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Wizard Spider is a Russia-linked, financially motivated cybercrime group known for operating the TrickBot malware ecosystem and conducting organization-wide ransomware intrusions. The group is also tracked as GOLD ULRICK, Grim Spider, ITG23, DEV-0193, UNC1878, UNC2053, Periwinkle Tempest, Storm-0230, TEMP.MixMaster, and the TrickBot Gang. It distributed Ryuk ransomware from August 2018 through early 2021 and Conti from early 2020; TrickBot was used to facilitate deployment of both ransomware families. Wizard Spider has used spearphishing attachments containing malicious documents, macro-enabled content, and malicious links to deliver malware, including Emotet, BazarLoader, Bokbot, and TrickBot. Post-compromise tradecraft includes PowerShell-based payload retrieval and command execution, lateral movement, scheduled-task persistence, Registry and Startup-folder persistence, and modification of WDigest settings to expose credentials in memory. The group conducts host, account, network-configuration, and network-share discovery using native commands, and has exfiltrated domain credentials and network-enumeration data through command-and-control channels. ITG23-linked developers and associates have also used crypters and loaders to obfuscate payloads and evade antivirus detection across a broad set of criminal malware operations.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
55 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
22 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
17 additional families tracked in Mallory.
17 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 17 of them exploited in the wild.
To quickly gain Windows domain admin credentials, Carmakal told BleepingComputer that the group had been seen using the Windows ZeroLogon vulnerability. For this reason, users must install necessary patches on all Windows servers.
DEV-0193 infrastructure has also been implicated in attacks deploying novel techniques, including exploitation of CVE-2021-40444.
De plus, grâce à des liens d’infrastructure, l’ANSSI a pu rattacher au même MOA plusieurs exploitations de la vulnérabilité ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41080 et CVE-2022-41082) ayant mené au déploiement de Play.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as Eternal Blue, during operations.
12 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
611 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Wizard Spider appears only in the detection's annotations list.
Listed in the detection's Annotations section.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.