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UNC1860 is a persistent Iranian state-sponsored threat actor likely affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Also tracked as ShroudedSnooper, Scarred Manticore, and Storm-0861, it principally targets government and telecommunications networks across the Middle East. The group is assessed to operate as a state-sponsored initial-access provider: it opportunistically exploits vulnerable internet-facing systems, deploys web shells and droppers, establishes durable footholds, and enables other MOIS-associated operators to access compromised environments. UNC1860 has operational overlaps with APT34 (OilRig) and has been associated with activity against organizations in Israel, Iraq, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. UNC1860 employs a large custom toolset centered on passive, listener-based implants that do not initiate conventional outbound command-and-control traffic. Its tooling includes HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop, TEMPLEDOOR, FACEFACE, SPARKLOAD, TOFULOAD, TOFUDRV, TEMPLEDROP, OATBOAT, STAYSHANTE, SASHEYAWAY, TEMPLEPLAY, and VIROGREEN. It has used custom controllers to execute commands, transfer files, proxy traffic, and facilitate remote access through compromised hosts. VIROGREEN has been used to exploit vulnerable SharePoint servers, while other components use Windows kernel and driver functionality, undocumented I/O control mechanisms, and HTTP listener capabilities. The actor also uses web shells, DLL search-order hijacking, obfuscation and decoding, masquerading as legitimate security or server components, and interference with Windows event logging to maintain stealth and persistence. UNC1860 has used compromised victim environments to scan regional targets, validate accounts across organizational domains, and identify exposed services for subsequent intrusion activity.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
26 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
30 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
25 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
138 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Stealth-focused long-term access operations in telecom and government networks using passive backdoors, web shells, and a repurposed kernel driver to maintain low-visibility persistence.
State-sponsored initial access group associated with Iran that gains footholds in victim networks, deploys webshells and passive implants, and transfers access to other Iranian threat groups for espionage, ransomware, or disruptive operations.
MOIS-attributed Iranian threat actor focused on intelligence collection and initial access operations, including telecom and government intrusions in the Middle East.
Iran-linked access broker providing initial access/footholds in high-value networks (especially telecommunications) and handing that access to other Iranian state hacking groups; uses a large set of custom passive implants/backdoors and inbound-only C2-like interaction to reduce detection.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.