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Malware3 associated actors

HTTPBrowser

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 12 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
KeyloggingPersistenceDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
PhishingLureFake update
Platforms
Windows
Also known asHttpDumpToken Control

HTTPBrowser is a Windows remote-access trojan used in cyberespionage operations by China-linked threat actors. APT27, also known as Iron Tiger, LuckyMouse, Emissary Panda, and BRONZE UNION, has used it since at least 2015. Its capabilities include capturing keystrokes and spawning a reverse shell, enabling remote command execution on compromised systems.

HTTPBrowser uses DLL side-loading and Windows DLL search-order abuse to execute through a legitimate Symantec antivirus executable. Its malicious DLL impersonates a legitimate Symantec component and decrypts and runs the RAT. The malware establishes persistence through a current-user Registry Run entry and deletes its original installer after installation, reducing artifacts left on disk.

HTTPBrowser is a predecessor of HyperBro. Pisloader, a variant used by APT18, also known as Wekby, uses DNS-based command-and-control communications.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Threat Group-3390

It is the evolved version of HttpBrowser, which the group has been using since at least 2015.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
APT18

APT18 Ghost RAT HttpBrowser APT18

APT6

"...either the well-known ‘PlugX’ or ‘HttpBrowser’ RAT, a tool which is believed to have Chinese origins and to be used only by certain Chinese hacking groups."

via ncc group researchnccgroup.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) is capable of spawning a reverse shell on a victim.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)

T1106Native APIEvidence1

“find the addresses of LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress to load all the necessary functions dynamically.”

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary, VPDN_LU.exe, to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL, navlu.dll.(Citation: ZScaler Hacking Team) [HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) has also used DLL side-loading.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) has established persistence by setting the <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> key value for <code>wdm</code> to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry <code>HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn “%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe”</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ZScaler Hacking Team)(Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis)

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) has established persistence by setting the <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> key value for <code>wdm</code> to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry <code>HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn “%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe”</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ZScaler Hacking Team)(Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis)

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070)'s code may be obfuscated through structured exception handling and return-oriented programming.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070)'s installer contains a malicious file named navlu.dll to decrypt and run the RAT. navlu.dll is also the name of a legitimate Symantec DLL.(Citation: ZScaler Hacking Team)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) deletes its original installer file once installation is complete.(Citation: ZScaler Hacking Team)

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary, VPDN_LU.exe, to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL, navlu.dll.(Citation: ZScaler Hacking Team) [HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) has also used DLL side-loading.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) is capable of listing files, folders, and drives on a victim.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: ZScaler Hacking Team)

Collection

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) has used HTTP and HTTPS for command and control.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis)

T1071.004DNSEvidence3

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) has used DNS for command and control.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) is capable of writing a file to the compromised system from the C2 server.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

4H RAT has the capability to create a remote shell. AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands. PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim. QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.