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Malware1 associated actor

PteroLNK

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs1Tracked

PteroLNK is a Gamaredon malware tool/weaponizer used for lateral movement and propagation. It is associated with the Russia-aligned Gamaredon APT (also tracked as Shuckworm, Armageddon, Primitive Bear, ACTINIUM, Callisto, and Aqua Blizzard), which has targeted Ukrainian government, military, law-enforcement, and defense-related entities. PteroLNK is used to infect removable USB drives and mapped network drives with malicious LNK files; when a victim opens one of those shortcut files, it triggers retrieval of downloader malware and follow-on payloads. Reporting states that the VBScript version of PteroLNK was enhanced in early 2024 to weaponize mapped network drives in addition to USB drives, expanding its lateral-movement capability. During the second half of 2024, it received updates that improved obfuscation, complicated LNK creation, and used registry-based techniques to hide files and file extensions. PteroLNK has also been referenced in 2025 reporting as part of Gamaredon’s continuing operations against Ukraine and was observed among Gamaredon tools deployed on systems that were also compromised by Turla, which installed the Kazuar backdoor. High-confidence behavior directly mentioned in the source content is propagation via malicious LNK files on USB and network drives for lateral movement within victim environments.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon also employed PteroLNK and PteroPaste for lateral movement via infected USB and network drives...

via scworldscworld.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

Gamaredon also employed PteroLNK and PteroPaste for lateral movement via infected USB and network drives

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“establishing persistence through scheduled tasks… The downloader payload is scheduled to execute every 3 minutes, while the LNK dropper script runs every 9 minutes.”

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

These files delivered malicious HTA or LNK files that executed embedded VBScript downloaders such as PteroSand.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

“the shortcuts contains a javascript command which leverages wscript.exe… javascript:eval('w=new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell"); … wscript.exe //e:vbScript ~.drv')”

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

...infecting USB drives and network drives with malicious LNK files that, when opened by an unsuspecting user, trigger the retrieval of downloader malware.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“establishing persistence through scheduled tasks… The downloader payload is scheduled to execute every 3 minutes, while the LNK dropper script runs every 9 minutes.”

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“concealing its activities by modifying Windows Explorer settings to hide files… modifies the registry in order to hide hidden files and folders, extensions and protected OS files.”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“parameters such as… persistence mechanisms (registry keys and scheduled tasks)… The Windows registry is leveraged to persistently store and retrieve the C2 addresses… HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\WindowsUpdates… WindowsResponby… WindowsDetect”

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Gamaredon introduced another novel technique: using malicious LNK files to execute PowerShell commands directly from Cloudflare-generated domains

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“establishing persistence through scheduled tasks… The downloader payload is scheduled to execute every 3 minutes, while the LNK dropper script runs every 9 minutes.”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“parameters such as… persistence mechanisms (registry keys and scheduled tasks)… The Windows registry is leveraged to persistently store and retrieve the C2 addresses… HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\WindowsUpdates… WindowsResponby… WindowsDetect”

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Gamaredon introduced another novel technique: using malicious LNK files to execute PowerShell commands directly from Cloudflare-generated domains

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Throughout the second half of 2024, it received multiple incremental updates, including improved obfuscation

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

“replacing existing files and folders with deceptive shortcuts… creates a malicious shortcut that mimics the original file… chooses… military-themed decoy filenames in Ukrainian”

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

“Shortcuts are configured to execute the main PteroLNK VBScript malware… via mshta.exe.”

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

“conditional execution logic… presence of the “360 Total Security” antivirus… execution… shifted from scheduled tasks to an infinite loop… no actions… to conceal files either.”

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

registry-based techniques to hide files and file extensions from victims.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“concealing its activities by modifying Windows Explorer settings to hide files… modifies the registry in order to hide hidden files and folders, extensions and protected OS files.”

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

“enumerates local and mapped drives… propagate through local and network drives”

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

“for each .pdf, .docx and .xlsx file in the root of the drive, it creates a malicious shortcut… repeats for subfolders up to three levels deep.”

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

“conditional execution logic… presence of the “360 Total Security” antivirus… execution… shifted from scheduled tasks to an infinite loop… no actions… to conceal files either.”

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

Gamaredon also employed PteroLNK and PteroPaste for lateral movement via infected USB and network drives

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence3

Gamaredon also employed PteroLNK and PteroPaste for lateral movement via infected USB and network drives

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“sends… HTTP GET request… using its custom User-Agent… DDR at telegra.ph… teletype.in… trycloudflare.com tunnel…”

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

“Cloudflare quick tunnel address… hosted on trycloudflare.com… adopted by threat actors… traverse network detection by blending with legitimate traffic.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“This payload serves as a downloader… designed to retrieve and deploy additional malware… processes server responses expected to contain Base64-encoded VBScript payloads.”

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

“Gamaredon uses Telegraph and Teletype articles as Dead Drop Resolver (DDR)… DDR response is parsed… to extract an updated C2 address… pivot between fallback mechanisms.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.