RustBucket
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injection
- Delivery
- PhishingSpearphishingLure
- Platforms
- macOSWindows
RustBucket is a multi-stage backdoor family associated with BlueNoroff, a North Korean threat actor within the Lazarus Group cluster. Observed since at least December 2022 and publicly documented in April 2023, it primarily targets macOS users in cryptocurrency, financial services, fintech, and venture capital organizations. A Windows .NET variant has also been identified. Its deployment supports financially motivated intrusions into organizations handling digital assets.
Typical infection chains use social engineering to persuade victims to install a malicious PDF viewer and open a specially crafted document. Recruitment-themed lures have also delivered RustBucket. The PDF viewer can display legitimate-looking material while decoding command-and-control configuration and retrieving subsequent payloads. macOS chains combine AppleScript, Swift, and Objective-C components with a Rust-based backdoor, and observed universal binaries support both Intel and Apple silicon systems. Some delivery applications have used valid Apple developer signatures and notarization before revocation.
The backdoor collects host information, including computer identity, operating-system details, running processes, and installation and boot timestamps, and transmits it to command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP POST. Operators can instruct it to download and execute additional Mach-O binaries or shell scripts, report execution status, or terminate. Updated macOS variants establish persistence through a user-level LaunchAgent. Evasion measures include obfuscated configuration, document-gated execution, and environmental checks. The Windows variant similarly profiles compromised hosts and retrieves additional stages; it checks for antivirus products and selects between alternate execution methods, including process injection.
Associated threat actors
5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The engineer was targeted via a targeted social engineering engagement involving a fraudulent developer recruitment evaluation that delivered an obfuscated, memory-resident backdoor related to the RustBucket and KandyKorn malware lineages.
The engineer was targeted via a targeted social engineering engagement involving a fraudulent developer recruitment evaluation that delivered an obfuscated, memory-resident backdoor related to the RustBucket and KandyKorn malware lineages.
Группировку связывают с вредоносным ПО RustBucket, SwiftBucket и NimDoor, а для вывода украденного она использует в том числе Tornado Cash.
The new RUSTBUCKET variant targets macOS, adds built-in LaunchAgent persistence, gathers system information, communicates with C2 infrastructure, and can receive commands to terminate or download and execute Mach-O binaries or shell scripts.
The new RUSTBUCKET variant targets macOS, adds built-in LaunchAgent persistence, gathers system information, communicates with C2 infrastructure, and can receive commands to terminate or download and execute Mach-O binaries or shell scripts.
Techniques & procedures
33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
Bluenoroff’s observed initial intrusion vector includes phishing emails, as well as leveraging social networks such as LinkedIn.
Bluenoroff’s observed initial intrusion vector includes phishing emails, as well as leveraging social networks such as LinkedIn.
The cybercriminals might have emailed it to targets as they did with past campaigns.
During our investigations, we identified the domain sarahbeery.docsend[.]me... We assess this likely was a profile used by Bluenoroff... possibly followed up by a delivery of malicious documents through the docsend sharing platform.
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
During Stage 1, the process begins with the execution of an AppleScript utilizing the /usr/bin/osascript command.
Command ID 0x30 enables the operator to upload malicious Mach-O binaries or shell scripts to the system and execute them.
Launching the LNK file results in downloading a Javascript file from Bluenoroff-controlled C2 server and executing it using mshta.exe... The downloaded file is an obfuscated Javascript.
If one of this antivirus is found, the DLL call the OpenProcess API...
this new variety was found inside a ZIP archive that contained a PDF file named, “Crypto-assets and their risks for financial stability”, with a thumbnail that showed a corresponding title page.
The fake PDF reader then requires opening a specific PDF file that operates as a key to trigger the malicious activity... When the proper PDF file is submitted to the fake PDF reader, it requests its C2 server... to download and execute a new payload.
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
The malicious PDF dropped a second-stage malware known as RUSTBUCKET... and in this instance persisted, via a Launch Agent disguised as “Safari Update”.
It establishes its own persistence by adding a plist file at /Users/<user>/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.systemupdate.plist.
SentinelLABS observed the use of a novel persistence mechanism abusing the Zsh configuration file zshenv.
The classical infection chain observed is ZIP > LNK & PDF... The archive contains... a LNK file masquerading as a TXT file... Launching the LNK file results in downloading a Javascript file...
Privilege Escalation
5 techniques
Privilege Escalation
If there is no antivirus, the DLL perform code injection on the provided explorer.exe process.
The malicious PDF dropped a second-stage malware known as RUSTBUCKET... and in this instance persisted, via a Launch Agent disguised as “Safari Update”.
It establishes its own persistence by adding a plist file at /Users/<user>/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.systemupdate.plist.
SentinelLABS observed the use of a novel persistence mechanism abusing the Zsh configuration file zshenv.
The classical infection chain observed is ZIP > LNK & PDF... The archive contains... a LNK file masquerading as a TXT file... Launching the LNK file results in downloading a Javascript file...
Stealth
10 techniques
Stealth
The downloaded file is an obfuscated Javascript: 5ca7c871dfe24b27b5cf7e9bf087f44c7620d78a1d4fa76373f22abedbdf8f82 The obfuscation method is straightforward and consists in encoding some characters in UTF-8 and Hex.
The LaunchAgent is named com.apple.systemupdate and executes the file located at /Users/<user>/Library/Metadata/System Update.
If there is no antivirus, the DLL perform code injection on the provided explorer.exe process.
The fake PDF reader uses a hardcoded 100-bytes XOR key to decrypt the new content of the document and the C2 server configuration... This script decodes its base64 block, writes it in a file 'tyrbz.js' and runs it.
It ad-hoc code-signs dropped payloads ( codesign --force --deep --sign - ) to bypass Gatekeeper.
Launching the LNK file results in downloading a Javascript file from Bluenoroff-controlled C2 server and executing it using mshta.exe.
If one of this antivirus is found, the DLL call the OpenProcess API to run the following command: rundll32.exe %s\DevExpress.Xpr.v19.2.dll,Update
variant A for gathering environmental information and checking for execution in a virtual machine via querying the SPHardwareDataType value of system_profiler .
The Stage 1 variant described by Elastic differs in that it writes the second stage as a hidden file to /Users/Shared/.pd .
Recent findings from Mandiant heist investigations have identified social engineering of developers via fake job recruiting with coding tests as a common initial infection vector.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The malware proceeds by granting execution permissions to the uploaded file using the chmod API.
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
This backdoor collects information about the compromised machine (name, active processes, network configuration, etc.) and sends this information to the C2 using POST requests.
The malware proceeds to gather comprehensive system information, including: List of active processes ... Status of all running processes within the system.
The malware proceeds to gather comprehensive system information, including: Computer name ... Current timestamp ... Installation timestamp ... System boot time.
variant A for gathering environmental information and checking for execution in a virtual machine via querying the SPHardwareDataType value of system_profiler .
This DLL checks for some antivirus on the infected machine: Bitdefender, Kaspersky, Sophos, AvastSvc, Norton, Avira, AVG and WindowsDefender.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
These infection chains notably include LNK, MSI, OneNote and VHD files.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The DoPost function is used to make the HTTP Post request to the C2 using libcurl.
The malware establishes its initial connection to the C2 server by transmitting the gathered data via a POST request.
This AppleScript is responsible for initiating the download of the Stage 2 binary from the C2 using cURL.
Observables
177 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.