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Malware1 associated actor

SharpDisco

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Dropper
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
AitmFake updateLanding pageLure
Platforms
Windows

SharpDisco is a .NET-based malware component within the Disco toolset used by the cyberespionage group MoustachedBouncer, which has targeted foreign embassies in Belarus. It has been observed as an early-stage dropper associated with adversary-in-the-middle operations that redirect victims to fake software-update lures and deliver payloads through SMB-based staging infrastructure.

SharpDisco is designed for stealthy execution and follow-on access. It can hide windows during execution using .NET process settings, create scheduled tasks for repeated execution, and deploy plugins that extend functionality. Documented plugins include a component that monitors external or removable drives and another that exfiltrates stolen files over SMB shares that also serve as command-and-control infrastructure. SharpDisco has also been observed creating scheduled tasks that implement SMB-based reverse-shell style communications by reading from and writing to designated SMB shares.

The malware is part of a broader operational ecosystem in which Disco components rely on SMB for payload staging, command exchange, and data theft, reducing dependence on conventional internet-facing command-and-control servers. MoustachedBouncer’s Disco framework has also been associated with screenshot capture, PowerShell execution, reverse-proxy functionality, and local privilege-escalation tooling elsewhere in the toolset. SharpDisco specifically targets Windows systems and supports espionage-oriented collection and covert post-compromise activity against diplomatic targets.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
MoustachedBouncer

(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) can create scheduled tasks to execute reverse shells that read and write data to and from specified SMB shares.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence5

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) can use `cmd.exe` to execute plugins and to send command output to specified SMB shares.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1106Native APIEvidence3

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) can leverage Native APIs through plugins including `GetLogicalDrives`.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) can create scheduled tasks to execute reverse shells that read and write data to and from specified SMB shares.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) can create scheduled tasks to execute reverse shells that read and write data to and from specified SMB shares.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Stealth

1 technique
T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence6

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) can hide windows using `ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden`.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that collect host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other basic system characteristics; examples include use of commands like systeminfo, ver, uname, sw_vers, and WMI queries.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) can identify recently opened files by using an LNK format parser to extract the original file path from LNK files found in either `%USERPROFILE%\Recent` (Windows XP) or `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent` (newer Windows versions) .(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence6

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) has dropped a plugin to monitor external drives to `C:\Users\Public\It3.exe`.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) can use a plugin to enumerate system drives.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence5

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) has dropped a recent-files stealer plugin to `C:\Users\Public\WinSrcNT\It11.exe`.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence3

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) has the ability to transfer data between SMB shares.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) has been used to download a Python interpreter to `C:\Users\Public\WinTN\WinTN.exe` as well as other plugins from external sources.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

[SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) can load a plugin to exfiltrate stolen files to SMB shares also used in C2.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

Cannon exfiltrates collected data over email via SMTP/S and POP3/S C2 channels. CURIUM has used IMAP and SMTPS for exfiltration via tools such as IMAPLoader. Kevin can send data from the victim host through a DNS C2 channel.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.