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Malware5 associated actors

RustBucket

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 16 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK33Techniques
IOCs177Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLure
Platforms
macOSWindows

RustBucket is a multi-stage backdoor family associated with BlueNoroff, a North Korean threat actor within the Lazarus Group cluster. Observed since at least December 2022 and publicly documented in April 2023, it primarily targets macOS users in cryptocurrency, financial services, fintech, and venture capital organizations. A Windows .NET variant has also been identified. Its deployment supports financially motivated intrusions into organizations handling digital assets.

Typical infection chains use social engineering to persuade victims to install a malicious PDF viewer and open a specially crafted document. Recruitment-themed lures have also delivered RustBucket. The PDF viewer can display legitimate-looking material while decoding command-and-control configuration and retrieving subsequent payloads. macOS chains combine AppleScript, Swift, and Objective-C components with a Rust-based backdoor, and observed universal binaries support both Intel and Apple silicon systems. Some delivery applications have used valid Apple developer signatures and notarization before revocation.

The backdoor collects host information, including computer identity, operating-system details, running processes, and installation and boot timestamps, and transmits it to command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP POST. Operators can instruct it to download and execute additional Mach-O binaries or shell scripts, report execution status, or terminate. Updated macOS variants establish persistence through a user-level LaunchAgent. Evasion measures include obfuscated configuration, document-gated execution, and environmental checks. The Windows variant similarly profiles compromised hosts and retrieves additional stages; it checks for antivirus products and selects between alternate execution methods, including process injection.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

The engineer was targeted via a targeted social engineering engagement involving a fraudulent developer recruitment evaluation that delivered an obfuscated, memory-resident backdoor related to the RustBucket and KandyKorn malware lineages.

via sh3llc0d3 blogsh3llc0d3.com
TraderTraitor

The engineer was targeted via a targeted social engineering engagement involving a fraudulent developer recruitment evaluation that delivered an obfuscated, memory-resident backdoor related to the RustBucket and KandyKorn malware lineages.

via sh3llc0d3 blogsh3llc0d3.com
SquidSquad

Группировку связывают с вредоносным ПО RustBucket, SwiftBucket и NimDoor, а для вывода украденного она использует в том числе Tornado Cash.

via xakepxakep.ru
APT38

The new RUSTBUCKET variant targets macOS, adds built-in LaunchAgent persistence, gathers system information, communicates with C2 infrastructure, and can receive commands to terminate or download and execute Mach-O binaries or shell scripts.

via elastic security labselastic.co
REF9135

The new RUSTBUCKET variant targets macOS, adds built-in LaunchAgent persistence, gathers system information, communicates with C2 infrastructure, and can receive commands to terminate or download and execute Mach-O binaries or shell scripts.

via elastic security labselastic.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1199Trusted RelationshipEvidence1

Bluenoroff’s observed initial intrusion vector includes phishing emails, as well as leveraging social networks such as LinkedIn.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Bluenoroff’s observed initial intrusion vector includes phishing emails, as well as leveraging social networks such as LinkedIn.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

The cybercriminals might have emailed it to targets as they did with past campaigns.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

During our investigations, we identified the domain sarahbeery.docsend[.]me... We assess this likely was a profile used by Bluenoroff... possibly followed up by a delivery of malicious documents through the docsend sharing platform.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence3

During Stage 1, the process begins with the execution of an AppleScript utilizing the /usr/bin/osascript command.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

Command ID 0x30 enables the operator to upload malicious Mach-O binaries or shell scripts to the system and execute them.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Launching the LNK file results in downloading a Javascript file from Bluenoroff-controlled C2 server and executing it using mshta.exe... The downloaded file is an obfuscated Javascript.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

If one of this antivirus is found, the DLL call the OpenProcess API...

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

this new variety was found inside a ZIP archive that contained a PDF file named, “Crypto-assets and their risks for financial stability”, with a thumbnail that showed a corresponding title page.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The fake PDF reader then requires opening a specific PDF file that operates as a key to trigger the malicious activity... When the proper PDF file is submitted to the fake PDF reader, it requests its C2 server... to download and execute a new payload.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

The malicious PDF dropped a second-stage malware known as RUSTBUCKET... and in this instance persisted, via a Launch Agent disguised as “Safari Update”.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

It establishes its own persistence by adding a plist file at /Users/<user>/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.systemupdate.plist.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

SentinelLABS observed the use of a novel persistence mechanism abusing the Zsh configuration file zshenv.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The classical infection chain observed is ZIP > LNK & PDF... The archive contains... a LNK file masquerading as a TXT file... Launching the LNK file results in downloading a Javascript file...

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

If there is no antivirus, the DLL perform code injection on the provided explorer.exe process.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

The malicious PDF dropped a second-stage malware known as RUSTBUCKET... and in this instance persisted, via a Launch Agent disguised as “Safari Update”.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

It establishes its own persistence by adding a plist file at /Users/<user>/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.systemupdate.plist.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

SentinelLABS observed the use of a novel persistence mechanism abusing the Zsh configuration file zshenv.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The classical infection chain observed is ZIP > LNK & PDF... The archive contains... a LNK file masquerading as a TXT file... Launching the LNK file results in downloading a Javascript file...

Stealth

10 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The downloaded file is an obfuscated Javascript: 5ca7c871dfe24b27b5cf7e9bf087f44c7620d78a1d4fa76373f22abedbdf8f82 The obfuscation method is straightforward and consists in encoding some characters in UTF-8 and Hex.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

The LaunchAgent is named com.apple.systemupdate and executes the file located at /Users/<user>/Library/Metadata/System Update.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

If there is no antivirus, the DLL perform code injection on the provided explorer.exe process.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The fake PDF reader uses a hardcoded 100-bytes XOR key to decrypt the new content of the document and the C2 server configuration... This script decodes its base64 block, writes it in a file 'tyrbz.js' and runs it.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

It ad-hoc code-signs dropped payloads ( codesign --force --deep --sign - ) to bypass Gatekeeper.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

Launching the LNK file results in downloading a Javascript file from Bluenoroff-controlled C2 server and executing it using mshta.exe.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

If one of this antivirus is found, the DLL call the OpenProcess API to run the following command: rundll32.exe %s\DevExpress.Xpr.v19.2.dll,Update

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

variant A for gathering environmental information and checking for execution in a virtual machine via querying the SPHardwareDataType value of system_profiler .

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

The Stage 1 variant described by Elastic differs in that it writes the second stage as a hidden file to /Users/Shared/.pd .

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

Recent findings from Mandiant heist investigations have identified social engineering of developers via fake job recruiting with coding tests as a common initial infection vector.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1222.002Linux and Mac PermissionsEvidence1

The malware proceeds by granting execution permissions to the uploaded file using the chmod API.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

This backdoor collects information about the compromised machine (name, active processes, network configuration, etc.) and sends this information to the C2 using POST requests.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The malware proceeds to gather comprehensive system information, including: List of active processes ... Status of all running processes within the system.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

The malware proceeds to gather comprehensive system information, including: Computer name ... Current timestamp ... Installation timestamp ... System boot time.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

variant A for gathering environmental information and checking for execution in a virtual machine via querying the SPHardwareDataType value of system_profiler .

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

This DLL checks for some antivirus on the infected machine: Bitdefender, Kaspersky, Sophos, AvastSvc, Norton, Avira, AVG and WindowsDefender.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

These infection chains notably include LNK, MSI, OneNote and VHD files.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The DoPost function is used to make the HTTP Post request to the C2 using libcurl.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The malware establishes its initial connection to the C2 server by transmitting the gathered data via a POST request.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

This AppleScript is responsible for initiating the download of the Stage 2 binary from the C2 using cURL.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

177 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching177Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping33Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.