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Malware

KeRanger

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Exfiltration
Delivery
Cracked software
Platforms
macOS

KeRanger is a macOS ransomware family widely regarded as the first fully functional ransomware observed in the wild targeting OS X/macOS. It emerged in March 2016 and was distributed through a supply-chain compromise of the legitimate Transmission BitTorrent client, whose installer was trojanized and signed with a valid Apple-issued developer certificate, allowing the malware to bypass Gatekeeper protections under default settings. The campaign reportedly infected thousands of Mac users.

After execution via the compromised Transmission application, KeRanger installs and launches a hidden payload, delays activity for several days, then profiles the host and contacts attacker-controlled infrastructure reachable through Tor-related services. It retrieves cryptographic keying material and encrypts victim files using a hybrid encryption scheme involving asymmetric and symmetric cryptography. It targets user data on local systems and mounted volumes, appends a new encrypted-file extension, and drops ransom notes instructing victims to pay for decryption.

KeRanger primarily targets macOS systems and focuses on encrypting a broad range of file types associated with documents, images, archives, source code, databases, certificates, and other user data. It has been described as an early notable macOS ransomware strain and as a variant or rewrite related to Linux.Encoder.1. Apple responded by revoking the abused signing certificate and updating built-in protections, while Transmission replaced the compromised installer with a clean version and issued updates to affected users.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

OSX/Keydnap was distributed on a trusted website... via a recompiled version of the otherwise legitimate open source BitTorrent client application Transmission and distributed on their official website.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

"the OSX/KeRanger authors hacked the official website for ... 'Transmission' ... infected the legitimate Transmission application"; similarly for Keydnap: "the official Transmission website ... was hacked again ... to distribute Keydnap"

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

In both cases, a malicious block of code is added to the main function of the Transmission application. The code responsible for dropping and running the malicious payload is astonishingly the same.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence2

a legitimate code signing key was used to sign the malicious Transmission application bundle... still signed by Apple and bypasses Gatekeeper protection.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The RC4 key used to encrypt HTTP POST data and decrypt the response changed... The hardcoded C&C URL is now hxxp://t4f2cocitdpqa7tv.onion/api/osx

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

"WannaCry ransomware attack"; "CryptoLocker"; "TeslaCrypt"; "KeRanger"; "Hidden Tear"; "Jigsaw (ransomware)"; "Atlanta government ransomware attack"; "2019 Baltimore ransomware attack"; "FBI MoneyPak Ransomware"; "Annabelle (ransomware)"; "Philadelphia (ransomware)"; "Kirk Ransomware"; "Rensenware"; "Hitler-Ransomware"

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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.