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Malware1 associated actor4 associated CVEs

SHOTPUT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns4Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs17Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows
Also known asBackdoor.APT.CookieCutterPirpi

SHOTPUT, also known as Pirpi and Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, is a Windows remote access Trojan and DLL backdoor associated with the China-based cyberespionage group APT3, also tracked as Gothic Panda, Buckeye, and UPS Team. It provides remote command execution, file upload and download, process management, and system information collection. Its discovery commands enumerate running processes, connected users, domain servers, and domain controllers, and it uses netstat to inspect TCP connection status.

SHOTPUT communicates with command-and-control servers through HTTP GET requests, carrying encrypted data in Cookie headers and retrieving encoded commands embedded in HTML tags. Some variants support SSL and contain embedded cryptographic keys. Its evasion techniques include anti-disassembly constructs, encoded data, and state-machine-based execution delays. Later variants introduced more complex encoding and randomized sleep behavior to hinder sandboxing and debugging.

APT3 has delivered SHOTPUT through spearphishing emails containing malicious links or attachments and through exploitation of Internet Explorer and Adobe Flash vulnerabilities. Documented delivery chains exploited CVE-2010-3962, CVE-2014-1776, CVE-2015-3113, and CVE-2015-5119. Some chains concealed encrypted backdoor payloads within animated GIF images using steganography. SHOTPUT has been used against organizations in the United States and United Kingdom; documented APT3 campaigns deploying it also targeted aerospace, defense, energy, and telecommunications organizations.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2014-1776via paloalto researchcenter historicExploited in the wildUse-After-Free Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Internet Explorer 6–11the most recent original zero-day released by this group is tracked by CVE-2015-3113, which has similarities to the once zero-day vulnerabilities CVE-2014-1776 and CVE-2014-6332 exploited by UPS in May and November 2014, respectively. | UPS has relied on steganography to conceal the payloads delivered after exploitation of zero-days by embedding payloads, specifically the Pirpi backdoor within animated GIFs.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-3113via paloalto researchcenter historicExploited in the wildHeap-based buffer overflow in Adobe Flash PlayerUnit 42 recently analyzed malicious Flash files that exploited CVE-2015-3113, which was a zero-day vulnerability in Adobe Flash that was patched on June 23, 2015. | UPS has relied on steganography to conceal the payloads delivered after exploitation of zero-days by embedding payloads, specifically the Pirpi backdoor within animated GIFs.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-6332via paloalto researchcenter historicExploited in the wildWindows OLE Automation Array Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilitythe most recent original zero-day released by this group is tracked by CVE-2015-3113, which has similarities to the once zero-day vulnerabilities CVE-2014-1776 and CVE-2014-6332 exploited by UPS in May and November 2014, respectively. | UPS has relied on steganography to conceal the payloads delivered after exploitation of zero-days by embedding payloads, specifically the Pirpi backdoor within animated GIFs.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2010-3962via web archiveExploited in the wildMicrosoft Internet Explorer CSS Memory Corruption RCEThey have a number of backdoors including one known as Pirpi... CVE-2010-3962, then a 0-day exploit in Internet Explorer 6, 7, and 8 dropped the Pirpi payload...View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT3

It is blamed for using a Remote Access Trojan named Pirpi in attacks against the US and UK.

via grimm bloggrimmcyber.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The Trojan is usually delivered through malicious attachments or links in spear-phishing e-mails

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The Trojan is usually delivered through malicious attachments or links in spear-phishing e-mails

Execution

1 technique
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

A June 23 FireEye blog post titled “Operation Clandestine Wolf” discussed a cyber espionage group, known as APT3, that had been exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Adobe Flash.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

9 Load a DLL from %APPDATA% and execute one of its exported functions

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence9

[SHOTPUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0063) is obscured using XOR encoding and appended to a valid GIF file.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: Palo Alto CVE-2015-3113 July 2015)

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence2

The malware author used steganography to embed an encrypted payload within this animated GIF image. The payload in the CVE-2014-1776 was also embedded within an animated GIF.

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

JPIN uses a encrypted and compressed payload that is disguised as a bitmap within the resource section of the installer. Ramsay has base64-encoded its portable executable and hidden itself under a JPG header. TEARDROP created and read from a file with a fake JPG header.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

9 Load a DLL from %APPDATA% and execute one of its exported functions

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The malware author likely implemented these state machines as an anti-debugging technique and to defeat most modern sandbox solutions.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Download a file, load it into memory, then delete the file

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The malware author likely implemented these state machines as an anti-debugging technique and to defeat most modern sandbox solutions.

Discovery

10 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence5

[SHOTPUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0063) has a command to list all servers in the domain, as well as one to locate domain controllers on a domain.(Citation: Palo Alto CVE-2015-3113 July 2015)

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence4

[SHOTPUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0063) uses [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) to list TCP connection status.(Citation: Palo Alto CVE-2015-3113 July 2015)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence9

[SHOTPUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0063) has a command to obtain a process listing.(Citation: Palo Alto CVE-2015-3113 July 2015)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

13 Get network adaptor information

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence9

[SHOTPUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0063) has a command to obtain a directory listing.(Citation: Palo Alto CVE-2015-3113 July 2015)

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

“actors used the following commands… to enumerate user accounts: net user >> %temp%\download; net user /domain >> %temp%\download … APT1 used the commands net localgroup, net user, and net group to find accounts… APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands net localgroup administrators … OilRig has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain …”

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence4

[SHOTPUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0063) has a command to retrieve information about connected users.(Citation: Palo Alto CVE-2015-3113 July 2015)

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1

FIN8 has used dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts; they have also used nltest.exe /dclist to retrieve a list of domain controllers.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The malware author likely implemented these state machines as an anti-debugging technique and to defeat most modern sandbox solutions.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The malware author likely implemented these state machines as an anti-debugging technique and to defeat most modern sandbox solutions.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

FireEye researchers analysing the Pirpi backdoor used by APT3 identified a sample that communicated with the domain twadcorp[.]com.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The Pirpi.2014 and Pirpi.2015 payloads communicate with their C2 by issuing HTTP GET requests to the C2 domain hardcoded inside the payload or within its “vcl.tmp” configuration file.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Download a file from the C2, launch it, and then delete it

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

both use the HTTP Cookie field to transmit data in encrypted form to the C2 domain.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Figure 5. Pirpi.2014 C2 Communication using Cookie Field for Exfiltration

Indicators of compromise

Observables

17 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching17Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.