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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors5 associated CVEs

KeyBoy

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns5Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs35Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
Windows

KeyBoy is a Windows backdoor associated with the China-linked espionage group Tropic Trooper, also known as GouShe. It has been used in intrusions targeting organizations in the Asia-Pacific region, with reporting linking the actor to government, healthcare, transportation, and high-technology sectors; transportation entities in Taiwan have been a particularly prominent focus. KeyBoy supports remote post-compromise operations including downloading and executing additional payloads through PowerShell, collecting browser-stored passwords, capturing screenshots, and installing a keylogger to intercept user input and credentials. It also performs host and network discovery by determining the compromised system’s public-facing IP address. For persistence, KeyBoy can install itself as a Windows service backed by a malicious DLL. Its operators have also used defense-evasion measures including concealed PowerShell execution with hidden windows and timestomping of dropped DLLs. Technical overlap identified in later campaigns indicates that EntryShell is an upgraded evolution of KeyBoy, preserving core backdoor functionality while updating communications, configuration, and command handling.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2015-1641via citizenlabExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office RTF Memory Corruption Vulnerability“The .rtf document attached to the malicious email was designed to exploit a more recent vulnerability: CVE-2015-1641. If successful, this exploit launches a newer version of the same malware…”View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-4114via citizenlabExploited in the wildSandworm“...weaponized using (closely related to CVE-2014-4114 aka Sandworm, which we have previously observed this exploit used against the Tibetan community)…”View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2012-0158via citizenlabExploited in the wildMicrosoft Common Controls ActiveX Remote Code Execution“The first attempt leveraged an old vulnerability in the parsing of Rich-text-format (.rtf) files (CVE-2012-0158)… The email attachment is a .rtf document containing a dropper, delivered using an exploit designed to leverage CVE-2012-0158…”View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-1770via citizenlabMicrosoft Office 2013 Uninitialized Memory Use VulnerabilityThe operation uses known and patched exploits to deliver a custom backdoor known as KeyBoy. We analyze multiple versions of KeyBoy revealing a development cycle focused on avoiding basic antivirus detection.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2012-1856via citizenlabMSCOMCTL.OCX RCE VulnerabilityThe operation uses known and patched exploits to deliver a custom backdoor known as KeyBoy. We analyze multiple versions of KeyBoy revealing a development cycle focused on avoiding basic antivirus detection.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Tropic Trooper

このことから、EntryShellはKeyBoyをバージョンアップさせたマルウェアであると判断しました。

via itochu cyber intelligence blogblog.itochuci.co.jp
GouShe

There was an adversary group which we called GouShe (a.k.a TroppicTropper, Keyboy) focus on infiltrating Transportation related entities in Taiwan. More than 70% of transportation related cases we observed were from this specific group.

via teamt5teamt5.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

“we observed a malware operation targeting members of the Tibetan Parliament… highly targeted email lures with repurposed content and attachments… urge recipients to open an attached .rtf file”

Execution

8 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence9

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) uses PowerShell commands to download and execute payloads.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) can launch interactive shells for communicating with the victim machine.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)(Citation: Rapid7 KeyBoy Jun 2013)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence5

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) uses VBS scripts for installing files and performing execution.(Citation: CitizenLab KeyBoy Nov 2016)

T1059.006PythonEvidence3

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) uses Python scripts for installing files and performing execution.(Citation: CitizenLab KeyBoy Nov 2016)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

“The first attempt leveraged… .rtf files (CVE-2012-0158)… The second attempt used… (CVE-2015-1641)… Opening the attachment… in Microsoft Word would result in the infection”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

“The message urges recipients to open an attached .rtf file… Opening the attachment… would… result in the infection”

T1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeEvidence3

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) uses the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) protocol to download remote payloads.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“wab32res.exe… used to load final payload… wab32res.dll… launched by wab32res.exe via DLL search order hijacking”

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“Once the KeyBoy DLL has been executed, it validates that a particular string value… is set in the Windows Registry… key named ‘Ver’… Additionally… ensure persistence… via… Winlogon Shell key”

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) installs a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.(Citation: Rapid7 KeyBoy Jun 2013)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“moving to… setting the Run key in the Windows registry in the early 2015 sample… HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”

T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence4

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) issues the command <code>reg add “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon”</code> to achieve persistence.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017) (Citation: CitizenLab KeyBoy Nov 2016)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) installs a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.(Citation: Rapid7 KeyBoy Jun 2013)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“moving to… setting the Run key in the Windows registry in the early 2015 sample… HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”

T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence4

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) issues the command <code>reg add “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon”</code> to achieve persistence.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017) (Citation: CitizenLab KeyBoy Nov 2016)

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence4

In one version of [KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387), string obfuscation routines were used to hide many of the critical values referenced in the malware.(Citation: CitizenLab KeyBoy Nov 2016)

T1070.006TimestompEvidence5

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) time-stomped its DLL in order to evade detection.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence6

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) uses <code>-w Hidden</code> to conceal a [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) window that downloads a payload. (Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“wab32res.exe… used to load final payload… wab32res.dll… launched by wab32res.exe via DLL search order hijacking”

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“Once the KeyBoy DLL has been executed, it validates that a particular string value… is set in the Windows Registry… key named ‘Ver’… Additionally… ensure persistence… via… Winlogon Shell key”

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) installs a keylogger for intercepting credentials and keystrokes.(Citation: Rapid7 KeyBoy Jun 2013)

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence10

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) attempts to collect passwords from browsers.(Citation: Rapid7 KeyBoy Jun 2013)

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) can determine the public or WAN IP address for the system.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence12

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) can gather extended system information, such as information about the operating system and memory.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)(Citation: Rapid7 KeyBoy Jun 2013)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) has a command to launch a file browser or explorer on the system.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) installs a keylogger for intercepting credentials and keystrokes.(Citation: Rapid7 KeyBoy Jun 2013)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence6

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) has a command to perform screen grabbing.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationEvidence3

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) uses custom SSL libraries to impersonate SSL in C2 traffic.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“Port… 443… The backdoor then sends a login beacon to the C2 server… all other communication… transmitted using an encoding mechanism…”

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

“hard-coded IP addresses for the C2 servers… communication… transmitted using an encoding mechanism based on principles from modular arithmetic”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence10

[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) has a download and upload functionality.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)(Citation: Rapid7 KeyBoy Jun 2013)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

“Download files from the victim computer” and “all other communication between backdoor and command and control server, is transmitted using an encoding mechanism…”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

35 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

41 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching35Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities5CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.