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APT38 is a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)-linked, financially motivated threat cluster associated with the Lazarus ecosystem and historically assessed to operate under the 110th Research Institute of the General Reconnaissance and Information Bureau. Also tracked as BlueNoroff, Sapphire Sleet, Stardust Chollima, and UNC1069, it has specialized in large-scale financial theft, including compromises of banking environments and abuse of the SWIFT payment network. The 2016 Bangladesh Bank operation, attributed by U.S. authorities and multiple security firms to DPRK-linked Lazarus/APT38 activity, involved stolen payment credentials, extensive reconnaissance of SWIFT-connected systems and payment workflows, manipulation of transaction records, and disruption of confirmation printing to conceal fraudulent transfers. APT38-linked operations have also targeted cryptocurrency and financial-services organizations. Recent analytical models assess the former APT38 cluster as having diverged into CryptoCore, focused on cryptocurrency theft, and Jade Sleet, focused on financial operations. DPRK cyber operations associated with this ecosystem support regime revenue generation and sanctions evasion.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
63 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
70 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
65 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
Kaspersky Lab confirms that sap.misapor[.]ch was compromised as well, and was spreading exploits for Adobe Flash Player and Microsoft Silverlight. Some of the known vulnerability CVEs observed in attacks originate from that website: 2. CVE-2015-8651
Some of the known vulnerability CVEs observed in attacks originate from that website: 4. CVE-2016-0034
Kaspersky Lab confirms that sap.misapor[.]ch was compromised as well, and was spreading exploits for Adobe Flash Player and Microsoft Silverlight. Some of the known vulnerability CVEs observed in attacks originate from that website: 3. CVE-2016-1019
Some of the known vulnerability CVEs observed in attacks originate from that website: 1. CVE-2016-4117
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
1,062 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Bluesky post links to “SEAL weekly stats: Sept. 15-22, 2026” and includes the hashtag #UNC1069.
Assessed as likely operating near Sinuiju, North Korea; mentioned only as context for the article's discussion of DPRK operational return channels.
Cluster présenté comme l’ancêtre organisationnel de CryptoCore et Jade Sleet.
A Lazarus subgroup explicitly described as focused on financial theft.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.