UNC1860
UNC1860, also known as ShroudedSnooper, Scarred Manticore, and Storm-0861, is an Iranian state-sponsored threat actor likely affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Reporting describes it as a persistent, stealthy, and opportunistic actor focused on gaining initial access and maintaining footholds in high-priority Middle Eastern networks, especially telecommunications and government organizations, with additional targeting noted across media, academia, and critical infrastructure. Multiple sources assess that UNC1860 functions primarily as a state-sponsored initial access group or facilitator for other Iranian actors, including MOIS-affiliated groups such as APT34/OilRig, handing off established access for follow-on espionage and, in some reporting, destructive or disruptive operations. UNC1860 has been active since at least 2020 and has conducted intrusions across the Middle East, including Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Its tradecraft centers on opportunistic exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing systems, including SharePoint exploitation via CVE-2019-0604, followed by deployment of web shells and droppers such as STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY. It then installs passive implants and backdoors designed to avoid traditional outbound command-and-control, including TEMPLEDOOR, FACEFACE, SPARKLOAD, TOFULOAD, WINTAPIX, OATBOAT, and TEMPLEDROP. Reporting states these passive implants use undocumented IOCTL or HTTP.sys-related mechanisms, do not initiate outbound traffic, and are intended to reduce network-detection opportunities. The actor’s tooling also includes GUI-based controllers TEMPLEPLAY and VIROGREEN, which support command execution, file transfer, payload deployment, and proxying or facilitation of RDP access for downstream operators. UNC1860 has demonstrated strong reverse-engineering and Windows internals expertise, including use of the repurposed legitimate Iranian Sheed AV kernel driver in TEMPLEDROP for stealthy persistence and file protection, and evasion techniques such as interfering with Windows Event Log service threads. Public reporting also notes overlap in victimology and operations with APT34/OilRig and assesses UNC1860 as a gateway enabling access for other Iranian nation-state actors.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Telecommunication Services
- Government & Administration
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇮🇱 Israel
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- IR
Tradecraft
13 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
30 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
25 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
Observables
134 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Stealth-focused long-term access operations in telecom and government networks using passive backdoors, web shells, and a repurposed kernel driver to maintain low-visibility persistence.
State-sponsored initial access group associated with Iran that gains footholds in victim networks, deploys webshells and passive implants, and transfers access to other Iranian threat groups for espionage, ransomware, or disruptive operations.
MOIS-attributed Iranian threat actor focused on intelligence collection and initial access operations, including telecom and government intrusions in the Middle East.
Iran-linked access broker providing initial access/footholds in high-value networks (especially telecommunications) and handing that access to other Iranian state hacking groups; uses a large set of custom passive implants/backdoors and inbound-only C2-like interaction to reduce detection.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.