with the detection content; no actor-specific activity is described in this reference.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.