WIZARD SPIDER
Wizard Spider is a financially motivated, Russia-based cybercrime threat actor associated with TrickBot and the Conti ransomware operation. Provided aliases include Conti Team One, DEV-0193, DEV-0237, FIN12, G0102, GOLD BLACKBURN, GOLD ULRICK, Grim Spider, ITG23, Periwinkle Tempest, Pistachio Tempest, Storm-0230, TEMP.MixMaster, TrickBot Gang, UNC1878, UNC2053, and Wizard Spider. The content states that Conti rebranded around May 2020 and appeared to merge with TrickBot/Wizard Spider by the end of 2021; after the Conti leaks, operators reportedly began winding down Conti by distributing activity across multiple ransomware operations. The actor is linked in the content to Ryuk and Conti ransomware deployment, and ANSSI states related operators have also been associated with Hive, BlackCat, Nokoyawa, Play, Royal, and possibly BlackCat. The group is described as using phishing to install TrickBot and BazarLoader, which provide remote access, followed by credential theft, lateral movement, data collection and exfiltration, and ransomware deployment. The content also links Wizard Spider-related activity to BazarCall distribution and to HTML smuggling campaigns delivering TrickBot. FIN12/DEV-0237 is described as specializing in rapid post-compromise ransomware deployment, primarily Ryuk, and as frequently targeting healthcare organizations; ANSSI linked this operating model to roughly 30 ransomware incidents in France between 2020 and 2023 and to the March 2023 CHU de Brest intrusion. Observed tradecraft in the provided content includes use of cmd.exe for command execution; macros to launch PowerShell downloaders; PowerShell for execution and lateral movement; WMI and LDAP queries for network discovery and lateral movement; batch scripts leveraging WMIC to deploy ransomware; scheduled tasks for persistence; Registry Run keys and Startup-folder shortcuts for persistence; collection of host configuration data via systeminfo and Get-ADComputer; exfiltration of domain credentials and network-enumeration data over C2; staging ZIP archives in local directories such as C:\PerfLogs\1\ and C:\User\1\ prior to exfiltration; file deletion for cleanup; disabling or uninstalling security tools; use of ipconfig for network configuration discovery; and RDP for lateral movement and interactive ransomware deployment. Tooling explicitly mentioned includes Empire, Cobalt Strike, Rubeus, AdFind, BloodHound, Metasploit, Advanced IP Scanner, Nirsoft PingInfoView, and SoftPerfect Network Scanner. The content also states Wizard Spider has used WMIC and vssadmin to delete volume shadow copies, and Conti ransomware to automate shadow copy deletion. The content further notes that Wizard Spider developed TrickBot and Conti, has been identified in Five Eyes reporting as a Russia-aligned cybercrime group, and has targeted sectors including healthcare, health, and education.
Know when an actor pivots toward your sector
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Materials
- Government & Administration
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇺🇸 United States
- 🇳🇴 Norway
- 🇳🇱 Netherlands
Tradecraft
59 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
36 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
31 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
17 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 17 of them exploited in the wild.
Afin de se latéraliser, les opérateurs du MOA ont tenté, sans succès, d’exploiter les vulnérabilités PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527), BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708), puis ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) via l’outil Mimikatz.
DEV-0193 infrastructure has also been implicated in attacks deploying novel techniques, including exploitation of CVE-2021-40444.
De plus, grâce à des liens d’infrastructure, l’ANSSI a pu rattacher au même MOA plusieurs exploitations de la vulnérabilité ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41080 et CVE-2022-41082) ayant mené au déploiement de Play.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as Eternal Blue, during operations.
12 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
287 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection analytic.
Referenced as a threat actor associated with registry modification behavior (MITRE ATT&CK T1112: Modify Registry) in the context of this detection analytic.
Referenced as a threat actor associated with the Network Share Discovery technique (T1135).
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.