TEMPLEDOOR
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Windows
TEMPLEDOOR is a passive Windows backdoor associated with the Iranian state-sponsored threat cluster UNC1860, which is assessed to be affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It has been used in intrusions targeting high-priority networks in the Middle East, particularly government and telecommunications organizations, as part of UNC1860’s broader strategy of establishing stealthy, long-term access and in some cases enabling follow-on operations by other Iranian operators.
TEMPLEDOOR is typically deployed after initial compromise through UNC1860 web shells and droppers, notably STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY, following exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing systems. It is part of a family of passive implants and backdoors that minimize reliance on traditional outbound command-and-control traffic, complicating network-based detection. A dedicated .NET controller known as TEMPLEPLAY is used to operate TEMPLEDOOR and provides capabilities including remote command execution, file upload and download, and HTTP proxying through compromised hosts. This proxying can facilitate access to otherwise unreachable internal systems, including support for remote desktop connectivity through infected middleboxes.
Observed functionality attributed to TEMPLEDOOR includes executing commands, transferring files, and interacting with system services. Its role within UNC1860 tradecraft is consistent with post-compromise persistence and covert remote access rather than smash-and-grab collection. TEMPLEDOOR has been deployed alongside other UNC1860 implants such as FACEFACE and SPARKLOAD, and forms part of a larger ecosystem of passive tooling that includes loaders, kernel-assisted implants, and defense-evasion utilities. The malware reflects UNC1860’s emphasis on stealth, operational handoff, and durable footholds inside strategically important victim environments.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
These shells enable further persistence by deploying full passive backdoors, such as TEMPLEDOOR and FACEFACE, which can execute commands, transfer files, and interact with system services.
ShroudedSnooper built a sprawling toolkit of passive backdoors and web shells — including the LionTail framework, TEMPLEDOOR, SASHEYAWAY, and a repurposed Windows kernel driver derived from Iranian antivirus software — designed to sustain long-term, low-visibility access.
Techniques & procedures
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
"Its job is merely to gain that initial foothold, primarily by scanning for vulnerabilities in public-facing assets at targeted organizations"
Execution
1 technique
Execution
The Command Prompt Tab sends a command line to execute on the target host. The default command is cmd /c 2 > &1 with parameter whoami.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Web shells like STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY are frequently deployed after initial access is achieved. These shells enable further persistence by deploying full passive backdoors, such as TEMPLEDOOR and FACEFACE, which can execute commands, transfer files, and interact with system services.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
TEMPLEPLAY and VIROGREEN... were used to provide a team outside of UNC1860 remote access to victim networks... the ability to remotely access infected networks via RDP... It appears that it is primarily intended to facilitate an RDP connection with the target server.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The Http Proxy Tab allows a remote machine infected with TEMPLEDOOR to be used as a middlebox that forwards data to a chosen target server.
The Upload File Tab sends a file from a local path to a target path on the remote machine... The Download File Tab is used to obtain a file from a given path on the infected machine... VIROGREEN... executing commands and uploading/downloading files.
Web shells and passive implants leverage HTTPS-encrypted traffic so commands/payloads cannot be extracted from captured network traffic.
Observables
7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.