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Malware2 associated actors

HeaderTip

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs31Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceDefense evasionPost exploitation
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

HeaderTip is a Windows malware family associated with activity tracked as UAC-0026 and publicly linked by some researchers to the Scarab espionage actor. It has been used in campaigns targeting Ukrainian organizations during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, including entities connected to critical information infrastructure. The malware is typically delivered through themed phishing lures using archive files that contain an executable loader and a decoy document impersonating Ukrainian government or law-enforcement material.

Operationally, HeaderTip functions as a lightweight first-stage implant with loader and backdoor characteristics. The initial executable drops auxiliary components, opens a decoy PDF to distract the victim, reconstructs a DLL payload from embedded data, and launches that DLL through standard Windows mechanisms. Persistence is established through user-level autorun entries so the malware survives reboots. The DLL payload is designed primarily to download and execute additional DLLs, enabling follow-on deployment of more capable malware such as trojans or rootkits.

HeaderTip uses several defense-evasion measures despite its relatively small size. Reported samples hide imports through stack strings, dynamically resolve APIs at runtime, and use hashed library and function names to complicate static analysis and signature-based detection. For command-and-control, the malware communicates over HTTP, including POST-based beaconing, and appears intended to await further tasking or secondary payloads rather than provide a broad standalone feature set.

Public reporting indicates similar activity dating back to at least 2020. Researchers have noted design and infrastructure overlaps between HeaderTip and earlier Scarab tooling, including possible lineage from the Scieron backdoor, though such attribution remains an analytic assessment rather than a universally established fact. Overall, HeaderTip is best understood as a compact persistent Windows loader/backdoor used in targeted intrusion operations for foothold establishment and follow-on malware delivery.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0026

Згаданий DLL-файл класифіковано як шкідливу програму HeaderTip, основним призначенням якої є завантаження та виконання інших DLL-файлів.

via cert uacert.gov.ua
Scarab

HeaderTip is a malware used by threat actor(s) that are leveraging the current Russia-Ukraine conflict to spread persistent malware. eSentire Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that HeaderTip serves as a backdoor and a loader for threat actor(s) to further deploy rootkits, trojans, or other types of malware.

via esentire blogesentire.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence3

...виявлено RAR-архів "Про збереження відеоматеріалів з фіксацією злочинних дій армії російської федерації.rar"...

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

CERT-UA noted the delivery of a RAR file archive ... Additionally, they note the archive contains an executable file, which opens a lure document, and drops the DLL file "officecleaner.dat" and a batch file "officecleaner".

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

...а також DLL-файлу з видаленим MZ-заголовком "officecleaner.dat" та BAT-файлу "officecleaner.bat", що забезпечить формування коректного DLL-файлу...

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

In the case of the 2020 documents, the user must enable document Macros.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Запуск виконуваного файлу призведе до створення на комп'ютері документу-приманки...

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

the archive contains an executable file, which opens a lure document, and drops the DLL file "officecleaner.dat" and a batch file "officecleaner". | In the case of the 2020 documents, the user must enable document Macros.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

...його запуск і запис в реєстр Windows для забезпечення персистентності.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\httpsrvlog; HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\httpshelper

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\httpsrvlog; HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\httpshelper

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The threat actor(s) is using obfuscation techniques in the malware sample to hinder the analysis and avoid detection.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Upon analyzing the file in a disassembler, we have noticed that the malware is hiding the API imports by applying the stackstrings and dynamically resolving APIs at runtime.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

...створення на комп'ютері документу-приманки "#2163_02_33-2022.pdf" (стосується листа Національної поліції України)...

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The officecleaner.dat file is removed from %TEMP% folder after successfully renaming itself.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence2

c:\windows\system32\rundll32.exe %TMP%\httpshelper.dll,OAService

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

We have also noticed a function containing a “Loader” string. We believe the function is responsible for loading the DLL into the memory by using VirtualAlloc API to allocate new memory regions inside the address space of a process.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

...його запуск і запис в реєстр Windows для забезпечення персистентності.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The malware creates a POST request handle, checks if the request is successfully received from the C2 server with HTTP response code 200, and reads 128 bytes of data received from C2 server by calling InternetReadFile API.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

...DLL-файл класифіковано як шкідливу програму HeaderTip, основним призначенням якої є завантаження та виконання інших DLL-файлів.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

The threat actor(s) is utilizing Dynamic DNS (DDNS) from ChangeIP with the hardcoded domain in the DLL sample, which means that the infected machines can connect to C2 servers using a domain name instead of IP address.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

31 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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esentire blogNews · Apr 5, 2022eSentire | Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis: HeaderTip | eSentireA persistent malware family used in a phishing campaign themed around the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It drops a BAT file and DLL, establishes persistence via Registry Run keys, uses obfuscation including stackstrings and API hashing, communicates with a C2 over HTTP on port 8080 using a DDNS domain, and appears to support in-memory DLL loading.Read more ↗sentinelone labsNews · Mar 25, 2022Chinese Threat Actor Scarab Targeting Ukraine | SentinelOneA custom 32-bit DLL backdoor used by Scarab. It is delivered via phishing lures and a loader/batch file chain, establishes persistence via HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and makes HTTP POST beacon requests to a C2 server. The report describes it as a limited first-stage infection waiting for possible second-stage payloads.Read more ↗cip gov uaNews · Mar 25, 2022Державна служба спеціального зв’язку та захисту інформації УкраїниA named malware family associated with attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.Read more ↗sentinelone labsNews · Mar 24, 2022Chinese Threat Actor Scarab Targeting UkraineA small 32-bit C++ DLL used by Scarab/UAC-0026 as a first-stage backdoor. It is installed via a loader and batch file, persists via HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and makes HTTP POST beacon requests to a C2 server while awaiting further updates or second-stage payloads.Read more ↗
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IOC matching31Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.