Skip to main content
Mallory
Threat actorLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

DoNot

Updated 2 days ago
Trending this week#72of 10,544 threat actors
Mention activity · 30 days15 mentions · peak 5 in a dayToday
CVEs2Associated
Malware10Families
ATT&CK64Techniques
IOCs426Tracked
Origin
🇮🇳 India
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
PKBDLKINNP
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injectionSpoofing
Also known asapt_c_35donotDoNot Team

DoNot Team is an India-aligned cyberespionage group active since at least 2016, also tracked as APT-C-35, SectorE02, SECTOR02, Mint Tempest, Origami Elephant, and Viceroy Tiger. Its operations primarily target government, military, defense, and diplomatic organizations in South Asia, particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and India. The group also targets Kashmiri nonprofit organizations and individuals. Its diplomatic targeting extends to South Asian embassies outside the region, and a 2025 campaign targeted a European foreign affairs ministry. The group develops and deploys Windows and Android malware for intelligence collection. Its arsenal includes the EHDevel and yty frameworks, yty variants Gedit and DarkMusical, LoptikMod, and the Android loader Firestarter. Windows toolsets use multistage downloaders and modular backdoors to deploy keyloggers, screenshot collectors, document collectors, and reverse shells. Android capabilities include collecting contacts, call histories, SMS messages, keyboard input, files, location, and application information. Initial access commonly relies on tailored spearphishing with geopolitical, military, or diplomatic themes. Delivery methods include malicious Office macros, remote-template injection, exploitation of Office vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-11882, and archives containing executables disguised as documents. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks, startup shortcuts, registry autorun entries, and Android reboot-triggered payload loading. Evasion techniques include encrypted strings and payloads, in-memory execution, shellcode injection, dynamic API resolution, anti-virtualization checks, and geographically restricted payload delivery. The group uses legitimate cloud services for payload hosting, command-and-control configuration, and messaging; Firestarter leverages Firebase Cloud Messaging for selective payload delivery and resilient operator access. Campaigns repeatedly revisit a small set of organizations to collect and exfiltrate sensitive information.

Are they targeting you?See whether this actor's campaigns touch your sector, your geography, or the products you run, and get alerted when that changes.
Check your exposure
Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Military
  • Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Energy
  • Commercial & Professional Services
  • Education & Research
  • Utilities

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Pakistan
  • Bangladesh
  • Sri Lanka
  • India
  • China
  • Italy
  • Nepal
  • Togo

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • India
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

64 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

13 of 15 tactics94 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance2 techniques
T1590Gather Victim Network Information
T1595Active Scanning
TA0042Resource Development1 technique
T1583Acquire Infrastructure
TA0001Initial Access2 techniques
T1078Valid Accounts
T1566×6Phishing
T1566.001×12Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×3Spearphishing Link
TA0002Execution5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×10Scheduled Task
T1059×4Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×2PowerShell
T1059.003×4Windows Command Shell
T1059.005×5Visual Basic
T1059.007JavaScript
T1203×4Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204×3User Execution
T1204.002×4Malicious File
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0003Persistence3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×10Scheduled Task
T1078Valid Accounts
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009Shortcut Modification
TA0004Privilege Escalation4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×10Scheduled Task
T1055×5Process Injection
T1078Valid Accounts
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009Shortcut Modification
TA0005Stealth13 techniques
T1027×9Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.007Dynamic API Resolution
T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded File
T1036×6Masquerading
T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1055×5Process Injection
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.004×3File Deletion
T1078Valid Accounts
T1140×2Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.011Rundll32
T1221×7Template Injection
T1480Execution Guardrails
T1480.002Mutual Exclusion
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×4System Checks
T1564Hide Artifacts
T1564.003Hidden Window
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
T1620Reflective Code Loading
TA0006Credential Access4 techniques
T1056Input Capture
T1056.001×2Keylogging
T1110Brute Force
T1110.003Password Spraying
T1555Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003Credentials from Web Browsers
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
TA0007Discovery8 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration Discovery
T1033System Owner/User Discovery
T1082×12System Information Discovery
T1083×4File and Directory Discovery
T1087Account Discovery
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×4System Checks
T1518×2Software Discovery
T1518.001Security Software Discovery
T1614System Location Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement1 technique
T1021Remote Services
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares
TA0009Collection7 techniques
T1005×3Data from Local System
T1056Input Capture
T1056.001×2Keylogging
T1074Data Staged
T1113×3Screen Capture
T1119Automated Collection
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
T1560Archive Collected Data
TA0011Command and Control6 techniques
T1071×6Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×8Web Protocols
T1102Web Service
T1102.001Dead Drop Resolver
T1105×13Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219Remote Access Tools
T1568Dynamic Resolution
T1573Encrypted Channel
T1573.001Symmetric Cryptography
T1573.002Asymmetric Cryptography
TA0010Exfiltration1 technique
T1041×4Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 2 of them are exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2017-118822 evidence · Aug 14, 2026Exploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorSeveral samples containing the remote code exploit for CVE-2017–11882 have also been attributed to the group.View vulnerability →
CVE-2017-01991 evidence · Oct 9, 2026Exploited in the wildMicrosoft Office and WordPad OLE Remote Code ExecutionDark Pink has been observed to exploit CVE-2017-0199, the Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, in most of its attacks and apparently continues to actively exploit this CVE.View vulnerability →
Indicators of compromise

Observables

426 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does DoNot target?
DoNot targets Government & Administration, Military, Non-Governmental Organizations, Energy, Commercial & Professional Services, Education & Research, and Utilities in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, China, Italy, Nepal, and Togo.
What malware does DoNot use?
DoNot is associated with LoptikMod, yty, DoNot, GEdit, DarkMusical, and 5 more.
What other names is DoNot known by?
DoNot is also known as DoNot Team.
Where is DoNot from?
Mallory's sources associate DoNot with India.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
risky biz rssNews · Nov 16, 2026Risky Bulletin: Hackers accessed Barracuda's cloudA suspected Indian threat group whose recent campaigns are referenced without details about victims, malware, vulnerabilities, or operational techniques.Read more ↗risky biz rssNews · Nov 4, 2026Risky Bulletin: Hackers lock out and extort Li Auto smart car owners in RussiaIdentified as an Indian APT group whose tools were exposed through an open directory. No specific targets, malware families, or attack techniques are provided.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Nov 2, 2026APT DoNot expose son toolkit via un répertoire ouvert ciblant le secteur nucléaire pakistanais | CyberVeilleThe report attributes an exposed offensive toolkit to DoNot and describes an apparent cyberespionage campaign targeting Pakistan’s nuclear and energy sectors. Scripts reference PAEC, Chashma, KANUPP, OGDCL, and industrial-control technologies. The toolkit supports remote access, credential capture, network reconnaissance, lateral movement, and sensitive-file collection. Attribution rests on infrastructure overlap, malicious-document behavior, and targeting consistency; the content cautions that its automatically extracted indicators require validation.Read more ↗blueteamsecNews · Nov 2, 2026Exposed Opendir Reveals APT DONOT Cyber Espionage Toolkit Targeting Pakistan's Nuclear and Energy Sectors - Infosec.PubAn exposed directory attributed to Donot contained tooling and configurations suggesting a potential cyberespionage operation. References to Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, energy sector, SCADA environments, and OGDCL impersonation indicate possible targeting, but the content does not establish successful compromise.Read more ↗
+31 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Are they targeting you?See whether this actor's campaigns touch your sector, your geography, or the products you run, and get alerted when that changes.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping64MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware10Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs2CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables426Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.