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Malware6 associated actors

LoptikMod

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors6Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
SpearphishingPhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

LoptikMod is a Windows remote access trojan associated with the India-linked DoNot Team, also tracked as APT-C-35, Mint Tempest, Origami Elephant, SECTOR02, and Viceroy Tiger. It has been reported in DoNot espionage operations since at least 2018 and has been used against government, diplomatic, defense, and NGO targets, including European foreign ministries.

LoptikMod is typically delivered through spearphishing emails that impersonate officials and use diplomatic or defense-themed lures. Observed campaigns used password-protected archives containing a malicious executable disguised as a document. Once executed, the malware establishes persistence through scheduled tasks, enforces single-instance execution, performs host reconnaissance, and communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over encrypted web traffic.

Its functionality includes collecting system and host-identification data, receiving operator commands, downloading additional modules or payloads, and exfiltrating information from compromised systems. Reported tradecraft includes string obfuscation, selective packing, runtime API resolution, anti-virtualization checks, and cleanup steps intended to reduce forensic visibility. The malware’s behavior and targeting are consistent with long-term surveillance and cyber-espionage objectives rather than disruptive or destructive operations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SECTOR02

The telemetry and analysis of the payload associated this attack with "LoptikMod" malware, reportedly used exclusively by DoNot APT since 2018.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
DoNot APT

The telemetry and analysis of the payload associated this attack with "LoptikMod" malware, reportedly used exclusively by DoNot APT since 2018.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
Origami Elephant

The telemetry and analysis of the payload associated this attack with "LoptikMod" malware, reportedly used exclusively by DoNot APT since 2018.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
DoNot

The telemetry and analysis of the payload associated this attack with "LoptikMod" malware, reportedly used exclusively by DoNot APT since 2018.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
VICEROY TIGER

The telemetry and analysis of the payload associated this attack with "LoptikMod" malware, reportedly used exclusively by DoNot APT since 2018.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
Mint Tempest

The telemetry and analysis of the payload associated this attack with "LoptikMod" malware, reportedly used exclusively by DoNot APT since 2018.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"spear-phishing ... using malicious LNK files" / "strong preference for using shortcut files (LNK), VBScript"

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

Attack vector: Spear-phishing email originating from a Gmail address ... The email contained a Google Drive link ... pointing to a malicious RAR archive named SyClrLtr.rar.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 Creates scheduled tasks: “PerformTaskMaintain” “MicorsoftVelocity”

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003 Executes Djkggosj.bat, sfs.bat

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Execution User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002 Victim opens SyClrLtr.rar → runs notflog.exe

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 Creates scheduled tasks: “PerformTaskMaintain” “MicorsoftVelocity”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 Creates scheduled tasks: “PerformTaskMaintain” “MicorsoftVelocity”

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

It also employs anti-VM techniques and ASCII obfuscation to hinder execution in virtual environments and evade analysis

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Instead of directly importing APIs, malware can load them dynamically at runtime. This is done using functions like `LoadLibrary` ... and `GetProcAddress` ...

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File T1027.013 Encoded ASCII strings in file Notflog.exe

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The RAR archive distributed via the emails contains a malicious executable that mimics a PDF document.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

It also employs anti-VM techniques and ASCII obfuscation to hinder execution in virtual environments and evade analysis

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware employs anti-VM techniques, specifically the "IN" assembly instruction, to hinder execution in virtual environments and evade analysis.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The malware gathers system details, including the CPU model, operating system name and build, username, hostname, CPU ProcessorID, and a list of installed software.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Discovery File and Directory Discovery T1083 Search for %localappdata% in user environment

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

It also employs anti-VM techniques and ASCII obfuscation to hinder execution in virtual environments and evade analysis

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware employs anti-VM techniques, specifically the "IN" assembly instruction, to hinder execution in virtual environments and evade analysis.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Command and Control Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 C2 communication: totalservices[.]info

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

receive further commands, download additional modules

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Exfiltration Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 HTTPS POST request: hxxps://totalservices[.]info/WxporesjaTexopManor/vrptpvabkokamekastra/N1/SA

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors6Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.