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Malware3 associated actors2 associated CVEs

Drokbk

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs27Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

Drokbk is a custom .NET backdoor for Windows used by Iranian government-sponsored operators, including COBALT MIRAGE Cluster B and a mature subgroup tracked by Microsoft as Mint Sandstorm. Observed since 2022, it is deployed after initial compromise to maintain access and execute additional commands or code received from command-and-control infrastructure. Its native functionality is limited, with operators relying on it to download and deploy additional tooling.

The malware consists of an installer or dropper and a secondary backdoor payload. The dropper extracts an embedded payload, installs it as a Windows service for persistence, and removes its temporary installation artifact. The payload uses GitHub as a dead drop resolver: it queries the GitHub API to locate an operator-controlled repository and retrieves command-and-control information from the repository's README. This separates the implant from a fixed command-and-control address and allows operators to rotate infrastructure without replacing the installed malware. After resolving its command-and-control destination, the payload sends an initial beacon containing the infected host's hostname and current time.

Drokbk was observed in a February 2022 intrusion into a U.S. local government network following exploitation of a VMware Horizon server through Log4j vulnerabilities CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2021-45046. Operators deployed it alongside other remote-access mechanisms to provide additional persistence. Its associated Mint Sandstorm subgroup has also targeted high-value energy and transportation organizations and U.S. critical infrastructure.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-45046via sophos threat researchExploited in the wildApache Log4j Thread Context JNDI Injection via Incomplete Log4Shell FixSecureworks® Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) researchers are investigating the Drokbk malware, which is operated by a subgroup of the Iranian government-sponsored COBALT MIRAGE threat group. This subgroup is known as Cluster B. Drokbk is written in .NET and is made up of a dropper and a payload.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-44228via sophos threat researchExploited in the wildLog4ShellSecureworks® Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) researchers are investigating the Drokbk malware, which is operated by a subgroup of the Iranian government-sponsored COBALT MIRAGE threat group. This subgroup is known as Cluster B. Drokbk is written in .NET and is made up of a dropper and a payload.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Magic Hound

“Similarly, Drokbk malware uses the GitHub API to parse a specific repository file to locate and re-establish its C2 connection.”

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
APT42

Since 2022, Microsoft has observed this Mint Sandstorm subgroup using two custom implants, detected by Microsoft security products as Drokbk and Soldier, to persist in target environments and deploy additional tools.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
COBALT MIRAGE

Secureworks® Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) researchers are investigating the Drokbk malware, which is operated by a subgroup of the Iranian government-sponsored COBALT MIRAGE threat group. This subgroup is known as Cluster B. Drokbk is written in .NET and is made up of a dropper and a payload.

via sophos threat researchsophos.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

The February intrusion that Secureworks incident responders investigated began with a compromise of a VMware Horizon server using two Log4j vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2021-45046).

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the operators use webhook.site for C2 and create scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The malware has limited built-in functionality and primarily executes additional commands or code from the command and control (C2) server.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the operators use webhook.site for C2 and create scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Using this newly created file, the dropper adds the SessionManagerService service for persistence.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the operators use webhook.site for C2 and create scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Using this newly created file, the dropper adds the SessionManagerService service for persistence.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Using the information from README.md, SessionService.exe sends an initial request to the C2 server. The request contains the hostname and current time.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The Drokbk backdoor issues a web request to obtain the contents of a README file on a Mint Sandstorm-controlled GitHub repo.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

Drobkbk and Soldier both use Mint Sandstorm-controlled GitHub repositories to host a domain rotator containing the operators’ C2 domains.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

Drokbk uses the dead drop resolver technique to determine its C2 server by connecting to a legitimate service on the internet (e.g., GitHub).

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Forensic artifacts indicated Drokbk.exe was extracted from a compressed archive (Drokbk.zip) hosted on the legitimate transfer.sh online service.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

COBALT MIRAGE's preferred form of remote access uses the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRPC) tool. While COBALT MIRAGE Cluster A uses a modified version of this tool known as TunnelFish, Cluster B favors the unaltered version.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

Drobkbk and Soldier both use Mint Sandstorm-controlled GitHub repositories to host a domain rotator containing the operators’ C2 domains.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

27 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching27Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.