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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

GhostContainer

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 23 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Post exploitationDefense evasionLateral movement
Platforms
Windows

GhostContainer is a modular .NET backdoor targeting Microsoft Exchange servers on Windows. It is associated with the NightEagle threat group, also tracked as APT-Q-95, and has been observed in attacks against government and high-technology organizations in Asia and manufacturing and construction enterprises in Russia.

The backdoor provides remote command execution, shellcode execution, loading of additional .NET payloads, and file download, reading, writing, and deletion. Its proxy and socket-forwarding components establish tunnels between external systems and internal hosts. GhostContainer receives encrypted commands through HTTP headers in incoming Exchange web requests rather than beaconing to dedicated command-and-control infrastructure. It derives an AES key from the server's ASP.NET machine validation key and disguises its activity within Exchange traffic.

GhostContainer patches Windows security functions to bypass AMSI scanning and Windows Event Log mechanisms. It also creates virtual ASP.NET pages to execute code without corresponding physical page files. The implementation incorporates public code from Neo-reGeorg, Exchange exploitation tooling, and ysoserial components. In investigated NightEagle incidents, operators deployed it after entering corporate networks with compromised VPN credentials; the precise mechanism used to install the backdoor on Exchange servers has not been established.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2020-0688via xakepMicrosoft Exchange Server Validation Key Remote Code ExecutionGhostContainer собран из компонентов нескольких опенсорсных проектов, свободно доступных на GitHub. В их числе туннель Neo-reGeorg, эксплоит для CVE-2020-0688, а также компоненты ysoserial. | After gaining access through VPN accounts, the attackers deployed the GhostContainer backdoor on Microsoft Exchange servers. It is assembled from components of several open-source projects, including Neo-reGeorg, an exploit for CVE-2020-0688, and ysoserial components.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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NightEagle

After gaining access through VPN accounts, the attackers deployed the GhostContainer backdoor on Microsoft Exchange servers. It is assembled from components of several open-source projects, including Neo-reGeorg, an exploit for CVE-2020-0688, and ysoserial components.

via xakepxakep.ru
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence4

[GhostContainer] includes elements connected to the Neo-reGeorg tunnel, code for CVE-2020-0688, and the GhostWebShell class.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

“Detection of a malicious DLL’s .NET assembly being loaded via PowerShell: suspicious_assembly_loading_into_powershell_via_reflection.”

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

C2 commands and functionality: Command ID Description... 2 Execute a command line

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Command ID Description 1 Run received data as a shell code

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

It acts as a C2 command parser, capable of executing shellcode, downloading files, running commands, and loading additional .NET byte code... 3 Load .NET byte code in a child thread

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence4

Хакеры могли извлекать криптографические ключи Exchange из конфигурации ASP.NET, модифицировать параметр VIEWSTATE и таким образом запускать вредонос прямо в памяти сервера.

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence8

После этого атакующие размещали на серверах Microsoft Exchange бэкдор GhostContainer.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

One of the most notable features is that it creates an instance of the App_Web_843e75cf5b63, which serves as a loader for the web proxy class (App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3) via a virtual page injector.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

“The names of the repositories and archives were disguised to look legitimate” and “files contained within the archives were also given names mimicking known legitimate software.”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

One of the most notable features is that it creates an instance of the App_Web_843e75cf5b63, which serves as a loader for the web proxy class (App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3) via a virtual page injector.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Command ID Description... 7 Delete a file... 11 Iterate and delete files whose names contain App_Global in the defined folder and its subdirectories

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4

“extracting encryption keys from Exchange and manipulating Microsoft's web application framework to execute the backdoor directly in the server's memory.”

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

To execute commands, Stub checks if the current user is a system account. If it is not, it attempts to impersonate a user by utilizing a token stored in the application domain’s data storage.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence7

GhostContainer ... способен ... обходить AMSI и механизмы журналирования Windows.

T1685.001Disable or Modify Windows Event LogEvidence1

«обходит ... механизмы журнала событий Windows (Event Log) путем перезаписи адресов в ... ntdll.dll»

Credential Access

1 technique
T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Next, it retrieves the machine key from the ASP.NET configuration, specifically the validation key, and converts it to a byte array.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Command ID Description... 8 Read file contents

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

«извлекали из конфигурации ASP.NET криптографические ключи, используемые Microsoft Exchange, перезаписывали параметр фреймворка VIEWSTATE и внедряли в него полезную нагрузку»; «эксплуатировали ... CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep)»

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

GhostContainer can receive commands through Exchange web headers.

T1090ProxyEvidence7

В результате бэкдор способен перенаправлять сетевой трафик.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

It acts as a C2 command parser, capable of executing shellcode, downloading files, running commands, and loading additional .NET byte code... 5 Download and save a file

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

If the header is Dzvvlnwkccf, the malware establishes or manages a long-lived TCP tunnel connection between the internet and intranet.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

it can function as a proxy or tunnel, potentially exposing the internal network to external threats or facilitating the exfiltration of sensitive data from internal devices... Receives data from the internal network, encodes it, and sends it back to the attacker as an HTTP response body.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.