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Malware

Silver Sparrow

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs6Tracked

Silver Sparrow is a macOS malware downloader/dropper identified by Red Canary Intelligence that targets both Intel-based Macs and Apple Silicon systems, including Apple M1. It uses JavaScript during installation of PKG files such as updater.pkg and update.pkg to generate files and scripts on disk, and establishes persistence via LaunchAgents. Reported persistence artifacts include ~/Library/Launchagents/agent.plist and ~/Library/Launchagents/init_agent.plist, with a version 1 script at ~/Library/Application Support/agent_updater/agent.sh configured to execute every hour. Silver Sparrow checks in hourly and attempts to download an implant or payload from Amazon S3 infrastructure, including mobiletraits.s3.amazonaws[.]com, using files such as /tmp/version.json and /tmp/version.plist to determine execution flow; /tmp/agent.sh is used as an installation callback script, and /tmp/agent is identified as the location of a final version 1 payload if distributed. At the time of reporting, no malicious final payload had been observed to download, and the malware’s ultimate objective remained unknown. The initial distribution method was also unknown, though the authors suspected malicious search engine results may have directed victims to the PKG installers. Two known variants were described. Version 1 used updater.pkg (MD5: 30c9bc7d40454e501c358f77449071aa) and communicated with api.mobiletraits[.]com. Version 2 used update.pkg (MD5: fdd6fb2b1dfe07b0e57d4cbfef9c8149) and communicated with api.specialattributes[.]com. Both variants included extraneous Mach-O binaries that appeared to be placeholder content rather than functional malware components: version 1 included an Intel x86_64 binary named updater (MD5: c668003c9c5b1689ba47a431512b03cc) that displayed "Hello, World!", while version 2 included a universal x86_64/ARM64 binary named tasker (MD5: b370191228fef82635e39a137be470af) that displayed "You did it!". The bundled Mach-O binaries would only run if a victim intentionally launched them. The file ~/Library/._insu was described as an empty file used to signal the malware to delete itself, although the circumstances under which it appeared were unknown. SentinelOne assessed that Silver Sparrow may have been sold to third-party affiliates or pay-per-install partners, consistent with commodity adware or malware ecosystems. Malwarebytes reportedly observed nearly 30,000 affected hosts that had not yet received a next-stage payload at the time of publication. A revoked Apple Developer ID, Saotia Seay (5834W6MYX3), was associated with the version 1 bystander binary. Detection guidance in the source material emphasized suspicious use of PlistBuddy with LaunchAgents and RunAtLoad, sqlite3 with LSQuarantine, and curl with s3.amazonaws.com.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

Look for a process that appears to be curl executing in conjunction with a command line that contains: s3.amazonaws.com . This analytic helps us find multiple macOS malware families using S3 buckets for distribution.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

~/Library/Application Support/agent_updater/agent.sh (v1 script that executes every hour)

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

/tmp/agent.sh (shell script executed for installation callback)

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

~/Library/Application Support/agent_updater/agent.sh (v1 script that executes every hour)

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

Look for a process that appears to be PlistBuddy executing in conjunction with a command line containing the following: LaunchAgents and RunAtLoad and true . This analytic helps us find multiple macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

~/Library/Application Support/agent_updater/agent.sh (v1 script that executes every hour)

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

Look for a process that appears to be PlistBuddy executing in conjunction with a command line containing the following: LaunchAgents and RunAtLoad and true . This analytic helps us find multiple macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence.

Stealth

1 technique
T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

~/Library/._insu (empty file used to signal the malware to delete itself)

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Look for a process that appears to be sqlite3 executing in conjunction with a command line that contains: LSQuarantine . This analytic helps us find multiple macOS malware families manipulating or searching metadata for downloaded files.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Based on data shared with us by Malwarebytes, the nearly 30,000 affected hosts have not downloaded what would be the next or final payload.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.