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Malware3 associated actors

DarkVNC

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs34Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasionPost exploitation
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

DarkVNC is a Windows remote-access trojan that uses hidden Virtual Network Computing (hVNC) functionality to give attackers concealed control of infected computers. It creates a hidden virtual desktop that operators can view and control remotely, keeping their activity separate from the victim’s visible desktop. DarkVNC also supports theft of victim information and its exfiltration to command-and-control infrastructure.

DarkVNC was deployed alongside TVRAT in an alleged June 2016–November 2017 campaign targeting users of a freelance-employment platform. Fraudulent accounts impersonating prospective clients distributed malicious Microsoft Excel attachments that prompted recipients to enable macros, which downloaded the malware. U.S. prosecutors attributed the operation to Searzhudin Tamirlanovich Aktulaev and alleged co-conspirators and alleged that stolen information supported fraud and other criminal activity; those allegations remain unproven. Approximately 80,000 users were targeted, rather than confirmed infected.

DarkVNC has also been identified as a payload distributed by Sload and linked to distribution through IcedID. It is distinct from TVRAT, despite their similar remote-control roles.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Tor2Mine

The campaign included the use of a variant of AZORult, an information-stealing malware; as well as the RAT Remcos; the DarkVNC backdoor trojan; and a clipboard cryptocurrency stealer.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
TA551

Today's diary reviews an example of Monster Libra pushing IcedID on Thursday 2022-08-11, and that IcedID infection led to Dark VNC activity and Cobalt Strike.

via handlers diary fullisc.sans.edu
TA554

We have observed final payloads including Ramnit, Gootkit, DarkVNC, Ursnif, and PsiXBot.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The ISO image seems to have been downloaded compressed with ZIP, possibly encrypted with a password, which indicates it's primarily spread via email.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence11

The conspirators allegedly created approximately 255 fake user accounts and used them to send messages containing malicious Excel attachments to around 80,000 freelancers.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The emails are crafted in the targeted country’s language and are often personalized to include recipients’ names and addresses in various parts of the email such as email body and subject. TA554 frequently uses package delivery or order notification lures; the emails contain URLs linking to zipped LNK files or zipped documents.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

Aktulaev and his co-conspirators built around 255 fake accounts on a well-known freelance work platform... [and] used those accounts to message roughly 80,000 users, posing as prospective clients.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It then creates a scheduled task with the name OneDrive SyncTask to execute hourly and launch the miner which is read from the previously created registry entry.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

we observed the attacker executing PowerShell commands to download files from multiple Tor2Mine-related domains

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence10

Opening an attachment prompted the recipient to enable or execute an embedded macro. If the user complied, the macro downloaded malware from the internet.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

TVRAT allows its users to exploit a vulnerability in remote access tool TeamViewer and take over a victim’s device. DarkVNC... exploited a bug in... VNC Viewer.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence11

Opening an attachment prompted the recipient to enable or execute an embedded macro. If the user complied, the macro downloaded malware from the internet.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It then creates a scheduled task with the name OneDrive SyncTask to execute hourly and launch the miner which is read from the previously created registry entry.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It then creates a scheduled task with the name OneDrive SyncTask to execute hourly and launch the miner which is read from the previously created registry entry.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Finally, the loader uses a process injector RunPE to inject a variant of the Azorult information-stealing trojan into the notepad.exe process.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

All strings, including the entire command line for the downloader PowerShell code are encrypted with a static byte key, different for each string, which also gets decrypted during the execution.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Finally, the loader uses a process injector RunPE to inject a variant of the Azorult information-stealing trojan into the notepad.exe process.

T1202Indirect Command ExecutionEvidence1

All malicious API calls are resolved dynamically... the address of the required functions which is then indirectly called using one of the 'call reg' instructions.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.005VNCEvidence2

Background LOBSHOT is the internal name given to an hVNC based bot by the Elastic Security Labs team. The public name of this malware is currently unknown. The primary capability of the malware is acting as both a stealer and hidden VNC.

Collection

1 technique
T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

Aktulaev used the access to steal data from victims... Aktulaev kept a document with stolen e-commerce login credentials and personal information on hundreds of victims.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

Thousands of computers infected with TVRAT were calling back to a command-and-control domain hosted in the U.S. The infected machine then reports its TeamViewer ID to a C2 server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

After infecting devices, he continued to access them through command-and-control domains.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence13

If the user complied, the macro downloaded malware from the internet.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence13

TVRAT and DarkVNC provided similar hidden remote-control capabilities... Prosecutors allege that the malware allowed the conspirators to control infected computers.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence10

Prosecutors allege that the malware allowed the conspirators to control infected computers and transfer stolen data to command-and-control servers.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Aktulaev used the access to steal data from victims and commit fraud.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

34 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

34 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching34Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.