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Malware

ViperSoftX

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 11 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK34Techniques
IOCs56Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingCrypto theft
Delivery
Cracked softwareLure
Platforms
Windows

ViperSoftX is a Windows information-stealing malware family first publicly identified in 2020, primarily associated with cryptocurrency theft. It fingerprints infected systems, discovers cryptocurrency wallet applications and browser wallet extensions, exfiltrates collected information, and replaces cryptocurrency addresses in the clipboard with attacker-controlled addresses. It also supports remote command execution, downloading and running additional payloads, and self-removal. Variants check for password managers, including KeePass 2 and 1Password.

ViperSoftX is primarily distributed through purported software cracks, activators, patchers, and key generators on unofficial download sites and torrent networks. Campaigns have also used malicious e-book packages. Its multistage execution chains use PowerShell, legitimate executable carriers, DLL sideloading or DLL load-order hijacking, and reflective loading. Evasion techniques include concealing malicious scripts within large, benign-looking log files, encrypting embedded payloads, using executable-specific byte-mapping tables, and checking for virtualization, analysis tools, and security software. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks; newer variants additionally use registry autorun entries and startup-folder launchers. Command-and-control techniques include domain generation, DNS TXT record abuse, and encrypted communications.

ViperSoftX can install VenomSoftX, a malicious browser extension that targets Chromium-based browsers. The extension disguises itself as legitimate software, steals information and credentials, and intercepts cryptocurrency exchange requests to redirect withdrawals while concealing transaction tampering. ViperSoftX operators have also deployed separate remote-access tools, clipboard stealers, and cryptocurrency miners, including QuasarRAT, PureRAT, and Monero-mining payloads.

Infections affect consumers and enterprises worldwide. Observed activity has included substantial enterprise exposure in Asia, alongside consumer infections across multiple regions. No named threat actor attribution has been established.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

9 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

the chosen techniques of the actors behind ViperSoftX (which involve using WMI Query Language (WQL), DLL sideloading/DLL load order hijacking, PowerShell reflective loading, browser hijacking, and C&C protection) are sophisticated.

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

Registers a Windows scheduled task named as WindowsUpdateTask that runs the batch file at user logon, ensuring persistence.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The malware creates a scheduled task using the legacy SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script for executing these hidden scripts afterward as well for ensuring persistence.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

On top of the information-stealing core, ViperSoftX provides RAT functionalities as well, like executing arbitrary commands on the command line

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

The current variant, creates PowerShell jobs to run each decoded payload.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The 2024 version ran decoded strings as shell commands using cmd.exe.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

In the beginning, ViperSoftX is served to victims when they download what they believe to be cracked software. It is commonly named Activator.exe or Patch.exe. Upon execution, however, the victim is infected with ViperSoftX.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

ViperSoftX is mostly spread via cracked software such as Adobe Illustrator, Corel Video Studio, Microsoft Office, and more, commonly distributed over torrents.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the chosen techniques of the actors behind ViperSoftX (which involve using WMI Query Language (WQL), DLL sideloading/DLL load order hijacking, PowerShell reflective loading, browser hijacking, and C&C protection) are sophisticated.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

Registers a Windows scheduled task named as WindowsUpdateTask that runs the batch file at user logon, ensuring persistence.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The malware creates a scheduled task using the legacy SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script for executing these hidden scripts afterward as well for ensuring persistence.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

the 2025 version it uses a robust 3-layer of fallback persistence strategy: Scheduled Task (WindowsUpdateTask) triggered at logon . Run registry key under HKCU . Bat file under startup folder.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Run registry key under HKCU . Bat file under startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

Registers a Windows scheduled task named as WindowsUpdateTask that runs the batch file at user logon, ensuring persistence.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The malware creates a scheduled task using the legacy SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script for executing these hidden scripts afterward as well for ensuring persistence.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

the 2025 version it uses a robust 3-layer of fallback persistence strategy: Scheduled Task (WindowsUpdateTask) triggered at logon . Run registry key under HKCU . Bat file under startup folder.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Run registry key under HKCU . Bat file under startup folder.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

it encrypts the payload using a basic XOR cipher ($XOR_KEY=65) and POSTs the encrypted buffer to the C2 server

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Registers a Windows scheduled task named as WindowsUpdateTask

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

il exploite l’environnement « AutoIt » pour charger du code dans le Common Language Runtime (CLR)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The 2025 version uses a GUID-style mutex identifier and increases the sleep time to 300 seconds — this delays sandbox detection, increases the likelihood of avoiding behavioral analysis | increases the sleep time to 300 seconds — this delays sandbox detection, increases the likelihood of avoiding behavioral analysis

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Les variantes 2025 ajoutent des délais d’exécution destinés à contourner les solutions de sandboxing.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the chosen techniques of the actors behind ViperSoftX (which involve using WMI Query Language (WQL), DLL sideloading/DLL load order hijacking, PowerShell reflective loading, browser hijacking, and C&C protection) are sophisticated.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

il exploite l’environnement « AutoIt » pour charger du code dans le Common Language Runtime (CLR)

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Les fonctionnalités malveillantes comprennent l’exfiltration d’informations sensibles (identifiants, données personnelles)

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Les fonctionnalités malveillantes comprennent l’exfiltration d’informations sensibles (identifiants, données personnelles)

Discovery

8 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

ViperSoftX searches the typical locations for web browser extensions and locally stored wallets.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

returns (OS, username, IP, detected apps)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

returns (OS, username, IP, detected apps)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

2025 supports a larger list of extensions and wallets (Exodus, Atomic, Electrum, Ledger), browser extensions (MetaMask, Binance, Coinbase), and Keepass configurations

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The 2025 version uses a GUID-style mutex identifier and increases the sleep time to 300 seconds — this delays sandbox detection, increases the likelihood of avoiding behavioral analysis | increases the sleep time to 300 seconds — this delays sandbox detection, increases the likelihood of avoiding behavioral analysis

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Les variantes 2025 ajoutent des délais d’exécution destinés à contourner les solutions de sandboxing.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

ViperSoftX performs fingerprinting of the infected machine, focusing on various types of information, including... Installed antivirus or other security software and whether the solution is active

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

Get-PublicIPAddress ... tries multiple web services in fallback order. Capturing public IPs helps attackers identify the infected device’s location and origin

Collection

2 techniques
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

ViperSoftX searches for cryptocurrencies stored locally on the infected device in cryptocurrency software and browser extensions, and monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses to perform clipboard swapping.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

the chosen techniques of the actors behind ViperSoftX (which involve using WMI Query Language (WQL), DLL sideloading/DLL load order hijacking, PowerShell reflective loading, browser hijacking, and C&C protection) are sophisticated.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Aside from trying to steal cryptocurrencies, the malware spoofs host headers to obfuscate its communication with the C&C servers.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

considering the monthly change of C&C servers and communication exchange, we believe in the possibility of another group involved based on the different coding or C&C scheme.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

constructs a HTTP GET request , encodes it in base64... In 2025 it adopts HttpClient ... better compatibility with HTTPS traffic

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

fetch new commands from C2 ... Receives the C2 server’s response — likely another base64-encoded or encrypted command. Decrypts the received data

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

constructs a HTTP GET request , encodes it in base64 ... Decodes the base64 meta request

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

ViperSoftX uses a domain-generating algorithm (DGA) to hide its C&C server and generate useless traffic.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Calls the Get-UserInfo function to collect user information, converts it into JSON format, and passes it to the Invoke-Request function.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

56 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching56Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping34Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.