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Malware1 associated actor

PoetRAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 17 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK48Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanning
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

PoetRAT is a remote access trojan targeting Windows systems that has been used in targeted attacks involving energy-sector industrial control systems and SCADA environments. It is distributed through malicious Microsoft Word documents, including spearphishing attachments, and uses Visual Basic scripts for malicious execution.

PoetRAT supports screenshot capture, running-process enumeration, collection of usernames and computer names, ZIP compression, and data exfiltration over its command-and-control channel. Its operations have used Nmap for remote-system discovery, a compiled implementation of pypykatz for credential theft, and a Python utility for harvesting browser credentials. An accompanying .NET utility has also been used to exfiltrate information through an email account. PoetRAT establishes persistence through Windows Registry modifications and can alter Registry settings to change its execution behavior. Its defense-evasion techniques include decoding obfuscated scripts with LZMA and Base64 libraries and checking disk capacity to identify analysis environments, treating disks smaller than 62 GB as indicative of a sandbox.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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stibnite

STIBNITE sent victims spear-phishing emails about such events as a first lure and attempt at installing a new version of PoetRAT written in .NET.

via dragos bloghub.dragos.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

48 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

STIBNITE leverages spearphishing to drop a custom malware known as PoetRAT.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence8

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) was distributed via malicious Word documents.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Execution

9 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

OT operators should look for PoetRAT activity in IT and OT environments through execution of Python and Lua.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has called cmd through a Word document macro.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence6

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used Word documents with VBScripts to execute malicious activities.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)

T1059.006PythonEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) was executed with a Python script and worked in conjunction with additional Python-based post-exploitation tools.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1059.009Cloud APIEvidence1

PoetRAT has executed a Lua script through a Lua interpreter for Windows.

T1059.011LuaEvidence4

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has executed a Lua script through a Lua interpreter for Windows.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails... has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer... has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence9

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used spearphishing attachments to infect victims.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) was delivered with documents using DDE to execute malicious code.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence10

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has made registry modifications to alter its behavior upon execution.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has added a registry key in the <RUN> hive for persistence.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has added a registry key in the <RUN> hive for persistence.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence7

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used a custom encryption scheme for communication between scripts.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has `pyminifier` to obfuscate scripts.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

Many examples describe post-intrusion cleanup, anti-forensics, and removal of artifacts such as logs, scripts, malware components, scheduled tasks, registry keys, and temporary files.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence8

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has the ability to overwrite scripts and delete itself if a sandbox environment is detected.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence9

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used LZMA and base64 libraries to decode obfuscated scripts.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) checked the size of the hard drive to determine if it was being run in a sandbox environment. In the event of sandbox detection, it would delete itself by overwriting the malware scripts with the contents of "License.txt" and exiting.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence5

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has the ability to hide and unhide files.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence10

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has made registry modifications to alter its behavior upon execution.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Multiple actors and tools are described as using Mimikatz/Windows Credential Editor/LaZagne/ProcDump to “dump credentials,” often by targeting LSASS memory (e.g., “used Mimikatz to capture and use legitimate credentials,” “dumped the LSASS process memory using the MiniDump function,” “injecting itself into lsass.exe”).

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) used voStro.exe, a compiled pypykatz (Python version of [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)), to steal credentials.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used a Python tool named klog.exe for keylogging.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence6

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used a Python tool named Browdec.exe to steal browser credentials.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Discovery

7 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence4

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) used Nmap for remote system discovery.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence8

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) sent username, computer name, and the previously generated UUID in reply to a "who" command from C2.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Ember Bear has used tools such as Nmap and MASSCAN for remote service discovery.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence7

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has the ability to list all running processes.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence13

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has the ability to gather information about the compromised host.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence9

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has the ability to list files upon receiving the <code>ls</code> command from C2.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) checked the size of the hard drive to determine if it was being run in a sandbox environment. In the event of sandbox detection, it would delete itself by overwriting the malware scripts with the contents of "License.txt" and exiting.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Collection

7 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Confucius has used a file stealer to steal documents and images... Patchwork developed a file stealer to search C:\ and collect files with certain extensions... Winter Vivern delivered a PowerShell script capable of recursively scanning victim machines looking for various file types before exfiltrating identified files via HTTP.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used a Python tool named klog.exe for keylogging.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence7

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has the ability to take screen captures.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)(Citation: Dragos Threat Report 2020)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence4

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) used file system monitoring to track modification and enable automatic exfiltration.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1125Video CaptureEvidence4

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used a Python tool named Bewmac to record the webcam on compromised hosts.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Multiple actors and tools are described as using 7-Zip/WinRAR/zip/tar/gzip/makecab/PowerShell Compress-Archive to compress (often password-protect/encrypt) collected data prior to exfiltration (e.g., “used 7zip to archive extracted data in preparation for exfiltration”, “created password-protected RAR archives prior to exfiltration”, “used built-in PowerShell capabilities (Compress-Archive cmdlet) to compress collected data”).

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has the ability to compress files with zip.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

STIBNITE is known to use Dynamic Domain Name System (DDNS) and common ports for C2 traffic.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence7

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used HTTP and HTTPs for C2 communications.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)

T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence4

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used FTP for C2 communications.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

The FTP section names “PoetRAT” and references “https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/”.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) used TLS to encrypt communications over port 143(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) used TLS to encrypt command and control (C2) communications.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence7

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence5

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used a .NET tool named dog.exe to exiltrate information over an e-mail account.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

T1048.001Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

Thrip has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data from a targeted organization over FTP.

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence3

[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has used [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) for exfiltration.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping48Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.