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Malware1 associated actor

WasabiSeed

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs12Tracked

WasabiSeed is a custom downloader malware used in TA866 intrusion chains and described by Proofpoint and Cisco Talos as an intermediate stage for retrieving additional payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure. It has been observed in financially motivated campaigns, with TA866 also known as Asylum Ambuscade and linked in reporting to both crimeware and possible espionage-related activity. Infection chains delivering WasabiSeed began with malspam, thread-hijacked emails, malicious attachments or URLs, PDF attachments containing OneDrive links, macro-enabled Publisher files, and malvertising or 404 TDS redirections. In observed chains, a JavaScript downloader retrieved an MSI package, which executed an embedded WasabiSeed VBS script such as OCDService.vbs or TermServ.vbs. WasabiSeed then downloaded and executed a second MSI payload, commonly Screenshotter, and continued polling in a loop for additional payloads. WasabiSeed established persistence by creating an LNK shortcut in the Windows Startup folder, including observed filenames such as OCDService.lnk. It randomized or keyed payload retrieval using the infected system’s C: drive serial number and contacted C2 endpoints such as hxxp://109[.]107.173.72/%serial% and hxxp://193[.]233.133.179/[C: Drive Serial Number]. Reporting states that TA866 frequently used WasabiSeed to deliver Screenshotter for victim triage and, in prior campaigns, follow-on payloads including AHK Bot and Rhadamanthys Stealer. Observed targeting associated with these campaigns was concentrated in the United States, with additional activity in Germany and broader follow-on victimology including manufacturing, government, and financial services.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA866

WasabiSeed effectively functions as another downloader stage that is used to retrieve additional payloads from attacker-controlled servers.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

Prior reporting indicates that TA866 has been observed leveraging malicious Google advertisements and SEO poisoning to infect victims.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Typical distribution campaigns As previously mentioned, initial access to target environments is typically obtained by TA866 through successfully infecting systems via either malspam or malvertising.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

In most cases, the threat actor embedded malicious hyperlinks, either directly into the body of the email message, or within an attached document, typically PDFs or Microsoft Publisher files.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

In most cases, the threat actor embedded malicious hyperlinks, either directly into the body of the email message, or within an attached document.

Stealth

1 technique
T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

Once downloaded, the MSI is passed to MsiExec to execute the next stage of the process.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Captured screenshots are transmitted to the attacker’s C2 server ... via HTTP POST requests.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

We have also observed the use of native Windows binaries, like certutil.exe, being used to retrieve and execute Resident backdoor on systems.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.